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VOL. XXXVII FEBRUARY, 1943 NO. 1

THE RÔLE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

WILLIAM ANDERSON
University of Minnesota

Custom has decreed that the president of this Association, as almost his final act before leaving his briefly-held office, shall deliver an address to those of his colleagues who are hardy enough to assemble to hear him. In this address he endeavors to give something of his best thought concerning some political question. Thereby he generally contrives, also, to convey to his fellow-members something of a feeling of corporate unity and a sense of professional direction.

As my thoughts have turned recently toward the consideration of political science as a whole, as a unified discipline, and as a factor in the government of man, I thought I would discuss with you the question of the rôle of political science in the conduct and preservation of what we now call democratic government.

Standing before you a year ago, President Frederic Austin Ogg spoke thoughtfully and with eloquence of American democracy after the war. He directed his remarks in part to the gloomy predictions of various speculative writers who prophesy the end in our age of democracy and constitutional government. With masterly competence, he showed that the modern trend toward strong executive leadership is not at all the same as a drift into dictatorship. In the United States this trend primarily means that the executive office is being developed to fulfil its true function in a democracy that intends to become stronger, more active, and more efficient. The democracy of the United States is persistently, and

* A revised form of a presidential address prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association scheduled to be held at Chicago, December 28–30, 1942, but abandoned because of war-time congestion of transportation.

at times rapidly, leaving behind it the swaddling clothes and leading strings of its early *laissez-faire* policy. Today it deals vigorously with important social and economic issues. It endeavors to round out the concept of democracy so as to include the social and economic as well as the political phases, and to extend the bill of rights by underwriting the claims of common men to remunerative employment, a share in the management of industry, social security, and new protections for health and home. This democracy of ours may even be learning, if it has not already learned, that no nation can live unto itself. If there is to be a free world of free nations, American democracy must have a positive program of international action, and be prepared to shoulder its part of the responsibility for world-wide order and decency. For all these new purposes, the people of the United States need, and are now developing, a type of popular leadership that is forthright, vigorous, and still, by deliberate preference, democratic.

In short, President Ogg's address was both robust and optimistic. It was the answer of a careful scholar to the fearsome imaginings of a limited number of publicists who are more vocal than learned, and who on every occasion predict the downfall of American democracy. In preparing and delivering it, President Ogg was performing one of the most important functions of the political scientist, the cool, objective analysis of political trends and ideas. Let us have more such addresses in the future!

As I read his address some weeks afterwards, it occurred to me that this was not only President Ogg speaking to us. His own contribution was truly substantial, yet behind him must be the works and the thoughts of many, many others. Speaking through him were not only his contemporaries here and abroad, not alone his immediate predecessors and teachers, but a whole line of students of politics back at least to Aristotle and Plato. The literature of American politics alone is already rich and extensive, yet behind it and around it lies an even vaster store of political writing and analysis, the fruit of many centuries and many lands.

Thinking of the awe-inspiring lapse of ages since Plato, one of the first political scientists, wrote down his pregnant thoughts, and of the great literature concerned with human government that has been produced since he taught Aristotle and other young men in his Academy, I felt again a great thankfulness for the inventions of

writing and of printing, which preserve and help to disseminate the ideas of great men. For today in any good library we can refresh ourselves with the living thoughts of the outstanding political thinkers of all recorded time. Alongside the literature of religion and philosophy, of drama, story, and poetry, stands the literature of human aspirations in government and politics, one of the most priceless possessions in the hands of men. There is about it a certain timeless quality, since all its writers, in their different lands and times, have really been discussing the same questions. There is about it, too, an uplifting quality, since they have taken us up to high places to survey the whole scene of human efforts to achieve justice, equity, efficient government, and humane public policies.

Scanning again some parts of this great literature, embodying its ageless debate on the best government for man, I could imagine myself at one end of the long corridor of time, listening in on the discussion of wise men. At the far end of the hall Plato was saying that justice is the purpose of state action, but that justice can be achieved only if every man is assigned to do the work for which he is best fitted. Voices nearer to me said that this sounded very much like the efficiency doctrines of modern students of public administration. But when Plato went on to say that men are by nature divided into several distinct classes and that fables and propaganda should be used to keep them in their places so that only philosophers would rule, I heard protests from many rooms along the hall. Many voices insisted that men are by nature equal, or so nearly equal that the differences are less important than the points of equality, and that all should have some part in rulership.

Aristotle then took up the argument, saying he largely agreed with the critics of Plato. But we must approach the question scientifically and systematically. There are, he said, three forms of government, and each has its good and its bad sub-varieties. First comes the government of one man, next the government of the few, and finally the government of the many. Not so, said James Bryce, far toward my end of the corridor. There is but one form of government, the government of the few.

So the debate continued, moving now in this direction, now in that, but always adding something to our knowledge, opening new vistas to thought, developing ever farther the interrelations of men and institutions, and approaching a fuller understanding of prob-

lems of human government. Some of the voices were bland, urbane, and philosophical, like those of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison. Others were tense and fiery, like those of Rousseau, Paine, and Marx. Machiavelli and Hamilton seemed hard and cynical, yet coldly logical. De Tocqueville was sadly pessimistic. Some, like Thomas Aquinas and Calvin, were motivated by high religious and moral purpose, while others took the scientific approach and said: "First let us look at the facts and see how they fit together." The discussion was at a high level throughout, for no grander secular theme is possible than that of human government, and no greater thinkers than these have ever lived.

Naturally I could hear and understand better the voices that spoke near the end of the hall where I stood. Not far away were Jefferson, Lieber, and Burgess, spanning a whole century, and still nearer Frank Goodnow, William Dunning, James Bryce, and Woodrow Wilson—not to mention any of the masters who still dwell among us. Their speech was practical, searching, and timely, yet it had about it a quality that no ravages of time could wholly obliterate. They digressed now and then into other paths, but mainly they dealt with the question of understanding and strengthening the American system of democratic government. In so doing, they showed how their own studies in political parties, public opinion, pressure groups, local government, public administration, legislation, and foreign policy could open new and fruitful avenues of study to those who would follow them.

As I listened and heard developed one phase after another of the whole problem of human government, I began to feel a new pride in American political science. In the whole sweep of time since Plato, our Association, which is not yet forty years old, has occupied but one-sixtieth of the time. If the centuries that have passed since Plato wrote can be compared to an hour, then fifty-nine minutes of it had already elapsed before our Association came upon the scene. And if we take the whole of the estimated period of human life upon the earth, some two million years or more, then we in this Association have had for our work but a single minute in a period of at least five or six weeks.

Despite the brevity of their effort as measured by time, the American people have made most outstanding contributions to the

practice of good government, and American students of government have made unrivaled additions to the knowledge of political science. To read over the names of the leading members of this Association during the past thirty-eight years is to read the names of many internationally recognized masters in their fields. To list their major works is to present a bibliography of some of the best contributions of all times.

What have been the factors that have made possible this rich flowering of political studies in the United States? First we may mention the existence of conditions in which neither church nor state has been dominant over all aspects of social life. We of the present generation have been the fortunate inheritors of an unusual measure of social and economic liberty. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, and press have all been ours. Closely associated with these have been the benefits of a developing system of popular government that has held forth unrivaled opportunities for the political participation, training, and experience of every citizen, and for the observations of the scholar. In counting up our blessings, neither should we forget the wealth of natural resources that made possible an ever-rising standard of living, and the widespread support of education up through the universities. To all these conditions let us add the generally hopeful outlook on life of the American people, their tolerance, their belief in progress, and their willingness to make and to permit numerous political and social innovations and inventions. Some of these would hardly have been possible in countries that were older, poorer, and more bound by tradition and the rigidities of a fixed class structure. No country in the world has been more favorable to the rise of the social sciences, and of political science in particular. In no country is there such a large number of teachers in colleges and universities devoting their time to these disciplines. Even so, and granting all these relative advantages, the very substantial achievements of American political science did not come without a great deal of imagination, courage, and hard work.

In short, we are the beneficiaries not only of a great political science tradition and literature from Plato to the present, not only of a set of conditions that have made possible the flowering of our subject here as in no other land, but also of the devoted and capable labors of hundreds of American statesmen and scholars who for at

least two hundred years have been adding significant works to the increasing and improving literature of political science. Let us think of ourselves, therefore, as united with all the ages. We are the stewards of a noble estate, the trustees of a great tradition.

Thirty-eight years ago our American predecessors in the study of political science accepted the trusteeship for advancing the study of political science in the United States. Though few in number, they struck out boldly and formed their own scientific and professional Association. How wise was their decision is recorded not only in the increased roll of members, but also in the great achievements of the Association and of many of its individual members. The stewardship that they accepted now rests squarely upon us. What was, then, the nature of the rôle that they visualized for political science in the United States? And what is that rôle today?

In what follows I have tried to make explicit what I believe is implicit in the actions and decisions of our founders and in the discussions and changes that have taken place in American political science since their time. If I have in any way misinterpreted the rôle of political science in American democracy, I trust that more learned and wiser men will find ways of correcting what I say.

The first and most comprehensive obligation of political scientists *as scientists* is to do what they can to understand, describe, and explain those forms and principles of government that provide the maximum freedom for the human spirit, and *as citizens* to do all that they are capable of to ensure and preserve those principles. In our day, this means defending to the utmost the essentials of responsible popular government and the constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom of religion, speech, and press. The United States and the other democracies among the Allied Nations are today the sole hope of human freedom, religion, and science. Darkness has already descended upon central Europe. The light of true learning has flickered out there except in a few weak and threatened neutral nations, where it burns with candle-light dimness. Such a thing as untrammeled, objective search for truth in any branch of knowledge has been destroyed in all the Axis nations and in the lands that they have conquered. The preservation of human freedom is the greatest immediate goal for the united democracies, and the continuing obligation of all men of good will. Political scien-

tists find today that their obligations as scientists and as citizens are so nearly in accord as to be practically indistinguishable. As best they can, they must show how popular governments should be organized and operated to ensure victory in the present battle for freedom, and to guarantee that the fruits of victory shall not be lost in the years to come.

In a sense, this merely states a broad goal for all political science activities. At the same time, it is not the only goal of our activities. Very few will be satisfied merely to preserve existing human rights and forms of government. They wish to see improvements made, to see rights extended and freedom enlarged, not only here but throughout the world. Democratic government has not yet reached the peak of its efficiency, or gone as far as it can in promoting human well-being.

These necessary changes and improvements in government may well be conceded, but is it not still true that the real goal is human welfare? Is not man himself the measure of the success of any government? If improvement is made, is it not measurable only in the morality, health, education, freedom, initiative, and general sturdiness and viability of the people? As I read the record, political science is not primarily interested in making the state powerful or efficient, or in extending the scope of government activity. These things may be necessary or desirable instrumentally, as means for perfecting men, but not as ends in themselves. It is the good life for men that is the true goal, and that implies the building up in man himself of character, intelligence, and a sense of public responsibility.

Toward the attainment of this broad goal, what are the specific responsibilities of political scientists? It is the burden of my argument that we have certain special obligations, an integrated cluster of duties, that we cannot shift to others. Economists, historians, and sociologists—lawyers, judges, legislators, public administrators, journalists, and politicians—all have their own important work to do in relation to government; but it is not the same as ours, although it impinges upon us. Our own specific functions may be grouped under four heads:

In the first place, most of us are directly, and all of us are indirectly, teachers. Like Plato and Aristotle and many others of our distinguished forerunners, down through Woodrow Wilson and

into our own time, we are responsible for *teaching* our fellow citizens the principles and the methods of free and popular government. As no other group, we have the golden opportunity to teach and train men and women for the service of the state. In helping as largely as we do to teach citizens the principles and processes of government, we are helping to mold the government itself as it is to be ten or twenty years hence. As we face our classes, we should never fail to remind ourselves that any one of these students may be a future governor of the state, another a senator or representative in Congress, that one or more may become judges, and that others will participate directly in public administration.

Of our responsibility as teachers there are at least two distinct phases. By many persons we are looked upon as teachers of citizenship and community responsibility in a very general way. Somehow it is thought that the instruction of college undergraduates, and even of high school students, in government or political science is identical with instruction in citizenship. What we teach should be, indeed, the heart of the subject if we perform our task properly, but the distinction between the two things should be most clearly indicated, and our rôle be correctly understood. Every citizen needs considerable knowledge of the government of his own country and of government in general. That knowledge we political scientists endeavor to impart. This is, indeed, one of our special functions.

But instruction in the responsibilities of citizenship generally is a much broader thing. It involves many, if not all, aspects of life. It is taught incidentally in courses in philosophy, ethics, history, economics, sociology, literature, and many others. It is a joint responsibility of the home, the school, the church, the community, and of many disciplines in higher education. It cannot be borne by political scientists alone, nor simply at the college level.

The problem of citizenship-training in our time is quite unlike that which Plato and Aristotle confronted. In their small city states, where only a small part of the people had citizenship, the numbers who needed to be taught the obligations of citizenship were relatively few, and the education given was at the same time training for the public service. Aristotle defined the citizen as one who takes part in the deliberative and judicial administration of his state. Moreover, he and Plato taught only small groups of men, kept them a long time in their schools, and tried to cover with them the entire curriculum. They were trying to educate men in all

arts and sciences in order to produce philosophers who could be kings. We in our departments of political science are responsible for only a small part of the curriculum, and we have most of our students for but a short time. We must not fail to remind our colleagues in other departments, therefore, that, while they have no duty to teach the principles of government as such, they share with us the responsibility of teaching the ethics of citizenship, objectivity in judgment, and social responsibility in general.

The other aspect of our teaching problem is that of further educating and training the relatively small number of more advanced students in methods of research and teaching, in the several branches of politics and public administration, and in the foreign service, to any one of which they may be admitted. At this point our teaching needs to be far more technical and detailed. There are many ways in which the work of government can be made more effective and economical, and many ways in which public administration in practice falls short of the ideal. It is difficult for the teacher who knows these things not to grow impatient and to impart some of his impatience to his students. The clumsy ways and low standards that so often prevail in democratic administration are always an easy target for cynical comment. It is not surprising, therefore, that some few graduates of training programs in public administration would like to brush away all democratic controls and get on to the streamlining of government. Here is a potential danger against which the teacher of public administration needs to be ever alert. Speed, efficiency, streamlining are not the only tests of good administration in a democracy. Transcending them all in importance is the preservation of popular government itself. That is the first principle for the student of public administration to learn.

A second major obligation of the political scientist is that of *direct service to the government*. Specific studies into problems of everyday government, including politics, administration, and intergovernmental relations, and a habit of taking broad and responsible views in public affairs, make the political scientist peculiarly valuable in certain advisory and technical consultant capacities in government. Several writers have expressed great pessimism and disappointment because politicians, legislators, and administrators make so little use of political scientists as advisers, while utilizing economists and other specialists extensively. It has been my own

observation that the fault, if any, lies as much on our side as on the other, but that on the whole the situation is rapidly improving. Political scientists are, in fact, being consulted more and more. City, state, and national governments are all tapping this source of advice and information, and are constantly coming back for more. Indeed the science of politics is already suffering because so many of our able colleagues are so much engaged in doing public work. We have unquestionably an obligation to give whatever we can of our knowledge and counsel when called upon by responsible public officials, and the direct contacts thus made with practical public questions are very important for every political scientist. But it is unfortunate that the talents of first-rate scholars in politics often come to be taken up with routine and unimportant work. With all our rising numbers, there are not too many of us engaged in the essential research and thinking that are needed to push forward the boundaries of knowledge in political science. It is often questionable, too, whether any particular scholar in our discipline would not be serving his nation and his science far better by holding a more detached position, one close to, but outside of, the government. This is a question that every individual needs to ponder and to answer for himself.

Those who do leave their teaching for public positions can still render invaluable aid to our science. They can be of great assistance to students and teachers by opening doors and clearing the ways for the latter when they wish to make their first-hand studies of government. Then, too, they can often, with a little effort, see to it that their own agencies establish intelligent practices of record-keeping and publication for the benefit of scholars now and in the future. And finally it is to be hoped that some of them will take the time and expend the energy needed to write down for later publication their own inside observations on government in action. There are in the United States all too few first-rate political and administrative autobiographies.

In our direct services to the government and the community, as well as in our capacity as scientists, we have, in the third place, opportunities for *political invention*, and for the installation and observation of such inventions. To put it in another way, there are many times when we can conduct genuine experiments in politics and administration. I refer in this connection to such recent innovations as municipal home rule, city manager government, modern

budgeting, central purchasing, improved methods of training and recruitment for the public service, public planning, administrative reorganization, legislative and judicial councils, the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and new forms of international administration. How much political scientists have had to do with inventing, developing, propagating, observing, and reporting upon such new devices it would be hard to say, but certainly it has been a great deal. More than any other learned profession, we have been participants in the making of many of these experiments. Political science is not simply a propaganda for any of these promising innovations. When political scientists help to introduce any one of them into their own nation or locality, it is not only because they think the change will do some good and advance the cause of better government. That is certainly an important motivation, but in addition every true scientist among us looks upon the innovation as an experiment that must be watched and reported upon to the ends that still further improvements may be made, knowledge may be extended, and the cause of better government may be advanced.

This reference to political invention and experimentation brings us directly to our fourth group of functions, our inescapable *obligations as scientists*. It is as scientists that we approach our full stature. It is as an organization of scientists that our Association will stand or fall. Our specific functions in this regard cannot be too often repeated.

First I would name the observation, analysis, and criticism of the *organizations and institutions* that carry on, or that affect in some important way, the government of the people. What are these institutions? How do they work? Do they promote or retard man's struggle toward such goals as justice and freedom? This work of observation and analysis must center itself in, but cannot limit itself to, those institutions that are strictly governmental. Great private aggregations like pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, the public press, and churches, have immeasurable influence on the functioning of government. The study must be a continuous one, because we can never be sure but that, at the very time when things seem to be going most smoothly, disturbing but undetected changes are not taking place. Few though we be, we must serve as sentinels to give warning and true description of the political and governmental changes that are taking place. Mon-

tesquieu might have done much better by all people if he had accurately described the British government in his time.

Closely related to these things are the analysis and criticism of the broad *policies* of governments, parties, and men in public life. We are engaged in studying something that is alive and in action. It is a government of parties and men as well as of laws and institutions. The general policies of public men and political parties may well be dangerous to the institutions and the final goals of the community. They must not go unexamined. This does not imply that the political scientist as such should step down into the political arena to make attacks upon public men, or that he is to concern himself with all the smaller acts of governments. His true rôle is to be impersonal and objective, to consider the broader phases of public policy, to discuss issues as issues, and to be the teacher of leaders and public officials as well as of citizens.

Then, too, there are the political *ideas* that are put forth from time to time—good ideas, bad ideas, nostrums, panaceas. Some are the products of the careful thought and study of intelligent men of good will. Others are the well-camouflaged designs of sinister, self-seeking interests. Many are just the dizzy speculations of irresponsible and inexperienced dreamers. All must be examined, tested, ventilated, and exposed for what they are. If we did nothing more than this, our work would not be in vain.

But while we are examining the political ideas and policies of others we must not fail to examine closely our own. We have a number of basic assumptions that affect our thinking and our scientific methods. We assume the dignity and the infinite value of each individual human being. We act on the belief that man is essentially a rational animal, with capacity for education and perfectibility. We assume that popular or democratic government will in the long run bring the race of men closest to the desired goal of justice and freedom. I have made these assumptions myself and would defend them, because I believe they have been thoroughly tested.

Nevertheless, even these assumptions need to be questioned, and still more so do certain others. What right have we, for example, to assume that a highly active, powerful national government will in the long run be amenable to popular control? Where is the experience and what are the reasons upon which this assumption is based? Further, can we safely postulate that a government that

provides the greatest personal security will also be one that guarantees maximum liberty? Again, how do we know that a governmental policy of raising the standard of living ever higher and higher is really in the long-run interest of man? How do we know that it will not undermine the vigor and fertility of the race and even produce race suicide? What price high standards of living if the very nations that enjoy them do not even desire to perpetuate their own kind, while those in poorer circumstances grow apace?

Out of all our questionings, studies, and analyses, the public and the scientific world in general not unreasonably expect that we will steadily develop and perfect a body of knowledge and generalizations that may be called the principles of political science, and that will actually serve the statesman and the citizen. Intelligent men will not expect from us a body of precepts having the accuracy of those in physics or chemistry; for, as Aristotle has said, "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subjects admits." Nevertheless we shall have no acceptable excuse or defense if we fail to make the most of our materials and opportunities.

As I survey the works of recent American writers in our field, it has surprised me that so few have written books that attempt to state systematically the principles of political science. Although many other disciplines have evidenced the same tendency, this charge cannot be made as forcefully against economists, sociologists, or natural scientists within their respective fields. But if there is an excess of books on the principles of economics or of chemistry, there is a great dearth of them in political science. Are we suffering from undue modesty, is our subject too vast to be summarized in one treatise, or are we permitting our preoccupation with particular subjects to prevent us from at least attempting to recapitulate the main principles of politics? The question is an important one because our fellow-citizens have a right to expect us to perform this essential task. And if we do not do this work scientifically, there are many others who are willing to, and who do, undertake it unscientifically.

With respect to the scope of the subject to be surveyed in such a book of principles, James Bryce and Henry Jones Ford, discussing this question in the early years of this Association, both concluded that a very wide view of the subject is essential. Bryce urged that men deal with questions in government broadly, in their relations

to other things. He in effect argued that the total situation should be appraised, and that the answers to questions should be pursued in any and every direction where pertinent and significant data could be found. If asked what limit to set to an investigation, he would reply, "No limit."

Some of us American political scientists need, I might suggest, a more comprehensive view of our subject. A purely American political science is just as impossible as a distinctly American science of chemistry. Political authority exists everywhere that men are found throughout the world. It has existed at least since the beginnings of recorded time. Anthropologists have found forms of law and government among the most primitive peoples, and biologists have described systems of social organization among animals and insects. The latter may not add much to our knowledge of human government, but they suggest interesting possibilities concerning origins.

But that is not all. There is evidence, too, that we have construed too narrowly the term "political." One of my colleagues has shown in a very thoughtful article how few American political scientists have dealt in significant ways with the economic factors and forces in politics. Despite the development of ever-closer relations between the state and the economic order, and the steady rise of a new political economy, we in general continue to neglect this area except, for example, in descriptive books on government regulation of business and in a few books on pressure groups. This subject, along with such crucial questions as fiscal policy, public budgeting, monetary and banking policy in relation to the state, and the rôle of labor and agriculture in politics, are conspicuous only by their almost complete absence from such books as we have on the elements of political science. Other subjects of transcendent importance that have been largely neglected in recent treatises on politics are the rôle of war and conquest and the place of the military establishment in modern government. To venture into the study of these fields requires both imagination and courage, yet what are these but the very hallmarks of the fertile scientific mind?

Here, too, it is not amiss to reëmphasize another aspect of our responsibility. It is that of trying to see things whole, or to see the thing we are studying in its significant relations to all other things. Other sciences may appropriately be more analytical and abstract, each dealing with a phase or a part of nature. It is the function of

political science to integrate, to synthesize, and to show things in proper balance. It considers the good of man as a whole. Adverting again to Aristotle, this seems to be what he had in mind when he spoke of politics as "the most authoritative art and that which is truly the master art." It is politics, he pointed out, "that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn, and up to what point they should learn them." Thus the goal of political science includes the specific ends of the other sciences. That is to say, since we are peculiarly responsible for studying government and politics, and since government affects the whole of human life, we cannot neglect any important relationship in human society.

Bryce had much the same thing in his thoughts when he said he would set no limit to any political study. Various psychologists have stressed the necessity of seeing total situations, and Mary Parker Follett has pleaded for "undepartmentalized thinking," and for "emphasis on the whole as a unit of study."

The importance of the particular thing one studies is not, then, what determines the importance of the study itself. One may study the work of a single wardheeler, of a small field office in administration, or of a single committee of a legislative body, and yet so study the thing as to see all its relations or, if you will, its universal aspects, and make a significant contribution. It is not the point at which one starts but the circumference of the circle at which one ends, and what one has done over the whole area within the circle, that determine the value of any study.

The need to see government and society as a whole, and to take an integrating and synthesizing view of things presents many difficulties. We often appear to the world about us as vague generalists rather than useful specialists. This is the more strikingly true because our subject is one that truly belongs to all men. There is about it nothing of mystery, such as the technical knowledge of the research chemist, or the elaborate special terminology of several of our sister social sciences. We are under the necessity of dealing with common things and in a language that all men can understand. We must meet and understand men on the basis of their common needs and ordinary characteristics, and still be scientific.

This apparent weakness has also its elements of strength. By staying close to the common man in our study and thinking, by retaining something of the common touch, by trying to see life

whole from a human point of view, we in fact acquire a kinship with men, and an ability to see more deeply into human character and motivation. The insight and understanding thus gained into the common needs and nature of mankind should give us indispensable aid toward the understanding of democratic government and the elements of the general welfare. This, in turn, should make us better scholars and teachers in our field, better advisers for political leaders and administrators.

But I can hear the voices of a few doubters earnestly objecting. We are so few, they say, when compared with the tens of thousands in such professions as law and medicine. How can we exert substantial influence? Besides, they say, we are hardly known. Even our colleagues in the universities fail to understand our function and our field of work. To these I would say: Be of good cheer! Remember the Biblical references to the tiny but potent mustard seed, and to the small amount of leaven that leavens the whole lump. Or if a more modern and scientific analogy be more acceptable, note how small and obscure are some of the glands that determine the life and growth and functioning of the whole human body. It is neither size nor visibility nor the public's full understanding of us that determines our importance. It is rather the function that we are performing and its significance to the body politic that we serve.

That function is truly possible only in free and democratic societies, and at the same time it is indispensable to them. To do the things that we must do, we need freedom of thought and speech, public support, and security of position. Dictators dare not permit the untrammeled and objective study of the institutions and policies of government, but democracies cannot live without it. In every land it is the holders of irresponsible power, the possessors of vested interests, and those who fear a genuine government of the people, who are the first to attempt to suppress the free discussion of political questions. Liberal constitutional democracies that know their true interests protect and promote the unrestricted study of political institutions and methods, because their own welfare and progress depend upon it.

And so I say: Be of good cheer, but be also of great courage. The prospects of higher learning in general and of the social sciences in particular in the post-war world are none too bright. There will be periods and phases of reaction when we shall not escape some

measure of adverse criticism. This will be evidence of the fact that there are great maladjustments to be corrected, and that the work that lies before us will be more arduous, more searching of all our abilities than anything we have done in the past. Men in all nations will need the research, the inventions, and the integrated thinking of political scientists as never before in our history. And one thing is certain, that if we perform our functions to the utmost of our capacities, the nations that have defeated a titanic combination of enemies in order to preserve free and responsible popular government will in due time give even greater recognition to the indispensable functions that we perform.

Let us, then, in the hard years that lie ahead, outmaster the masters of our science who have gone before. Let us make our science both more searchingly scientific and more practical than ever. Let us prove to the American people and to the world that the scientific study of politics and administration is indispensable to the good government of democracy.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN WAR-TIME: THE FIRST YEAR

I. THE WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

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The chief lesson of the war to date for constitutional interpretation is that the Constitution is an easily dispensable factor of our war effort—perhaps one might say an "expendable" factor. That the Constitution is not needed as a source of national power for war purposes has been stated by the Court itself. Speaking in 1936 for himself and brethren in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, Justice Sutherland said: "The investment of the Federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and *wage war* [my italics], to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have been vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality" (299 U.S. 304, 318).

From this it follows that silence of the Constitution is not a denial but an affirmance of power in the national government to adopt any measures that seem best calculated to bring a foreign war to a successful conclusion. Even so, it may be contended that the Constitution is still of some importance in distributing the power which the above doctrine attributes to "the Federal government" as a whole. The suggestion is certainly a tenable one logically, but is hardly borne out by certain recent developments, of which the President's Labor Day address to Congress is an outstanding instance. Demanding on that occasion that Congress should repeal a provision of the Emergency Price Control Act of February 2, 1942, which prohibited ceilings on food products until farm prices had gone, on the average, sixteen per cent beyond "parity prices," Mr. Roosevelt said:

> "I ask the Congress to take this action by the first of October. Inaction on your part by that date will leave me with an inescapable responsibility to the people of this country to see to it that the war effort is no longer imperiled by threat of economic chaos.
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> "In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act.
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> "At the same time that farm prices are stabilized, wages can and will be stabilized also. This I will do.
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> "The President has the power, under the Constitution and under Congressional acts, to take measures necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with the winning of the war.

"I have given the most thoughtful consideration to meeting this issue without further reference to the Congress. I have determined, however, on this vital matter to consult with the Congress. . . .

"The American people can be sure that I will use my powers with a full sense of my responsibility to the Constitution and to my country. The American people can also be sure that I shall not hesitate to use every power vested in me to accomplish the defeat of our enemies in any part of the world where our own safety demands such defeat.

"When the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—to whom they belong."

I interpret these words as saying to Congress, in effect, "unless you repeal a certain statutory provision forthwith, I shall nevertheless treat it as repealed." On what grounds does Mr. Roosevelt rest his case for power in these premises? He makes a vague gesture toward "Congressional acts," and it is true that he and certain of his advisers have from time to time achieved some rather striking results in the name of statutory "interpretation"—the $25,000 limit on salaries, which purports to be based on the Anti-Inflation Act of October 2, being a notable example. Nevertheless, I opine, Mr. Roosevelt's principal reliance is on his "powers under . . the Constitution." Now it is a fact that Presidents have before this on a few occasions announced that they did not consider themselves to be constitutionally obligated by something which Congress had enacted but which, they asserted, trenched on Presidential prerogatives. But the position advanced by Mr. Roosevelt in the above quoted passage goes beyond this, for therein he claims the right and power to disregard a statutory provision which he does not deny, and indeed could not possibly deny, that Congress had full constitutional authority to enact, and which, therefore, he was under obligation by the Constitution to "take care" should be "faithfully executed." And yet to anyone who followed with care the controversy over the "Fifty Destroyer" deal, the course projected by the President in his Labor Day address can hardly appear surprising, inasmuch as he thrust aside on that occasion legislation which was undeniably enacted by Congress in the exercise of its constitutional powers.

Currently, moreover, the President has not hesitated either to add to or subtract from statutory provisions the enactment of which lay within the national legislative province beyond any possibility of challenge. One instance is afforded by his now famous order to Montgomery Ward and Co. to accord C.I.O. a maintenance of membership contract; and another is furnished by Section 5 of his recent order on manpower, which declares that "no employer shall retain in his employ any worker whose services are more urgently needed in any establishment, plant, facility, occupation, or area designated as more essential by the chairman" of the War Manpower Commission. So far as I can discover, there is nothing in either of the War Powers Acts, the Selective Service Act, or any other act,

that remotely supports such a decree. And the vast proliferation of "defense agencies" embracing some forty "administrations," "agencies," "boards," "offices," "commissions," "committees," "authorities"—what have you?—have almost all (OPA is one exception) been summoned into existence by the magic wand of the President without reference to statutory authorization.

The President's main reliance, in fact, is upon his powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy"—or at times as "Commander-in-Chief in time of war." To the latter term it has been pertinently objected that the Constitution knows no such office. But whichever term is employed, the intention is generally the same, namely, to claim for the President the constitutional power and duty to take any steps which he may deem helpful in prosecuting the war, any act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, in the final sentence of his Labor Day address, the President seems to invoke for his measures an even higher sanction than the Constitution. He there says: "When the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—to whom they belong." This seems to suggest that the President derives his war powers *directly* from the people, and not *via* the Constitution, a doctrine closely akin to the Leadership principle which our armed forces are combating today in the four quarters of the globe. The sentence was unfortunate.

So much for what may be called the *civil* aspect of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief as that power is interpreted by Mr. Roosevelt. Let us now turn to its *martial* aspect. In this connection, two Presidential acts are of outstanding importance to date: the order of February 19 last, directed primarily to the danger of Japanese sabotage on the West Coast, and the order of July 2 creating a military commission for the trial of the eight saboteurs. The essential paragraphs of the former document read as follows:

> "Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities. . . .
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> "Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the military commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his discretion.
>
> "The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other ac-

commodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said military commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. . . .

"I hereby further authorize and direct all executive departments, independent establishments and other Federal agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said military commanders in carrying out this Executive order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities and services."

In pursuance of this order, about 100,000 Japanese residents of Western states, the great majority of them native-born citizens of the United States, were in due course removed from their farms and homes and put in concentration camps, where many of them still are. In the entire history of the country, no comparable interference with the private security and private rights of citizens has been witnessed. How is it to be justified in terms of constitutional law?

By the tests imposed by the decisive opinion in the Milligan Case, the President's order was totally unconstitutional, and even by the Chief Justice's concurring opinion for himself and three associates, it would have had to be authorized by Congress. Since the Milligan Case, however, a new kind of martial law has been identified by the Court—"preventive" as against "punitive"—and in the leading case of Moyer v. Peabody a situation roughly analogous to that which confronted the President was solved on the basis of this distinction. The facts, briefly, were these: Moyer, a labor leader, brought suit against Peabody, a former governor of Colorado, for ordering his imprisonment in the course of a strike which occurred during Peabody's incumbency. Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes conceded that the state courts were open at the time; also, "as it must be, that the governor's declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive on the Courts;" and, finally, "that the governor, *without sufficient reason but in good faith* [my italics], in the course of putting the insurrection down, held the plaintiff until he thought he could safely release him." In the face of these admissions, the Court held that Moyer had no action. Conforming, therefore, the President's order of February 19 to the pattern furnished by the Moyer Case, that order may be regarded as representing the President's judgment that the war situation on the West Coast threatened imminent violence that would be disastrous to our war effort. And the good faith of such a judgment being conceded, as it undoubtedly must be, the question of its reasonableness becomes, on the basis of the Moyer precedent, irrelevant. In short, the order of February 19 represents a qualified and limited declaration of martial law.

The material facts in the case of the saboteurs are given sufficiently in the appended note.[1] The trial instituted under the President's order of

[1] Only seven saboteurs were parties to the case, Dasch being the exception. All

July 2 began on July 8. While it was still going on, but after all the evidence was in, counsel for seven of the saboteurs petitioned both the Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for leave to bring *habeas corpus* proceedings. Early in his opinion for the unanimous Court—Justice Murphy being absent—the Chief Justice makes it plain that the Court is not going to attempt to draw any line between the powers of Congress and those of the President in the premises of the case. "We are concerned only," he says, "with the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the national government to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are charged." In arriving at an affirmative answer to this question, the opinion rebuts three principal contentions of the petitioners, the first of which was that "violation of the laws of war" —the first offense charged against the petitioners, and apparently the one which the Court regarded as best supported by the evidence—was not an offense known to the laws of the United States. The Chief Justice admits that Congress has never attempted to codify violations of the laws of war, but holds that the reference in the 15th Article of War to "offenses that . . . by the laws of war are triable by a military commission" is sufficient to meet the objection, particularly when it is read in connection with the Rules of Land Warfare promulgated by the War Department and with the Hague Convention of 1907 (ratified by the Senate in 1909) by which is recognized a class of "unlawful belligerents" not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, among them being combatants not wearing fixed emblems. In short, petitioners' conduct fell within well-established legal categories which are addressed particularly to military tribunals.

Secondly, however, the petitioners urged that they were entitled by

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except Haupt, an American citizen, were citizens of the Third Reich and hence enemy aliens. All of them following the outbreak of war between Germany and this country, being then in Germany, took a course of training in sabotage in a school near Berlin, their tutor being a member of the German High Command. Thereafter three of them, together with Dasch, boarded a German submarine at a French port and proceeded to Long Island; while the remaining four found their way in like fashion to the Florida coast. The courses pursued by the two groups on their arrival in this country were substantially identical. Coming ashore during hours of darkness on June 13 and June 17, respectively, they divested themselves of the German uniforms or parts of uniforms which they had been wearing and buried them, along with a quantity of explosives, fuses, and timing devices, in the sand. One party then went to New York City, the other to Jacksonville, Florida, all members being in civilian dress. In the course of the ensuing fortnight, all were picked up, either in New York or Chicago, by the FBI; and on July 2 the President appointed a military commission to try them for offenses against the laws of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War, which trial began on July 8.

I ought to add that I prepared this article before I was aware of Professor Cushman's excellent review of the same case in the December issue of this REVIEW.

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a civil trial, inasmuch as theirs was not a case "arising in the land or naval forces." The premise of this argument the Chief Justice concedes in effect. "We may assume, without deciding," he says, "that a trial prosecuted before a military commission created by military authority is not one 'arising in the land . . . forces,' when the accused is not a member of or associated with these forces." But that concession, he immediately proceeded to add, did not affect petitioners' position, since "no exception is necessary to exclude from the operation of these provisions [of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments] cases never deemed to be within their terms;" and petitioners' cases were of that kind. Nor was Haupt, although a citizen of the United States, in any different situation in this respect from the other petitioners, for all alike were enemy belligerents who by entering the country with hostile intent and in civilian garb had violated the usages of war. Nor did Milligan's Case aid Haupt's cause, inasmuch as Milligan was found by the Court to be a non-belligerent, "not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy."

Lastly, the petitioners pointed out that the Presidential order under which the trial was conducted departed sharply in certain respects from the requirements of the Articles of War. Thus whereas the 43rd Article of War provides that "no person shall, by general court martial [no mention here of military commission] be convicted of an offense for which the death penalty is made mandatory by law, nor sentenced to death, except by the concurrence of all the members of said court martial present at the time the vote is taken," the President's order expressly declared that the concurrence of only two-thirds of the members of the Commission should be necessary for conviction or sentence; and other material departures by the order from Articles 38, 46, 50½, and 70 were noted by counsel. Dealing with this argument, the Chief Justice says:

"We need not inquire whether Congress may restrict the power of the Commander-in-Chief to deal with enemy belligerents. For the Court is unanimous in its conclusion that the Articles in question could not at any stage of the proceedings afford any basis for issuing the writ. But a majority of the full Court are not agreed on the appropriate grounds for decision. Some members of the Court are of opinion that Congress did not intend the Articles of War to govern a Presidential military commission convened for the determination of questions relating to admitted enemy invaders and that the context of the Articles makes clear that they should not be construed to apply in that class of cases. Others are of the view that—even though this trial is subject to whatever provisions of the Articles of War Congress has in terms made applicable to "commissions"—the particular Articles in question, rightly construed, do not foreclose the procedure prescribed by the President or that shown to have been employed by the Commission, in a trial of offenses against the law of war and the 81st and 82nd Articles of War, by a military commission appointed by the President."

The main question which arises on the opinion as a whole is that of its

necessity. In other words, was not the Court here performing a work of supererogation? The Chief Justice himself appears to have some such thought in mind when, in close proximity to the passage just quoted, he remarks: "Petitioners do not argue and we do not consider the question whether the President is compelled by the Articles of War to afford unlawful enemy belligerents a trial before subjecting them to disciplinary measures." And petitioners' reticence in this regard was, it seems to me, the better part of valor, although I do not think it should have precluded the Court from speaking on the point. These saboteurs were invaders, their penetration of the boundary of the country, projected from units of a hostile fleet, was essentially a military operation, their capture, followed by their surrender to the military arm of the government, was but a continuation of that operation. Punishment of the saboteurs was therefore within the President's power as Commander-in-Chief in the most elementary, the purely martial, sense of that power. Moreover, six of the petitioners were enemy aliens, and so, strictly speaking, without constitutional status. As to Haupt, the American citizen, the better course would possibly have been to try him in the civil courts as a traitor. It is certainly curious to compare the apparent hesitation of the President on this occasion to assert his indubitable authority as Commander-in-Chief with his lack of hesitation to appropriate the powers of Congress in his putative rôle of "Commander-in-Chief in war-time."

Also, in view of a certain recent development, a glance should be paid the theory, so often voiced by writers (including the present one) that in its control of the purse-strings Congress possesses its most effective check on Presidential power. At best, the promise of this rule is seriously impaired by war, inasmuch as legislative prying into Presidential budgets at such a time always involves the danger of revealing military secrets. But when the President lays before Congress a budget which calls for appropriations amounting in the total to the national income, Congress's difficulties are multiplied indefinitely; and that is the situation which confronts Congress at this moment.

* * *

In an address which he gave early in World War I, the Honorable Charles Evans Hughes said: "While we are at war we are not in revolution. We are making war as a Nation organized under the Constitution, from which the established national authorities derive all their powers either in war or in peace. The Constitution is as effective today (i.e., in the midst of war) as it ever was and the oath to support it is just as binding. . . . "

I doubt if as circumspect a gentleman as Mr. Hughes would venture such a statement on the basis of the events of this war to date. The crucial matter is, of course, the question of the right of the President to invade the field of Congress and to set aside Congressional legislation on

his own finding that our war effort will be aided by his doing so. That this question should have been raised is, however, by no means the fault of the President alone—Congress, too, is to blame. Moreover, until recently it is the President rather than Congress that has enjoyed the support of dominant public opinion in this matter, a warning which Congress needs to take to heart. Unless Congress can, by improving its organization and reforming some of its procedures, render itself a more consistently useful public agency, it seems likely to be gradually reduced to the level of a badly tarnished pageant, and little more. And in this connection it should not escape attention that the operative Constitution of World War I has become since then, under the New Deal, the everyday Constitution of the country. There is always a tendency, even in democracies, for the emergency device to become the normal.

II. NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

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The Purpose: Perspective on the Larger Aspects. The present purpose is not to examine in detail the first year of war administration, but to place some of the larger aspects of the record in such perspective as is possible at close range.[1] Accordingly, four topics will be considered: (1) the theoretic requirements of total-war management; (2) some qualifying factors that must be taken into account in applying these theoretic requirements to appraisal of the actual administrative record; (3) observations pertinent to such appraisal; and (4) conclusion.

Managerial Requirements of Total War. Public administration is never so difficult or so crucial as in time of total war. It then becomes the appropriate function of Congress to vote the vast lump-sum appropriations, and to make the broad delegations of power that the President needs, and for the rest, to prod the Commander-in-Chief and his civil and military aides by constructive criticism and suggestion, and to act as a sounding board for public opinion back home, so as to enable executive leadership to deal intelligently with that opinion. Indeed, the latter functions must be exercised with courageous discretion, if fatal errors are not to be forced upon administrators by selfish pressure-groups or uninformed lay opinion. The necessary result is that total-war administration deals at once with the determination of high policy and with the operation of a gigantic routine, and that for both the Commander-in-Chief is primarily responsible. By the same token, the results reflect, with even more serious con-

[1] The closeness is in time. The writer brings to his task, not the intimate observations of active participation, but the point of view of an outsider.

sequences than normally, the managerial capacity or ineptness of the occupant of the White House.

Total war calls for a streamlined administrative organization and procedure in which the President retains final authority at the same time that he delegates power in few and straight, not in many and zig-zag, lines. While complex interrelations will necessarily make it impossible to avoid the overlapping of authority as between different units, provision should be made for the maximum threshing out of conflicts below the White House level. If consensus is achieved by the President's principal subordinates, their responsibility to him and his responsibility to the nation require that major decisions receive his sanction, and that he be kept currently informed of progress by reports which will enable him intelligently to accede to the way things are going, or else to intervene in his discretion. If consensus cannot be reached below, then his responsibility requires that appeal be allowed to him. Such appeal, however, should be taken only on crucial choices of policy, which should be carefully presented as such, with fair digests of the data and the competing arguments upon which intelligent choice can be based, and so routed as not to strain, more than is necessary, the President's span of control. Such issues should be presented to him for final choice or for his authoritative directive of temporary postponement, before the stage of frayed tempers and public bickering is reached among his subordinates. He should make it clear at the outset that if he has to settle minor disputes, or if public confusion and lack of confidence are caused by unseemly strife, he will get new aides. Finally, time is of the essence, and a speed of attainment which would be deemed satisfactory in ordinary times may in total war be fatally slow.

Some Qualifying Factors. Important, however, as these theoretic requirements of total-war management are in themselves, to consider them alone is erroneously to assume that management is the whole of administration, and to take administration out of its political and social context. Before one can gain a reasonable perspective on the record, therefore, one must recall certain qualifying factors which explain the difficulty of attaining this theoretic ideal, and the reasons why even its attainment on paper would still leave grave but inherent handicaps. Three such factors will now be mentioned.

In the first place, formal application of the blue-print of total-war management would facilitate, but would not automatically produce, coördination. How to coördinate in fact, and not merely on paper, depends upon precise knowledge of what is to be coördinated. This knowledge is made enormously difficult by the complex intermeshing of every aspect with every other aspect of total-war effort. There are hundreds, nay thousands, of minor, even routine, choices which must be made at lower levels, but

can be made intelligently only in the light of a consistently coördinated over-all policy; but it is just as true that the making of this over-all policy becomes mere blind guessing unless it is grounded upon accurate knowledge of what can be done in detail, and of how long each operation will take. Nor can this process stop at examination of our own needs and plans considered alone; for these must be dovetailed into the still larger whole of the needs and plans of the United Nations. On the global scale on which it is now being undertaken, total-war administration is thus a truly stupendous task. A thousand relatively detailed decisions and actions, at every subordinate level down the hierarchy, must at once form the basis of, and be geared into, high policy; and this two-way process goes forward under the stress of the realization that time is so desperately precious that action cannot long wait for judgment to mature.

To be sure, this situation furnishes the very reason why the creation of a few straight lines of responsibility is urgently needed. It makes it equally clear, however, that, while the lack of such a streamlined organization might produce breakdown and failure, its provision would be no panacea. Whether it is a *sine qua non* of success, only the event can prove.

In the second place, in considering whether the President should have moved more swiftly toward administrative integration, it must be remembered that he is a democratic leader and not a dictator. If the student of public administration can anticipate needs for administrative consolidations, for a shortened span of control, and for enlarged powers of administrative compulsion,[2] before such needs become acute, it does not follow that the democratic leader will or can act upon such anticipations as soon as they are thought up. This is not the way democratic government is accustomed to operate. Its method is empirical; a new agency is created in response to some immediate, pragmatically felt need; and a consolidation is effected only when this hastily improvised machinery has been creaking for some time. Needs that affect powerful groups are not met until they become so acute that even these groups must recognize their practical necessity. In every major move, a President must be able to carry along with him organized groups and administrative advisers, civil and military, whose interests will be affected, or else he may risk more than he can hope to gain. It is certainly no condemnation of democracy that it is not geared at the outset of total war to the authoritarian methods it must willingly accept[3] before it is too late.

In the third place, allowance must be made for an elementary truth

[2] If legislation is needed to enlarge administrative powers of compulsion in such matters as war savings and manpower, it is the responsibility of the President to ask for it.

[3] Thus willingly accepted, such methods are not really authoritarian in the fascist sense.

which Miss Dorothy Thompson, in one of her moments of brilliant insight, recently recalled to the readers of her column: "Our administration cannot be anything except a reflection of our whole civilization." Our war administration is Americans planning and doing things. They bring to the task the attitudes engendered by our American *mores*, and behave in accordance with the worst as well as the best in those *mores*. "Our civilization," says Miss Thompson, "has been a 'business' civilization. Its basis has been ruthless competition for power, prestige, and success. . . . The means of attaining power, prestige, and success in private life has been to build up the personal sphere, by smartness, shrewdness, salesmanship, and the creation of pressure blocks and alliances for the same purposes. . . . Translated into government, this means the fight of one branch of the armed services against the other, the fight of one agency against the other, inside every agency the fight of one department against the other, each resorting to pressures and alliances to try to widen its powers, and each trying to sell itself by salesmanship methods." This is a severe indictment; but at bottom, as Miss Thompson points out, it is an indictment of war-time Washington[4] only as it is a reflection of ourselves. The stream cannot rise above its source; and the President must use American and not angelic personnel.

In Appraisal of the Record: Some Observations. Neither a history[5] nor a final appraisal of the administrative record can now be ventured; but some facts and observations[6] pertinent to such appraisal must be set down.

To begin with Pearl Harbor would be to misrepresent the record by an artificial division. For most of the present war administration had its origins in the earlier "defense" period, which goes back as far as May, 1940.

This primary fact leads at once to two important conclusions. For our having made a start more than eighteen months before December 7, 1941, nobody else deserves nearly so much credit as Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On the other hand, the fact that we had such a start makes it fair to demand that a higher speed be attained in the first year of actual war than could otherwise have been expected.

Before Pearl Harbor, however, the President's moves were colored by

[4] In this respect, war-time Washington is, of course, not unlike peace-time Washington. Cf. Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest.*

[5] High points of the organizational history may be traced through the several issues of the *U. S. Government Manual* and the *Federal Register* for the period. See also L. F. Schmeckebier's periodic articles in this REVIEW, notably that in the June, 1942, issue, and L. Vaughan Howard, "War and the Federal Service," in this REVIEW, Oct., 1942.

[6] The writer is indebted to Ernest K. Lindley and Raymond Clapper, and by chance to a less extent to Walter Lippmann, whose syndicated columns make valuable contributions to such tentative appraisal as is currently possible.

the fact that he had the delicate task of leading a divided country, and was himself under less pressure than later to subordinate political and personal to administrative considerations. The result, as will now be shown, was a sprawling structure, the integration of which has not been attained at the end of a year of combat.

For the purpose of making the desired start, an act of 1916 furnished a ready-made statutory basis. Under this act, the Council of National Defense[7] was, in May, 1940, revived, and an Advisory Commission[8] to the Council was appointed under Section 2. At the same time, the Office for Emergency Management (OEM) was set up[9] as a division of the Executive Office of the President; and its head[10] was made Secretary of the Council and of its Advisory Commission, and charged with maintaining liaison between these agencies and the President.

In the presidential campaign of 1940, candidate Willkie criticized the failure to appoint a single head of the production program; but while a Priorities Board[11] was created in October, 1940, no further efforts at coördination were made before January through March of 1941. The funds of the Advisory Commission were then reallocated to OEM, and most, but not all, of the new agencies were "established in or coördinated through"[12] this staff arm of the President. An Office of Production Management (OPM) was also established under William S. Knudsen as Director General, and Sidney Hillman as Associate Director General, and with principal divisions concerned with Labor, Production, Purchases, and Priorities.

The first year of actual war has seen greater concentration of authority in several fields. Noteworthy is the creation of the War Production Board (WPB) under the control of Mr. Nelson (January); the War Shipping Administration under Rear Admiral Land (February); the National Housing Agency, involving a grand combination (February); the War

[7] Consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

[8] This consisted of seven Commissioners in charge, respectively, of Industrial Production, Industrial Materials, Employment, Farm Products, Transportation, Price Stabilization, and Consumer Protection.

[9] The OEM had been anticipated by Executive Order No. 8248 (September 8, 1939). This order was an outgrowth of transfers made by the Reorganization Plans under the Reorganization Act of 1939. After setting up five principal divisions of the Executive Office of the President, the Order added simply: "(6) in the event of a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency, such office for emergency management as the President shall determine."

[10] Its first head was Mr. William H. McReynolds, one of the Administrative Assistants to the President.

[11] Under the chairmanship of Mr. Knudsen, and with Donald M. Nelson as Administrator.

[12] *U. S. Government Manual* (Mar., 1941), 69–70.

Manpower Commission (April), with power in Chairman McNutt to issue directives to other agencies, including the Selective Service System; the Office of War Information (OWI) (June)[13]; and the Office of Economic Stabilization (October).[14] There is already talk of a single food administrator.

During this whole period, numerous other agencies[15] were created, one at a time; while of course the regular departments and agencies became directly and indirectly involved in "defense" and war activities. Coördination with Canadian efforts was implemented in the earlier period;[16] and since the war began, similar means of coördination *vis-à-vis* Great Britain have been established.[17]

From the standpoint of the managerial requirements of total war, this record leaves much to be desired. As an *ex officio* body, the Council of National Defense could not provide substantial coördination, much less unified control under the President. The OEM provided coördination on paper, but at best such a staff agency is no adequate substitute for unified direction. In the Advisory Commission, industrial production was at first divided even from industrial materials. OPM marked an advance, but its dualism of headship was an administrative anomaly. Only after Pearl Harbor was WPB established. Nor did the first year of war witness a unification of war mobilization as a whole.

In the early days of the defense effort, the enmity between Secretary of War Woodring and Under-Secretary Johnson was allowed by the President to become a public scandal. Likewise, it was months after Pearl Harbor, and only after Elmer Davis had taken charge of OWI, that the President finally issued a general directive against that airing in public of administrative differences which was notoriously producing lack of certainty and of confidence.

The division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy has its roots deep in the past, as have the obstructions to coördination among the United Nations. There is, however, a Joint United States Chiefs of Staff,

[13] Formed from the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), part of the staff of the Coördinator of Information (COI), the Office of Government Reports of the Executive Office of the President, and the Division of Information of OEM.

[14] See Executive Order No. 9250 (Oct. 3, 1942).

[15] These are too many to enumerate; nor would a mere enumeration be helpful.

[16] Permanent Joint Board on Defense (August, 1940); Materials Coördinating Committee (May, 1941); Joint Economic Committees (June, 1941); Joint Defense (later War) Production Committee (November, 1941).

[17] Combined Raw Materials Board, Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, and Munitions Assignments Board (January, 1942); Combined Chiefs of Staff (February 1942), with Coördinator of Information (COI) becoming Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Joint United States Chiefs of Staff (June, 1942); Combined Food Board, and Combined Production and Resources Board (June, 1942).

which represents the United States on the Combined Chiefs of Staff—United States and Great Britain; and Admiral Leahy has been made Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy, with consequent membership in both bodies. The worst effects of division of authority, as between the Army and Navy, have come at lower levels and in the field. Hence the country was relieved to learn that General Eisenhower is in supreme command of the Anglo-American North African invasion. A "unified command" for the whole global war seems absurd; and how far a "unified strategy"[18] among all the United Nations, the seeming lack of which has caused friction and raised grave political questions, could have been more effectively implemented, is rendered debatable by recent revelations.

Be that as it may, on the home front, at least, the President's managerial record has not been above criticism, and has at times been inexcusable. He has seemed reluctant to delegate power except in many and zig-zag lines. By thus supposedly keeping the reins in his own hands, he has ignored the inherent limits of his span of control. This may partly explain his failure to deal with timely vigor with conflicts between his subordinates.[19] It is more important that the general manager be in a position to act with dispatch upon major issues of policy than that he attempt to keep in close touch with everything that goes on. In this attempt he is bound to fall behind schedule; and the only excuses are the individual temperament and mentality of the man and his terrible responsibility. This method has certainly caused him to lag behind reasonable expectations in moving toward the integration of war administration.[20]

Mr. Roosevelt's enemies, however, have always paid him the unconscious compliment of damning him for not being perfect. It is needful, therefore, to emphasize the qualifying factors which have been mentioned. The multiplicity of agencies which has evolved, each in response to some felt need, is proof enough of the complexity of the administrative task, and of the fact that coöordination would under any organization be inherently difficult. That in creating these agencies the President followed

[18] The distinction was recently drawn by Mr. Ernest K. Lindley.

[19] Another reason seems to be a personal weakness of Mr. Roosevelt: dislike of personal clashes or show-downs with those who work with him.

[20] Thus a proposal of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, of which Representative John H. Tolan, of California, is chairman, threatens to place the President in the position of following rather than leading in this respect. House Report No. 2589, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 20, 1942). Suffice it to say here that, in proposing the creation of an Office of War Mobilization, the report views the problem in the grand manner of administrative statesmanship. It is said that Senator Truman, another constructive critic, supports the plan.

the method of democratic empiricism, is certainly normal. So also is his apparently having often allowed political or personal considerations[21] to outweigh conflicting managerial considerations. If personal considerations are not justified, they are explained by the fact that the President is human. If political considerations are not always, they are sometimes, justified. To assume that he should never have allowed them to control is to forget that the American President is, and should be, primarily a political leader rather than a blue-print man, and that Mr. Roosevelt's invaluable political genius consists in no small part in his uncanny sense of timing.

Equally pertinent is the reflection in war administration of that competition for power and prestige which Dorothy Thompson attributes to our "business" civilization. Another reflection in Washington of American civilization appears in the charge that business men have brought to their tasks in OPM and WPB ties and loyalties which have colored their decisions. The probability that this is the case seems to follow from Miss Thompson's hypothesis. If the special information of such men is needed in a consultative capacity, it might still be urged that decision belongs to disinterested men with trained minds and broader outlook. It would, however, be hard to convince the American public, steeped as it is in a "business" civilization, that this would be "practical." This is a reminder that "business-civilization" attitudes are not confined to business men in the ordinary sense. One may suppose, for example, that the public employment of able young academic men at great advances in salary has had a demoralizing effect in sharpening personal ambition. This result was to be expected when they were suddenly projected into a highly competitive situation. But had a "business" civilization not already conditioned American academicians in the forms of competition and personal ambition to which their untypical environment gives scope?

The OPA has been faced with typical American reactions in its external no less than in its internal[22] relations. For its price and rationing administration, it has had to improvise techniques of control on a nation-wide

[21] The ability of favored individuals to "sell" ideas to Mr. Roosevelt without due regard to the total picture appears to have been an important source of administrative disorganization and confusion. The limits of space forbid any examination of this factor, as the limits of the topic forbid any examination of the influence of political considerations in shaping the organizational development, or of the extent to which this influence has been justified.

[22] An interesting study would be of the rôle of "commodity specialists" in OPA. But has finality of decision tended to pass to the OPA lawyers, and if so, is this a consequence of judicial supremacy? Were some of the "commodity specialists" retained in OPA after priorities had practically eliminated the problem of prices for civilian use of their special commodities? If so, does this reflect the heading of OPA by men whose concentration on economic problems gives them too little appreciation of administrative management?

scale amongst a people unused to such controls, and with habit-patterns which make them repulsive, and evasion easily rationalized, even in the face of stark necessity.[23] To assume that all the shortcomings which result reflect upon OPA, never upon the American people, is to indulge in smug self-righteousness. To say this results from a "business" civilization is but to say that American individualism and self-reliance, precious as they are in their finer aspects, are at their worst a form of hedonistic egoism that stresses personal rights to the neglect of social duties.

The record has its brighter and its darker spots. The high calibre of some of the President's top-ranking administrative appointments deserves mention. The names of James M. Landis, Rear Admiral Land, Joseph B. Eastman, Elmer Davis, and Byron Price speak for themselves. There have been conspicuous examples of continuity of service. Leon Henderson was in charge of the price problem from May, 1940 to January, 1943. General Hershey has been in the Selective Service System since its establishment, as Deputy Director and then Director. Donald M. Nelson has passed through several earlier jobs connected with war production, to attain the headship of WPB. Other names also run through the story.

On the other hand, some of the top men have not fared so well, and several agencies have come in for severe criticism. Mayor LaGuardia left the Office of Civilian Defense with impaired prestige. Messrs. Knudsen and Stettinius were shifted from their original positions. In early fall, Mr. Nelson seemed to be on his way out as head of WPB. He was accused of having delayed too long a shift from a system of priorities to one of allocations as a means of keeping the flow of materials under planned control. He responded with reorganization and with a plan, but one that will take months to put into full operation. As the end of the first year approached, he faced a show-down with the armed services, from which he sought to take back important powers previously delegated. Again, the rubber-and-gasoline problem was weakly handled, until Mr. William M. Jeffers was made Rubber Director in WPB in September, in pursuance of the excellent report of the Rubber Survey (Baruch) Committee.[24] Toward the close of the first year, the manpower problem had not yet been faced in direct fashion; while as Director of Economic Stabilization former Justice Byrnes had still to prove himself.

Conclusion. While this appraisal has taken as its point of departure the failure to effect managerial unification, this failure has been shown to be a natural result of democratic politics, and only one of the reasons for

[23] This emphasizes the administrative importance of public relations. Leon Henderson's bold frankness, if it annoyed Congressmen and farm lobbyists, won him respect among the thinking—and large sections of the consuming—public.

[24] As this is written, it is reported that the disgraceful pressure to force postponement of nation-wide gasoline rationing, due December 1, 1942, has collapsed.

such shortcomings as have become manifest. In the perspective furnished by the other reasons, the outsider who returns from Washington to describe it as an administrative madhouse needs to realize that there could not, in the nature of things, be anything less than a great deal of confusion, competition, and even bickering. One remembers that the same sort of criticism was heard in the war of 1917–18; but one also remembers that when we looked back upon that administrative effort, we were almost surprised to find that, all things considered, the net results were truly remarkable.

This time the threat is, indeed, more portentous, and the haste, accordingly, more desperately urgent; but, though the task is also more monumental, and the conflict between needs and habit-patterns sharper, the accomplishments of the first year seem to be correspondingly greater. Things are certainly getting done in Washington, throughout the country, in the Solomon Islands, in North Africa, and on the highways of the seas. The brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed invasion of North Africa eleven months after Pearl Harbor, and the maintenance at the same time in the South Pacific of a naval force which can throw back a superior Japanese squadron, speak not only for themselves, but also for the administrative plans and achievements, civil as well as military, without which they would not have been possible.

There is still another weight to be placed in the scales of judgment: Mr. Roosevelt's magnificent leadership in war has been worth, in sheer administrative results, far more than an ideal organizational arrangement in the hands of a man of less vision and less effective leadership could have wrought. His failure to provide a unitary war mobilization must be regarded, provided only the net results spell success, as but a defect of his quality.[25]

When, however, the very life of the nation depends upon the rapidity with which we can adapt both administrative action and political practice to the unaccustomed requirements of total war, there are, after all, no certain tests except those of victory or defeat. Whether our adaptation is too little or too late will be determined by the final outcome.[26]

[25] It seems safe to predict that Mr. Roosevelt's name will be inscribed on the short roll of the great when those self-important men of narrow vision whose patriotism does not preclude wanton abuse of their Commander-in-Chief will be remembered only by the worms that feed on decayed organisms. In sharp contrast to wanton abuse stands Wendell Willkie's wholesome criticism.

[26] This appraisal stands as it was originally written. It takes no account of further important concentrations of authority made by the President just before the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor. These related to petroleum (Executive Order No. 9276, of December 2, 1942), manpower (Executive Order No. 9279, of December 5, 1942), and food (Executive Order No. 9280, of December 5, 1942).

III. FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS

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I

Like all other aspects of public administration, intergovernmental relations are undergoing constant readjustment to the times and conditions. War so alters conditions in public affairs that federal-state-local realignments are taking place from month to month. Never before have so many administrative operations at the local level been guided by so many directives out of Washington. Coöperative government by federal-state-local authorities has become a by-word in the prodigious effort to administer civilian defense, rationing, and other war-time programs. The first year of war brought new forces into the field of administration, but developments have followed an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary pattern. Intergovernmental administration, while it is a part of all levels of government, is turning into something quite distinct from them all.

The states have coöperated in passing war-time legislation; in ironing out transportation problems created by diverse state regulations; in controlling aliens and relocating Japanese-Americans; in foregoing construction of new public works; in building public works in war-affected communities where in-migration has resulted from concentrations of war industries and military personnel. New programs affecting the lives of all Americans, such as civilian defense, price control, and rationing, are making demands upon localities and states for intergovernmental action. In the absence of any complete overhauling of the federal-state-local tax systems, the Bureau of the Budget has written a new chapter in the intergovernmental field by giving a set of directives for state and local governments to follow or to ignore at their own risk.

Old techniques of federal assistance and assumption of functions have been brought into play to deal with the special needs of problem areas—the war-boom communities. The Public Health Service, the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, the component units of the Federal Works Agency, have been drawn into the fight to reënforce expanding urban areas around war plants and military and naval reservations. In housing, a new agency has been established, the Federal Public Housing Authority, to provide facilities in regions where lack of housing would impede the war effort.

While the general pattern of intergovernmental action in these new fields is more old than new, the thing that makes the difference is the massiveness of the operations involved. Because of this, federal administrators have been eager, wherever possible, to work through state and local

authorities, to rely upon citizen action at the local level.[1] It is only slightly less true to say that local governments have been eager for state and federal guidance. Through civilian defense, rationing, and related enterprises, more Americans have come in contact with governmental administrators than ever before.

II

Coöperative measures taken by the states in the war effort are numerous and widespread. Even before the war, the states were active in the creation of state defense councils and in stimulating the development of corresponding local organizations. State health and welfare agencies have had the responsibility of assisting local administrations with problems arising from in-migration of workers to war industry centers. State and local educational administrators have had to demonstrate their capacity to absorb children new to specific areas and representative of diverse cultural patterns. State highway departments have coöperated with the War Department and the Public Roads Administration in constructing facilities to serve new war industries. Such a colossus as Henry Ford's Willow Run bomber plant necessitated federal-state-local action in the planning, financing, and building of new express-ways, by-passes, and access roads.

During the "defense" period of 1940–41, and as the war machine gathered momentum, one of the outstanding illustrations of state cooperation was the selective service program. Each governor was charged with the enforcement of selective service in his state. Individual state headquarters coördinated the work of various appeal boards, medical advisory boards, local boards, and other units. Local boards carried on the details of administration, exercising their discretion in classifying registrants and making final decisions except in cases of appeal. In spite of criticisms over lack of an integrated manpower authority at the federal level and variations in the effects of the draft within local districts, the work of individual draft boards expanded rapidly with growth of the army by the millions. Their work represented local administrative efforts to carry out a huge federal program where knowledge of local people and local conditions was indispensable.

In congested areas, particularly in coastal regions, the states have coöperated with the Army in formulating routes and controls for transportation to expedite movement of troops and equipment. States also collaborated in making plans for evacuation of certain groups from densely-populated centers.

The Council of State Governments' committee on national defense

[1] An outstanding exception was the conversion on January 1, 1942, of the state-administered employment offices to a system of national operation so as to assure a maximum mobilization of manpower for war production.

and its drafting committee joined with federal agencies in codifying legislative principles covering such subjects as state emergency war plans, mobilization for fire defense, military traffic control, emergency health and sanitation areas, defense public works and housing, and zoning for defense areas. In setting forth its proposals, the Council had the advice and assistance of the War Department, Office of Civilian Defense, Office of Government Reports, Federal Security Agency, Treasury, and other departments. A special defense unit of the Department of Justice served as the channel of communication between the Council's committee and interested federal agencies.[2] Out of this program has come extensive state defense and war legislation designed to gear state activities with the Federal Government. The states have worked with the Department of Justice in registering aliens and in the control and relocation of enemy aliens.[3]

Another instance of joint action was the quick response of the states to federal requests for elimination of state requirements interfering with interstate trucking of war materials. The rapid-fire action of the states was succinctly told in the telegram of President Roosevelt to the governors on June 1, 1942: "Two weeks ago I appointed a committee consisting of the heads of the war agencies to confer with the executive committee of the Governors' Conference relative to state laws, rules, and regulations that were impeding the war effort, especially in the field of transportation. The executive committee of the Governors' Conference agreed to do everything possible to have all the States adopt uniform standards for motor transport and interstate reciprocal arrangements within a period of ten days. I am informed today by the Executive Director of the Council of State Governments that all the states have agreed to go along with such standards. . . . "[4]

The states acted promptly to establish regulations for the enforcement of a national 35-mile-per-hour speed limit when this proved essential to conserve rubber resources. A small matter, but one indicative of the determination of the states to go all-out in the war effort was the issue of automobile license plates for 1943. The states have relaxed regulations dealing with such plates and have agreed to use in 1943 the existing 1942 plates.

State governments as well as local governments have been in accord with national policies in eliminating construction of public works which would eat into the supply of labor and materials. Of course, the administration of priorities under the War Production Board would have compelled compliance, had it not been forthcoming otherwise. State and local

[2] "Progress Report on State War Legislation," *State Government* (May, 1942), p. 107.

[3] Frank Bane, "The States and the War Effort," *ibid.* (June, 1942), p. 125.

[4] *State Government* (July, 1942), p. 145.

officials have, however, swung into line unhesitatingly in foregoing construction currently, creating a backlog of public works and listing a public works reserve for the future.

Some states have faced peculiar problems, as was the case in the evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast. A number of federal administrative agencies joined to handle the process of evacuation and resettlement. The responsibility for registration and social welfare services was that of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board. This federal bureau delegated the responsibility for program operation and for staffing social service positions to state departments of social welfare and county welfare departments. One author has described the result as "a highly successful, practical demonstration of public welfare agency coöperation at three levels of government."[5] The federal government provided supervision and liaison for social welfare activities in the evacuation. The state provided supervisory personnel in actual operations. The county supplied case workers. Joint undertakings entered into during the depression of the thirties provided a *modus operandi* for situations incident to the war.

Typical of close working relations between federal and state officials was the Governors' Conference at Asheville, North Carolina, during June, 1942. Some thirty-eight governors discussed war problems with federal administrators, including Donald M. Nelson, Leon Henderson, Paul. V. McNutt, James M. Landis, and Joseph B. Eastman.

President Roosevelt summarized in brief compass the rôle of the states when he wrote to Governor Harold E. Stassen, chairman of the Governors' Conference, on June 13, 1942, as follows: "The States have been in the forefront of our war effort: they have perfected the organization of their defense councils to handle all civilian defense activities; they have established and operated a selective service system which has met with universal approval; they have set up machinery covering every community throughout the country for rationing and price control; and in coöperation with the war agencies of the Federal Government, recently they have eliminated many impediments which were hampering the war effort."[6] Through the coöperative action of the states in the first year of war, a working demonstration was afforded of the vitality and adaptability of the American federal system.

III

At the time of Pearl Harbor, the Office of Civilian Defense was operating in an advisory capacity to state and local defense councils, and this continued for some months after the United States declared war. Execu-

[5] George D. Nickel, "Evacuation: American Style, Part II," *Survey Midmonthly* (Oct., 1942), p. 263.

[6] Reprinted in *State Government* (Aug., 1942).

tive Order 8757 (May 20, 1941) had established the OCD in the Office for Emergency Management and directed the OCD to assist state and local governments in the development of state and local defense councils. During its advisory stage, OCD was a planning and stimulating agency preparing the nation for defense against enemy action. Over the thousands of local defense councils it had no real control, except that inspired by leadership and the necessities of the hour. While it could establish minimum standards for the training of air raid wardens, for example, it had no way of imposing such standards upon state and local defense councils. Yet the development of thousands of local defense units during 1941 was a tribute to federal leadership and coöperative action on the part of states and localities. In describing this basic pattern, Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia said at this time: "Let me stress here that the program of civilian protection in the States is the responsibility of the state authority, just as the problems of civilian protection become in turn the responsibility of each locality."[7]

However, in January, 1942, Congress gave the OCD its first teeth. The director of the office was authorized to make regulations and orders relating to the wearing of official insignia. Violations of the director's decisions in this respect were made a federal offense. Another method of control was devised through the long familiar process of appropriating funds with strings attached. Congress appropriated $100,000,000 to OCD for the purchase of equipment such as fire apparatus and gas masks. Formal agreements between the national office and communities are required before the loan of any such equipment. The community must agree to regulations governing its use as determined by the director. If localities fail to follow the agreement, OCD can recall the equipment or decline to allocate further supplies.

On April 29, 1942, James M. Landis, who had succeeded Mayor La Guardia as director of OCD, announced official status for the Citizens Defense Corps. He prescribed standards of eligibility and training for membership in this body. He issued regulations prohibiting any person not a member of this official corps from wearing its insignia or receiving or using protective equipment issued by the OCD. The director reserved to OCD and to local defense councils the right to terminate or suspend membership of any member failing to comply with regulations or orders, failing to perform his duties, improperly appointed, inadequately trained, or lacking in adequate knowledge or ability.[8]

By this order, Director Landis gained a measure of national control over state and local defense councils. He infused a unity of national requirements into a variegated administration of state and local defense

[7] "Civilian Protection in War-time," *State Government* (Jan., 1942), p. 13.
[8] *Federal Register*, Vol. 7, No. 85 (May 1, 1942), p. 3248.

councils which on March 1, 1942, reported 6,066,748 persons voluntarily enrolled in 8,945 local defense councils.[9]

During the first year of war, the danger of enemy action against the continental United States became more remote. Other aspects of OCD besides the protective services then assumed greater importance. In addition to the Citizens Defense Corps, which embraces the protective services, there is the Citizens Service Corps, which is designed to integrate the work of communities in diversified civilian mobilization as required by total war. This corps is intended to keep citizen action focused on rationing, salvage, housing, consumer protection, child care, transportation conservation, sale of war bonds, family security, and whatever else the war demands of the home front. The Civilian Defense Volunteer Office, as an arm of the local defense council, serves as a personnel office, registering volunteers and classifying and training them for appropriate participation before feeding them out into the stream of civilian action. So long as the United States does not have compulsory mobilization, the CDVO will serve to make the best disposition possible of volunteer manpower and womanpower. The year 1942 was also marked by the inauguration of neighborhood war clubs as part of the national OCD program to furnish a broad base of response to the demands of the war effort, and to channel vital information into every home.

While it is true that 1942 brought a change in the powers and scope of OCD in Washington, the spirit of coöperative federal-state-local action remained its central theme. This was stated by Director Landis in addressing the conference of mayors and other municipal officials of the state of New York during the month of June, 1942: "The Local Defense Council . . . is, of course, your war-time agency that must combine not only the protective and non-protective aspects of Civilian Defense, but also be, in itself, a main avenue of approach to the individual for the Office of Price Administration, the War Production Board, the Health and Defense Welfare Services, the Office of Defense Transportation, indeed the whole war effort of the United States when that war effort calls for the voluntary participation of men and women. Moreover, it is more than just these agencies because it must *do* what these agencies have thought and created."[10]

The OCD has emphasized the importance of building into local defense councils the leaders of municipal peace-time administration, including the chief of police, the fire chief, the commissioner of health, the public welfare director, and the superintendent of public works. This is essential

[9] *New York Times*, May 3, 1942.

[10] James M. Landis, "Relation of Local Defense Councils to Municipality, State, and Nation," *American City* (July, 1942), p. 59.

to achieve implementation of civilian defense activities through pre-existing community services.

State legislatures and municipal councils had to add their efforts to civilian defense. Municipal governments, for example, have had to give their attention to ordinances controlling black-outs, official liability to volunteers in protective services, and other practical problems. Cities have had to determine questions as to paid and volunteer workers, and make provision as to operating expenses of local defense councils. The states have had to utilize the broad resources of the police power, particularly in those fields where the municipality had no authority or jurisdiction. State dim-out, black-out, and air-raid precaution laws, for example, were necessary because of the state-wide extent of the action involved.[11]

The development of civilian defense called for administrative decentralization. While protective and supplementary services were vital to all communities, problems were variable according to regional needs. The sea coasts had more need for protective corps; inland war-boom areas experienced more need for social planning. State and local coöperation was forthcoming, due to the emergency. Every man, woman, and child had a stake in civilian defense on the home front. Washington wisely utilized these state and local reservoirs of citizen action. The nature of the emergency made it obvious that a little federal authority would go a long way in producing results at the state and local level.

IV

Further impetus was given to official coöperation with the introduction of price control and rationing. When it became necessary to ration tires, Frank Bane, executive director of the Council of State Governments, undertook to organize state and local rationing authorities. Speaking of the inception of the rationing program, John E. Hamm, deputy director of the Office of Price Administration, paid tribute to "the amazing state and local organization which Frank Bane and his courageous associates built up in an incredibly short time to handle the rationing of rubber tires. These 48 state offices and some 8,000 local rationing boards have taken in their stride one responsibility after another. Few of the participants realized when they undertook to ration tires that they would soon be called upon to handle automobiles, typewriters, sugar, and gasoline."[12]

As the work of OPA broadened out into vast price and rationing controls, more and more responsibility was piled upon the local boards at the

[11] James M. Landis, "Address before New York Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials" (Syracuse, N. Y., June 9, 1942). Mimeo. copy, p. 5.

[12] J. E. Hamm, "Administrative Structure for Rationing," *State Government* (June, 1942), p. 119.

base of the field organization—the local war price and rationing boards. The informal designation for these instrumentalities has been the local "committee of neighbors." The model for these local war price and rationing boards has been in large measure the selective service boards. They consist of home-town citizens, nominated in most cases by local defense councils. They serve without pay, and are in a position to apply national directives to local problems because of intimate knowledge of their communities. "This model," according to OPA, "proved successful for the administration of rationing, and it was felt that the same boards could deal with complaints and retailers' problems in connection with the administration of the General Maximum Price Regulation. Paid clerical assistance is provided by the office out of Federal funds."[13] The OPA war price and rationing boards developed in function and in membership rapidly after January 5, 1942, when the ban on tire sales was lifted and sale under rationing began. As new programs have evolved, additional groups of members, such as fuel-oil and gas rationing panels, have been added to the local boards.

Local boards have had a bifurcation of functions: the ministerial one of collecting and maintaining records and the discretionary one of ruling on local applications in relation to individual need and national policy. OPA has undertaken to supply clerical and stenographic assistance, reserving so far as possible the time of the local boards for discretionary judgments which they alone can exercise. The clerical assistance which OPA could supply has been small in relation to the total efforts required. Civilian defense volunteers and school teachers have had to bear the brunt of processing rationing programs under supervision of board members at the local level. How the local boards tie into the state OPA offices is indicated further: "The local boards report in most cases immediately to the State office, located at the State capitol or metropolis. Where districts have been established within a State, however, the local boards report to the district offices, which are located in principal centers of population." In addition to other activities in the stream of administration, the district offices assist "local boards in handling consumer relations and rationing matters within the area of their district."[14] The state offices are likewise designed to adapt national policies to the requirements of the individual states. General supervision over these state offices is maintained by regional offices.

The impact of rationing on American economic life has called for an outpouring of citizen action at the local level, all of which is coördinated by policies stemming from Washington, D. C. The rationing of sugar in the spring of 1942 found federal officials calling on school districts throughout the United States to register civilians and distribute War Ration Book

[13] OPA, *First Quarterly Report* (Apr. 30, 1942), p. 70.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71.

One. In this program, "All the school superintendents in the country—close to 9,000 of them—were mobilized for the registration program. The next step was to enlist the 1,250,000 public school teachers of America to register the civilian population and distribute War Ration Book One."[15] The exigencies of public administration prompted the coöperative or conjoint administration of a national program through the personnel of local school districts.[16]

As 1942 progressed, it became clear that the exigencies of the war had produced new uses for our 165,000 units of local government. School units which had handled the sugar rationing program in the spring were busy with gas (basic mileage) rationing in November. In connection with such war programs as rationing, local CDVO organizations were strained to the utmost in providing volunteers for the necessary clerical and ministerial functions.

V

With the inflationary tendency becoming more pronounced throughout 1942, federal officials cast about for all possible means of regulation besides price control, such as heavy federal taxes and the wide purchase of war bonds. One means suggested for checking inflation and preparing against a post-war depression was the maintenance of state and local tax rates. Before a conference on emergency fiscal problems in New York City on May 8, 1942, Harold D. Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget, indicated a number of ways by which the states might coöperate in supporting federal policy. Specifically, he suggested that the states: "(1) pay off debts; (2) build up balances by restricting expenditures and maintaining tax rates; (3) sterilize these balances in dormant bank deposits or in Federal Government bonds; (4) prepare to offset possible post-war depression by developing programs and blue-prints for public works and services, and by accumulating means of financing them; (5) remove hindrances to production, convert state-owned facilities to war uses; (6), improve administrative management to conserve manpower and commodities and to minimize impairments of service; (7) join actively in the national economic policy to control the cost of living; (8) distinguish carefully between war-created local needs that warrant federal aid and those that should properly be met out of local resources."[17]

If these directives are sound for the states, they are also pertinent to the

[15] OPA, *Rationing: Why and How* (Washington, 1942), p. 11.

[16] When the fall of 1942 rolled around, the steel mills were running short of scrap. The local defense councils and the schools literally "got in the scrap." Under the leadership of school administrators and teachers, the children did everything from ringing doorbells to collecting the scrap. In this instance, coöperative action implemented a program of the War Production Board.

[17] "Suggestions for Harmonizing State with Federal War-time Fiscal Policies," *State Government* (June, 1942), p. 123; from an address by Harold D. Smith before a Conference on Emergency Fiscal Problems in New York City, May 8, 1942.

165,000 units of local government. Local governmental expenditures in 1941, after allowing for intergovernmental transfers, totalled approximately 7 billion 300 million dollars. Local governments are large-scale employers and major consumers; they purchased in 1941 between three and four billion dollars worth of goods and services.[18] Before the conference of mayors and other municipal officials of the state of New York on June 9, 1942, Director Smith reiterated "that a period of great inflationary danger is not a proper time for reducing state and local tax rates."[19]

Much as the state and local governments may coöperate to the extent of pursuing fiscal policies tending to brake inflation, the issue is by no means a simple one. With automobile production for civilians stopped and gasoline and other commodities rationed, state gas and weight taxes and sales taxes are headed for a decline. Cities have been piecing out their revenues with federal and state grants, while the general property (real estate) tax suffers from the rigidities imposed by tax limitation, on the one hand, and by exemptions on the other. Personnel and material costs have been rising for state and local governments. Existing state and local surpluses result in large measure from temporary increments in tax revenues and drastic cuts in public works. In a real sense, these units of government are living off their existing plants and structures.

Fiscal policies at the state and local level have direct bearing upon the future of our democratic and federal system. What will happen if state and local governments do not build reserves? During the depression of the thirties, municipalities and states turned to Washington. The dependence of state and local governments on the federal Treasury was extensive. Relationships between the levels of government was modified accordingly. Local governments, so far as their revenue systems went, found themselves during the first year of war in need of constructive state action as well as federal directives. Attention has been called to the importance of future state action in reducing mandatory local expenditures; in freeing the real estate tax from limitations and exemptions now impairing its productivity; in improving local procedures in assessing, particularly in rural areas and small incorporated places; and in assuming leadership in the basic problem of over-all reorganization of our 165,000 units of local government.[20] The first year of the war produced little evidence that these significant phases of intergovernmental relationships were nearing the action stage. With federal taxes and debts rising sharply in 1942, the state and local administrators had every reason to anticipate, as the war progressed, a taxpayer's revolt against all non-war expenditures.

[18] Harold D. Smith, "Cities Defenders of Democracy," Amer. Mun. Assoc. Mimeo. Release, June 9, 1942.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] See T. H. Reed, "Federal-State-Local Fiscal Relations," *State Government* (Oct., 1942), pp. 204–205.

VI

Military establishments and industrial plants have caused in-migration of population to many key areas. Federal assistance and assumption of function, a familiar pattern during the depression, has again come into play. The United States Public Health Service is assisting state and local health authorities in maintaining proper sanitation facilities and other measures for the protection of the public health in military, naval, and war-industry areas. A federal appropriation of $8,984,000 was made for emergency health activities during the fiscal year 1943.[21]

Executive Order 8890 (September 3, 1941) created in the Office for Emergency Management the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services, superseding a preëxisting coördinator's office in the same fields. During the first year of the war, the ODHWS served as a center to coördinate health and welfare services available through federal, state, and local agencies, especially in geographical sore spots resulting from the impact of the war. The ODHWS has made available to states and communities health and welfare experts in planning and executing state and local programs. In so far as practicable, ODHWS has used the facilities and services of existing federal agencies, state and local welfare administrators, state and local defense councils, and private social welfare institutions.[22]

The Federal Works Agency has likewise played a part in meeting the needs of special areas. WPA programs were soon shifted to include such projects as airport construction, access-roads, nursery schools for children of working mothers, and vocational training for war workers. The Federal Works Administrator has been authorized to meet war needs through public work projects and loans and grants for the provision of public works by public authorities and non-profit private agencies.[23] Such public works have been designed to provide community facilities in areas rapidly expanded by in-migration. They have been primarily schools, waterworks, sewers, sewage, garbage and refuse disposal systems, public sanitary facilities, hospitals, recreational projects, and street and access roads. The Federal Works Administrator is authorized to relieve local shortages with the approval of the President. Presidential approval is contingent upon the determination that there exists, in a given area, a shortage of public works necessary to health, safety, and welfare of persons engaged in war activities. This decision is also dependent upon local inability to provide the necessary community facilities or inability to provide them without an excessive tax burden or unusual or excessive debt incurrence.

[21] *U. S. Government Manual* (Fall, 1942), p. 385.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.

[23] Under Title II of the Lanham Act (June 28, 1941), as amended January 21, 1942.

By late August, 1942, a total of 1,726 war public works projects of an estimated value of $282,801,739 had been approved by the President.

Within the Federal Works Agency, the Public Roads Administration has shifted to new highway projects of direct and immediate value to the war effort. Access roads to military areas and to war-industry locations account for most of this program. Monies available have included federal-aid funds, $125,000,000 from the Defense Highway Act of 1941, which was supplemented on July 2, 1942, by an additional $160,000,000. Through federal-aid funds, critical weaknesses in main highway systems are being corrected to assist transport of war materials.[24]

The vital necessity of providing housing for in-migrants to areas saturated with new war industries has compelled federal-state-local action. By 1942, some sixteen different federal agencies had been established which either built housing with public funds or sought to encourage private enterprise through extension of government guarantees or credit. This diffusion of administrative authority created a problem not only in federal administration, but for local governments struggling to cope with the housing shortage. During February, 1942, the President acted by executive order to create a National Housing Agency with a single administrator. One of the three principal constituent units of this new agency was the Federal Public Housing Authority—an amalgamation of all federal agencies and personnel engaged in constructing housing with public money. Other principal administrative units were the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration. Some months after its creation, the National Housing Agency was described as a "war-forged instrument of the Federal Government. At this time it has the single objective of providing housing for war workers."[25]

In coöperation with the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and other federal agencies, the office of administrator of the National Housing Agency determines the need for housing for war workers in areas where shortages exist or threaten to impede the war program. The office determines how much of the housing needs can be met by increased use of existing facilities; how much can be supplied by private builders; and how much of residual needs absolutely essential to the war effort must be met by publicly financed housing. The Federal Housing Authority, as a constituent of the NHA, is authorized to provide housing for persons engaged in war activities in areas where the President finds that an acute shortage exists or impends which would impede the war effort and would not be met by private enterprise. The FPHA may use

[24] *U. S. Government Manual* (Fall, 1942), pp. 402, 406.

[25] John B. Blandford, Jr., speaking at the Conference of Governors, Washington, D. C., May 6, 1942.

local housing agencies both in the construction and operation of these federal war-housing projects.[26]

Many new "defense" plants constructed during 1941 were established on the periphery of metropolitan areas or in rural locations. The attendant housing problems could not be solved by state and local governments. Their revenues and credit could not logically be consumed in large-scale housing programs for migratory war workers whose residence in the area might prove to be of war-time duration only. The Federal Government responded with assumption of a function program at first widely dispersed among administrative agencies, but later integrated within the framework of the NHA.

During 1942, Administrator John B. Blandford, Jr., announced that war housing units completed since July 1, 1940, cost approximately $525,000,000 and totalled 141,690 units. This broke down into 116,169 family units, 15,027 dormitory accommodations for single workers, 152 dormitory or war apartments for two-person families, as well as 10,342 trailers. Public housing under contract or construction included 129,088 family units, 21,248 dormitory units, 13,078 dormitory apartments, and 547 trailers. A homes utilization program was designed to find 650,000 accommodations in existing structures. Scarcity of critical materials made it essential to use existing facilities to the fullest extent.[27]

While the federal administrators planned and programmed, shortages of labor and critical materials made it necessary to adopt many stop-gap expedients in the housing field, and many of these required coöperative action by local governmental authorities. Building and plumbing codes had been drafted in the past without any idea of a national emergency and concomitant shortages in materials. The Federal Government led the way with advice and assistance in recommendations like the emergency plumbing standards for defense housing. The National Bureau of Standards also prepared a new model building code for new-dwelling construction. States and localities have been urged to adapt state laws and local ordinances to these new problems, utilizing the models prepared under federal authority.

As shortages became critical in 1942, housing fell back upon older and more familiar methods. Homes registration offices were encouraged for war-boom areas. Under the direction of the Homes Utilization of the NHA, more than 300 homes registration offices were opened in communities with war-industry problems. Rent-a-room campaigns were undertaken. Conversion of old dwellings and vacant stores was advocated. Here again federal plans had to run through local channels. To stimulate

[26] *U. S. Government Manual* (Fall, 1942), pp. 112, 124.
[27] *Victory*, Vol. 3, No. 43 (Oct. 27, 1942), p. 26.

room-renting and conversion, it was necessary to relax local zoning ordinances, for example. The National Housing Agency, through its Division of Urban Studies, commented in October, 1942, on this problem of zoning in relation to homes utilization. Speaking of the process of introducing greater occupancy into existing homes, the Division stated: "As this intensive absorption process goes on, the number of structures in which roomers may be housed, and in which additional families may be accommodated, *within the limitations of the present zoning ordinances and regulations*, approaches the vanishing point."[28] It was indicated that the only answer would lie in revision of zoning ordinances, an operation in which the NHA was dependent on local authorities. While state and local authorities played their respective rôles, the Federal Government was very much alive to the needs of war-affected communities and altered its action programs accordingly.

VII

During the first year of American participation in World War II, federal-state-local intergovernmental relations have been extended upward, downward, and outward. Coöperative administration has been broadened and intensified. The federal government has collaborated with state and local administrators and assumed responsibilities in tackling emergencies in health, welfare, and housing in key areas. State and local officials have assisted in the administration of federal programs and policies requiring their efforts. Volunteers by the millions have pitched into civilian defense and rationing problems. Without coöperative government and citizen action, many of the large-scale, war-winning federal policies could not have been administered on the home front.

For years, some people have cocked a wary eye on centralization of authority in the state capitals and a very wary eye upon Washington. In the first year of the war, a rejuvenation of local initiative was clearly under way. Although much of this effort was geared to national policy and direction, infinite were the variations and adaptations in administration down at the grass roots. Whether the war proves to be of long or short duration, the timber of federal-state-local governmental interrelations during the first year indicates how sweeping new programs can be administered on the home front in the total mobilization for victory. If the people who have now gone behind the scenes to see for themselves how democracy works put comparable efforts into national, state, and local government and administration in peace-time, the fruits of victory will be reaped on the home front as well as on the battlefield.

[28] NHA Division of Urban Studies, *Bulletin No. 6:* "Zoning in Relation to the Homes Utilization Program."

IV. CIVIL LIBERTIES

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Before Pearl Harbor, many thoughtful persons believed that civil liberty in this country could not survive our participation in another world war. Today, civil liberty enjoys a vitality which even the optimist had hardly dared hope for. There are several reasons for this.

First, since the last World War the American people have become "civil liberty conscious." That war found us totally unprepared to deal with our sudden problems affecting civil liberty. Our legislatures had no experience in drafting, or our executive officers in enforcing, emergency restrictions upon free speech and press. Our trial courts faced new and difficult civil liberty questions with no established principles, no relevant Supreme Court decisions, to guide them. Since that time, the Supreme Court, in nearly a score of important decisions, has interpreted and strengthened our constitutional civil liberties. As a nation we are wiser; the costly mistakes of the last war have been thoroughly aired, and there is a healthy intention that they shall not be repeated.

Second, the complete suppression of civil liberty in Axis-controlled countries has been a shocking and impressive object-lesson. We are forced to consider whether the witch-hunter and the "patrioteer" who would arbitrarily suppress minority opinion may not have much in common with the Nazi.

Third, we are fighting this war with a real conviction of its necessity. We were attacked. All argument as to *whether* and *when* we should fight was stopped. Russia is our valued ally, and the Communists vigorously support the war effort. The respectable body of opinion (notably several influential newspapers) which opposed the President's war policies and our voluntary entry into the war cannot, openly at least, oppose the war effort. Yet at the same time, the intrenched position of these dissenters serves to keep alive and in the foreground the right of an opposition to be heard.

Fourth, we have had a centralized federal management of civil liberty problems. The states have wisely refrained from dealing with subversive talk, publications, or conduct. This has permitted the Department of Justice to operate uniformly throughout the country.

Finally, the Administration, through President Roosevelt and Attorney General Biddle, has steadily declared its determination not to repeat the excesses of the government during the last war. The government's record may not be immaculate, but it has followed a positive policy of moderation. Congress had included in the Alien Registration Act of 1940 the most drastic law directed against sedition since the Sedition Act of 1798, and

the Department of Justice might have embarked on a campaign of drastic repression; but this the Attorney General has refused to do. He has kept a firm hand on the entire policy of federal prosecutions under these statutes; he has required federal district attorneys to follow the moderate policy of the Department, and to clear their cases with Washington before proceeding.

What has actually happened during the year in the management of civil liberties? How fully have we protected them, and where have we failed?

Freedom of Speech and Press. During the first year of the war, twenty-three persons were imprisoned for sedition. These included William Dudley Pelley, George W. Christians, and Robert K. Noble. On December 1, 1942, indictments were pending against forty-six others charged with sedition and "other morale-impairing crimes." Some suggest that this indicates a deterioration in the Attorney General's attitude toward free speech and press. Most of us will prefer to reserve judgment on this until these trials occur. There has been no attempt to suppress or to punish even the most bitter criticism of the President and his policies, or the general management of the war effort; whereas during the last war such critics were in many cases severely dealt with. The government attempted to indict the *Chicago Tribune*, perhaps the bitterest newspaper critic of the Administration, on the charge that the *Tribune* had published confidential naval information. Mr. Biddle designated Mr. William D. Mitchell (Rep.), Attorney General under President Hoover, to represent the government. The federal grand jury failed to indict.

During the year, at the request of the Department of Justice, seventy newspapers and publications have been barred from the mails by the Postmaster General under authority conferred by the revived Espionage Act of 1917. In this group were *Social Justice*, the *Galilean*, and the *Philadelphia Herold*. Assuming that the government had grounds for suppressing these publications, which I am not discussing, the procedure followed in these cases is so bad as to constitute a serious threat to civil liberty. The method ordinarily followed is to bar a single issue of the paper from the mails because it is objectionable under the law, and then to withdraw second-class mailing privileges from future issues. This, of course, means total suppression. Under decisions of the Supreme Court dating from the first World War, the discretion of the Postmaster General, in withdrawing second-class mailing privileges, is virtually unlimited and unsupervised. In the *Social Justice* case, the Postmaster General did under pressure set up a panel of postal officials to hear the case, but *Social Justice* did not appear. Freedom of the press remains in danger until adequate judicial review of administrative action in these cases is provided for.

War-time censorship came into existence in December, 1941, by execu-

tive order issued under authority of the revived War Powers Act of 1917. Mr. Byron Price was appointed Director of Censorship. All communications destined to leave the country by mail, cable, or radio are censored by the staff of this office. Censorship of the domestic press and radio was set up by Mr. Price through the medium of a Censorship Code issued in January, 1942, and revised in June. This press and radio censorship is voluntary, since there are no penalties for violations of the Code. The plan has worked effectively. There have been no conspicuous violations, though many feel that the censorship has been needlessly tight. Criticism was directed at the complete suppression of news about the President's tour of the nation's war industries in September until the trip was over, and our foreign censorship, which reaches political opinions as well as fact, is exceedingly tight. In the main, the administration of censorship has met with approval. The government has shown its desire to release as much news as it safely can by the creation in June of the Office of War Information with Mr. Elmer Davis at its head.

Red-baiting Inside the Government. An unfortunate situation has arisen inside the federal government itself from official efforts to "purge" the federal service of those who hold, or ever held, political or economic views regarded in certain quarters as objectionable. Federal officers and employees have been dismissed or denied routine promotion because of alleged or suspected "Communist" leanings, a term loosely construed in these cases to cover almost any views critical of the existing economic order. A competent young federal officer was denied normal promotion for many months because the records of the Dies Committee showed that he had publicly sympathized with the Loyalist cause in Spain, and also had done graduate work in a university department of political science whose chairman early in 1933 signed a petition urging President Roosevelt to recognize the Soviet Republic. Support of Franco's cause in Spain by federal civil servants, or even a friendly attitude toward fascist doctrine generally, seemed to cause no similar concern in the same high places. This policy stems partly from departmental bureaucrats and partly from Congress. In the Appropriation Bill for the Department of Justice for 1942 (Act of June 28, 1941), $100,000 was set aside to investigate federal employees "who are members of subversive organizations or advocate the overthrow of the federal government." This difficult assignment was turned over by Attorney General Biddle to a four-man Interdepartmental Committee to which Edwin D. Dickinson, special assistant to the Attorney General, was attached as executive secretary. In October, 1941, Representative Dies sent to the Attorney General a list of 1,121 federal employees said to be affiliated with subversive organizations. More than 3,000 other complaints of a similar character had been lodged with the F.B.I. The F.B.I. sifted these charges and made its findings. The

Interdepartmental Committee reported on September 2, 1942, that dismissal or disciplinary action was shown to be necessary in the case of two of Mr. Dies' 1,121, and in less than forty of the 3,000 other cases. In sending to Congress the report of the Interdepartmental Committee, Attorney General Biddle endorsed the Committee's recommendation that when charges of subversive views or affiliations are made against federal employees there should be "fair and adequate procedures for the disposition of cases, including an opportunity to be heard, . . . and that a permanent board be established to provide advisory review upon request of either the employing department or agency or the employee." No action along this line has been taken.

Conscientious Objectors. The Selective Service Act of 1940 exempts from combatant training and service anyone who, "by reason of religious training or belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." The reality of conscientious objections is passed on by the local draft boards. Appeals lie first to special boards which are aided by F.B.I. investigation and recommendation, and ultimately to the President, which means the Selective Service. Conscientious objectors may upon induction be assigned to forms of military service designated by the President as non-combatant, or "to work of national importance under civilian direction." The National Service Board for Religious Objectors, representing the Quakers, Mennonites, and twenty-odd other pacifist sects and groups, undertook the responsibility of organizing and financing Civilian Public Service Camps in which this "work of national importance" could be carried on "under civilian direction." The government has coöperated in these arrangements. Men refusing to register, or refusing induction when denied the status of conscientious objectors, have been sentenced to prison, but under an executive order these persons may be paroled to the Civilian Public Service Camps. Recently men have been sent on furloughs from these camps to perform medical or social work or to work on farms. Those who refuse parole remain in prison. Most of these are Jehovah's Witnesses, who demand the status of ministers. In the case of men in the 45 to 64 age group who refused to register, the government does not prosecute, but accepts any identification as the equivalent of registration. The whole problem has been wisely and sympathetically managed. Some difficulties have arisen from an unduly narrow meaning given by local draft boards to the words "religious training and belief" in the Selective Service Act, and the consequent refusal to recognize the scruples of those having no church affiliation. Some men were inducted into the army, were court-martialed for refusal of duty, and sentenced to military prison. Efforts are being made to get these back under civil jurisdiction, and some have been released.

Enemy Aliens. Leaving out of account for the moment the compulsory

evacuation of all Japanese from the Pacific coast, the government's policy toward enemy aliens has been moderate and just. All aliens were registered and fingerprinted under the provisions of the Alien Registration Act of 1940. After Pearl Harbor, enemy aliens were placed by executive orders under more rigorous restraints and more constant surveillance, not, however, unreasonable or unduly onerous. Enemy aliens dangerous to the public security are interned. This is a quarantine proceeding, not a criminal action. In very clear cases, the Department of Justice proceeds directly and either interns the alien or prosecutes him if there are criminal charges against him; and in cases of doubt the government plays safe and interns the alien even if conclusive evidence of subversive words or acts is lacking. Since in most cases the wisdom of allowing an enemy alien to remain free can best be determined in the community in which he lives, enemy alien hearing boards attached to the office of the federal district attorney have been set up in each judicial district. These are unpaid boards composed of responsible citizens; the procedure is informal, efficient, and fair. Enemy aliens suspected by the Department of Justice of being subversive or guilty of violating any of the applicable regulations are sent, together with their records, before the board. The board recommends in each case whether the enemy alien should be interned, be allowed to go free, or be paroled under suitable sponsorship. The recommendations of the board are purely advisory. Final decision lies with the Department of Justice, but the recommendations of the boards have usually been followed.

Official records reveal that of more than 600,000 enemy alien Italians in this country, it had been necessary to intern only 210. Accordingly, on October 12, 1942, Attorney General Biddle removed Italian aliens from the category of enemy aliens, in recognition of their demonstrated loyalty to this country. Similar treatment of other loyal enemy alien groups is being considered.

The Denaturalization of Naturalized Citizens. American citizens, native-born or naturalized, may be deprived of their citizenship as a punishment for crime, or by taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign power. In addition, one who becomes an American citizen by naturalization may have that naturalization cancelled if it can be shown that he acquired it by fraud. During the last war a number of naturalized German-American citizens were thus "denaturalized," thereby becoming enemy aliens, when federal courts were convinced that their later loyalty to Germany indicated that their oaths of allegiance to the United States had not been taken in good faith but with mental reservations which made them fraudulent. These cases were sporadic and were dealt with as *ad hoc* situations.

The Department of Justice is now engaged in a drive to revoke the naturalization certificates of hundreds of members of the German-American

Bund and other naturalized citizens alleged to be disloyal. By December, 1942, 42 "denaturalizations" had been accomplished, some 300 suits were still pending in the courts, and over 2,500 cases were being actively investigated. A bill designed to strengthen the Department's hand in these cases passed the House of Representatives providing for the revocation of the citizenship of naturalized Americans with a "superior loyalty to a foreign government." The bill did not pass the Senate. It has been severely criticized on grounds both of policy and of constitutionality.

Japanese Evacuation from Western Defense Areas. The sharpest impact of the war on civil liberty is seen in the compulsory evacuation of the Japanese from defense areas on the Pacific coast. On February 19, 1942, the President by executive order authorized the military authorities to designate military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded. By act of March 17, 1942, Congress implemented this order by providing penalties for its violation. On March 2, General DeWitt, in charge of the Western Defense Command, designated a prohibited zone about fifty miles wide from the Canadian border to the eastern boundary of Arizona; in a press release he stated that persons in the following classes would be excluded from the zone: (1) persons suspected of espionage, sabotage, or any subversive activity; (2) Japanese aliens; (3) American-born persons of Japanese lineage; (4) German aliens; (5) Italian aliens. Later, rigid restrictions on enemy aliens and on American citizens of Japanese origin were imposed in zones that comprised all the West coast states and Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. For a time, voluntary evacuation from the prohibited zone was encouraged and Army assistance given, and about 8,000 Japanese moved without compulsion. However, voluntary evacuation broke down, due to the refusal of neighboring states to receive the evacuees, and was replaced by compulsory evacuation coupled with government responsibility for relocation. On March 18, the President created the War Relocation Authority to deal with the resettlement of evacuees, and on March 27 General DeWitt forbade further voluntary evacuation of Japanese from the prohibited zone. About 112,000 Japanese were involved in the evacuation program, and about 85,000 of these were native-born American citizens. The task of transferring these persons to Assembly Centers or Relocation Areas has been completed. The War Relocation Authority now permits and encourages indefinite leaves to find homes and jobs outside the relocation centers. Thousands have been temporarily released to harvest crops. The F.B.I. investigates these applicants and so far few have been refused. The citizens evacuated suffered property losses, estimated at from fifty to sixty per cent. Evacuation is justified by the government on grounds of military necessity. This necessity is stated to have arisen from the risk of sabotage and other subversive activity, and from risk of race riots and mob violence in the event of Japanese invasion.

The constitutionality of this treatment of American citizens of Japanese origin has been attacked so far in at least eight cases in the federal district courts. Several of these cases are on their way to the Supreme Court. Only one federal judge has held against the government. The constitutional issues involved cannot be dealt with here, but a scrutiny of some of the briefs indicates that the Supreme Court will be faced with some very difficult problems. The Tolan Committee (House Committee on National Defense Migration) has followed the entire situation and issued valuable reports.

A drive is on foot to deprive Japanese born in this country of their American citizenship on the grounds of an alleged allegiance to Japan. A constitutional amendment has been introduced in the Senate to accomplish this. There is also a bill in the Senate to authorize the internment of all persons of Japanese origin. The Native Sons of the Golden West brought suit in the United States district court in San Francisco to disfranchise all citizens of Japanese origin. The district judge dismissed the case on the authority of United States v. Wong Kim Ark. The case is being appealed to the Supreme Court in the hope of securing a reversal of the Wong Kim Ark case. There is a touch of irony in the ruling of the attorney general of California that citizens of Japanese origin evacuated to inland counties may not acquire voting residences there because "residence" means "residence of choice."

Negro Discrimination. The war created new problems of Negro discrimination and accentuated old ones. Negroes in the army are segregated, but a limited number are trained as officers and these Negro officer-candidates attend training schools with white candidates. A few Negro Air Corps officers are being trained at Tuskegee. Until recently, no Negro had ever been admitted to combat service in the Navy; they had served as messmen and in other menial capacities. In April, Secretary Knox announced that Negroes could enlist as "reservists," and more than a thousand are in training. Negro naval officers are promised when complete Negro crews have been developed. Negroes are segregated in the WAACs; they are not admitted to the WAVEs. The American Red Cross, in building up blood banks, first refused Negro blood, and now without scientific justification segregates it.

Discrimination against Negroes in war industries continues to be an acute problem. A survey made by the United States Employment Service early in 1942 showed that about half of the available jobs in war industries were closed to Negroes as a matter of policy. This was due to the prejudice of the employer, his fear of trouble with white employees or local community resentment, and often to exclusion policies of labor organizations. Well-supported charges of racial discrimination were made against many branches of the federal civil service. Negro resentment had culminated

as early as the spring of 1941 in a threat of a well organized "march" on Washington. To forestall this, President Roosevelt issued an executive order reprobating racial discrimination in the government service, and directing that all government defense contracts should contain clauses barring such discrimination. He also created the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices to investigate charges of discrimination and to take steps to redress grievances. This Committee has done a useful job, but its achievements have been limited. It has had little money to spend. It has power to order war contractors to cease discriminatory employment practices under threat of cancellation of war contracts. Such orders have been issued, but the threatened penalty is so drastic that some employers have been willing to gamble that the government will not have the courage to cancel an important war contract on this ground. No contracts have been cancelled so far. Some lesser penalty for discrimination might be more effective.

Negroes have not received equal treatment in the government's housing program for war workers, although they have not been ignored. In Detroit, the opening of federal housing facilities for Negroes resulted in violence and threats by white gangs. The Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice secured the indictment of the leaders in these outrages under the sections of the Criminal Code penalizing interference with the constitutional or statutory rights of citizens. The cases have not yet been tried.

The problem of racial discrimination cuts much deeper than any governmental policy or law. The problem is being exposed as never before, and constructive effort, private and official, is being focussed on it. Some progress is being made. There is disquieting evidence, however, of growing resentment and alarm in the South at any developments which might imperil the deep-rooted tradition of "white supremacy."

Comment on the Bridges deportation case, the poll tax bill, and the peonage and lynching cases is omitted because these civil liberty situations did not stem from the war. The writer discussed the case of the Nazi saboteurs at length in the December, 1942, issue of this REVIEW.

V. PUBLIC INFORMATION AND OPINION

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Even before the outbreak of war between the United States and the Axis powers on December 7, 1941, public officials in Washington had taken steps to deal with public opinion problems arising out of the belligerent trends in international affairs. One of the first moves of the federal gov-

ernment was an effort to identify and disclose the extent and nature of propaganda activities on behalf of foreign governments in the United States. On June 8, 1938, Congress passed the McCormack Act vesting authority in the Department of State to issue and administer rules and regulations governing the registration of agents of foreign principals engaged in propaganda and related activities in this country.[1] This action, designed to protect the American public mind by revealing the extent to which foreign countries were using American channels of communication to further their own ends, was soon followed by official actions to strengthen the public opinion and cultural bonds linking together the various peoples of the Western Hemisphere. On July 27, 1938, the Department of State established its Division of Cultural Relations.[2]

Although the year 1939 witnessed the rapid extension of Axis aggression and finally the formal outbreak of war between England and Germany, there were comparatively few observable changes in the governmental machinery of the United States during this period to reflect the rapidly mounting public opinion problems of modern warfare. In 1940, however, the tempo of efforts to meet the impending crisis accelerated. In April, a Special Defense Unit was established in the Department of Justice which devoted a considerable proportion of its time to the study and analysis of subversive propaganda activities.[3] On June 28 came the passage of the Alien Registration Act. On August 16, the Council of National Defense announced the establishment of the Office for Coördination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics. And on October 17, 1940, Congress passed the Voorbis Act, in consequence of revelations regarding subversive and un-American activities brought to light by the Fish, McCormack, and Dies investigating committees.[4]

During the year 1941 and the months immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, the impact of war was even more definitely felt, and in rapid succession the departments and agencies of the federal government expanded, transformed, and streamlined their public opinion activities. Increased attention was given to surveying and analyzing public opinion

[1] For a discussion of the political and social implications of this act, see Bruce Lannes Smith, "Democratic Control of Propaganda through Registration and Disclosure," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 6, pp. 27–40 (Spring, 1942). In 1942, the administration of this act was transferred to the Department of Justice.

[2] For a comprehensive statement of the program of this Division, see House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Hearings* before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on the Department of State Appropriation Bill for 1943, Jan. 20, 1942, pp. 102–133.

[3] For a description of the functions and activities of this Unit, see House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Hearings* before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on the Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, Jan. 14, 1942, pp. 253–268.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 265–268. See also Bruce Lannes Smith, *supra*.

trends throughout the United States, especially on questions relating to the war and domestic morale. Propaganda activities within the United States were more carefully scrutinized. Specific campaigns to win support for the expanding defense effort were launched, notably by the Treasury Department on March 19, 1941.[5] Problems of civilian and military morale came to the fore. Special government agencies were created to study foreign, particularly Axis, propaganda. Public officials awakened to the significance of psychological warfare.

The multiplication of defense agencies under the roof of the Office of Emergency Management soon created the need for a centralized information service to make possible the presentation of a more comprehensive, coördinated, and authoritative picture of defense activities. In June, 1941, the Division of Information, which had been servicing the National Defense Advisory Commission, was transferred to the OEM, and, under the direction of Robert W. Horton, undertook to supply information specialists to the various defense agencies associated with it, coördinate their publicity activities, and, by direct contacts with the press, radio, motion pictures, and other media, give the American people a meaningful interpretation of the defense program.[6]

Meanwhile, the military chiefs of the War and Navy Departments had been taking cognizance of their war-time public opinion problems. As early as July 24, 1940, Secretary Stimson announced the transfer of the public relations branch of the War Department from G2 to the Deputy Chief of Staff.[7] Also, in July, 1940, the Morale Division of the Adjutant General's Office had been activated, and on February 25, 1941, a special three-day Morale Conference was held under the auspices of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation. On February 11, 1941, came the statement that the public relations branch had been shifted again, and was now placed directly under the supervision of the Secretary of War. These shifts in administrative arrangements were accompanied by an enlargement of the public relations staff and by many functional innovations. On March 11, 1941, under the auspices of the War Department, a special public relations conference was held in Washington

[5] For a description of the Department's noteworthy Bond Campaign, see Peter H. Odegard and Alan Barth, "Millions for Defense," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 399–411 (Fall, 1941).

[6] See George E. McMillan, "Government Publicity and the Impact of War," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 383–398 (Fall, 1941); also Cedric Larson, "Official Information for America at War," *Print*, Vol. 2, pp. 66–68 (Oct.–Dec., 1941).

[7] See James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, "Public Relations of the U. S. Army," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 275–282 (June, 1941); also Cedric Larson, "Publicity for National Defense—How it Works," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 18, pp. 245–255 (Sept., 1941).

which brought together a notable array of specialists from outside as well as within the armed services.

The Navy Department, recognizing the increasing importance of its public relations problems, placed the supervision of these matters directly under the Secretary of the Navy, increased the size of the staff, and elaborated its functional specialization. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the War Department, the Navy Department employed a private advertising agency to assist it in meeting its recruiting and informational problems.

As the United States became more and more deeply involved in the war, and outright participation seemed imminent, the demand for an over-all propaganda agency to mobilize public opinion within the United States, combat enemy propaganda, and otherwise deal with public opinion problems arising out of the relations between the United States and other countries became more insistent. These demands, coming from inside and outside official circles, ranged all the way from appeals to revive the Creel Committee to arguments in favor of greater coördination merely. As the debate progressed, and the view that propaganda was a legitimate function of democratic government in war-time won more and more supporters, there ensued in Washington an amazing struggle for power to determine who should be the propagandist to lead the United States to battle in the war of words. It almost seemed as though every journalist, advertiser, public relations counsel, and official information specialist felt, deep in his heart, that he was the unknown Goebbels America needed.

On May 20, 1941, there was set up within the OEM the Office of Civilian Defense which, in some quarters, was looked upon as an agency which might ultimately become the over-all manager of domestic public opinion and morale. During the weeks immediately following its establishment, some support for this view was given as various propaganda campaigns were launched. It soon became clear, however, especially after the appointment of James M. Landis as director, that the public opinion activities of this agency would be limited.[8]

Another agency which, in these pre-Pearl Harbor days, may have seemed to some to have the "makings" of a dynamic propaganda agency, on the domestic front at least, was the Office of Government Reports.[9] The OGR stemmed from the early days of the New Deal and the National Emergency Council. Under the direction of Lowell Mellett, it developed into the government's leading clearing house of information. On July 1,

[8] For a brief description of its functions, see *U. S. Government Manual* (Fall, 1942) pp. 63–65.

[9] See Margaret Hicks Williams, "The President's Office of Government Reports," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 548–562 (Winter, 1941).

1939, it became one of the branches of the Executive Office of the President, and in June, 1941, it was given a more permanent standing.

Even during the early days of the New Deal, the Division of Press Intelligence of OGR perfected elaborate machinery for giving public officials the most comprehensive and detailed digests of newspaper content in existence. Its Information Division published from time to time an extremely useful manual of information regarding government organizations and activities. And through its Division of Field Operations the OGR served as a liaison agent in the information sphere between the federal government on the one hand and the state and local governments on the other. But Lowell Mellett clung tenaciously to his view that any federal activity which could fairly be labelled "propaganda" was a dangerous one.[10] By insisting that his agency should confine its output to "information," he automatically eliminated the OGR from the race for official leadership in matters of opinion.

The leading contestants for the rôle of America's over-all propaganda agency, in the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, finally narrowed down to four: the previously mentioned Division of Information in the OEM under the direction of Robert W. Horton; the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs; the Office of the Coördinator of Information; and the Office of Facts and Figures. At the time, two of these—the Horton agency and the OFF—were concentrating primarily on domestic public opinion problems. The other two—the CIAA and the OCI—were concerned principally with the sphere of foreign relations.

Possibly it is a mistake to include the CIAA in this list of contestants. On August 16, 1940, President Roosevelt had created, under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, an Office of the Coördinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics. This Office, which was transferred to the OEM in July, 1941, as the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, came into being in response to the pressing need for a comprehensive and thoroughly coördinated attack on the problem of relations between the United States and its South and North American neighbors. The jurisdiction of this Office was clearly restricted to the Americas, and there is no indication that those in charge of the work contemplated an expansion. Nevertheless, there were some outside the organization, impressed by the skill with which cultural, economic, and propaganda resources had been mobilized for the job at hand, who did think in terms of such an expansion.

On July 11, 1941, President Roosevelt created, by executive order, the Office of Coördinator of Information, under the direction of Colonel

[10] See Lowell Mellett, "Government Propaganda." *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 168, pp. 311–313 (Sept., 1941).

William J. Donovan. Its field of operations was virtually the world, exclusive of the Americas. To gather information regarding peoples and geographical areas of vital interest to policy-makers, it dispatched agents to the far corners of the earth. At the same time, it sought to bring together whatever pertinent information it could from the files of other government agencies, such as the War, Navy, and State Departments, the Short-Wave Monitoring Division of the FCC,[11] the CIAA, the Department of Commerce—all to the end that policy-makers might have a centralized and reliable source of information on which to base their decisions. Whether it was because of lack of authority, or for some other reason, however, the fact remains that the OCI never quite measured up to expectations. It failed to overcome the barriers of departmental autonomy in Washington to such an extent as to be able to bring to its files all the significant information other departments were collecting. Nor was it by any means the sole agency to which responsible policy-makers turned for guidance.

Whereas, by the fall of 1941, it seemed as though the United States, administratively at least, was adequately prepared to deal with our public opinion problems *vis à vis* the Americas and the rest of the world through the CIAA and the OCI, the situation on the domestic front was far from promising. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that problems on the domestic front could not be sharply differentiated from those on the foreign front, and that the existing administrative division of labor was unsatisfactory. Conflicting statements emanating from the various defense agencies were only one indication of the confusion that prevailed. To facilitate the dissemination of more satisfactory and reliable information regarding the defense effort, and to secure a more uniform information policy generally, the President finally created the Office of Facts and Figures on October 7, 1941, under the direction of Archibald MacLeish, librarian of Congress.[12] Instead of clarifying the situation, however, this step added new complications. It was obvious that there was not room in Washington for three super-information agencies such as the units directed by Mellett, Horton, and MacLeish.

Any appraisal of the public opinion preparations of the United States prior to Pearl Harbor should take into consideration the fact that the public opinion situation at that time was, in many important respects,

[11] For some information on the work of this Division, see House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings* before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on the Independent Office Appropriation Bill for 1942, Jan. 8, 1941, pp. 647–724. See also *ibid.*, 2nd Sess., *Hearings* on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1943, Dec. 10, 1941, pp. 317–334.

[12] See R. Keith Kane, "The O.F.F.," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 6, pp. 3–26 (Spring, 1942).

vastly different from that in 1917. In the first place, the war itself was far more an issue in 1941 than in 1917. It took a Pearl Harbor to submerge the rather widespread cleavages of opinion regarding the war engendered by isolationists and interventionists. In the second place, the United States found itself confronted with a far more difficult and complex military situation. Not only that, but government information specialists found themselves handicapped by a heritage of intellectual confusion and lack of a clear-cut program of world reconstruction. They lacked, in other words, the basis for a vigorous, positive, specific propaganda program. Moreover, the initiative, from the propaganda as well as the military point of view, rested with the enemy. In contrast to the situation in 1917, it was the Axis powers rather than the United Nations who were attacking the status quo, who asserted that they were fighting to establish a new world order.

Not only outside Washington, but within official circles themselves, there existed an aversion to propaganda, a dislike of creeds or doctrinal programs which smacked of another crusade to "make the world safe for democracy," or any crusade for that matter. The public's response to the President's "Quarantine Speech" was not such that public officials were encouraged to accept overt responsibility for opinion leadership. It seemed to many to be the better part of wisdom to keep in step with the masses rather than to push boldly ahead of them. This was an understandable, if unfortunate attitude, reflecting as it did the aftermath of the first World War, previous mistakes in policy, a lively distrust of crusades, and the evil days upon which the concept "propaganda" had fallen.

The formal entrance of the United States into the war on December 7, 1941, brought with it, almost immediately, certain changes in administrative organization along the public opinion and propaganda front. A Committee on War Information, representing relevant departments and agencies, became active. On December 19, 1941, an Office of Censorship was established under the direction of Byron Price.[13] On January 9, 1942, this Office issued its Code of War-Time Practices for the American Press and a similar Code for American Broadcasters. These codes, as amended, now provide editors and broadcasters with a rather detailed enumeration of what they should not print or broadcast. Fortunately, compliance has been almost perfect, and the federal government has not been forced to use weapons, undoubtedly at its disposal, for compelling compliance.

The censorial activities of the OC do not extend directly to control over the releases and publications of the departments and agencies of the federal government itself. The informational output of these agencies is now controlled to a very large extent by the Office of War Information,

[13] See Byron Price, "Governmental Censorship in War-Time," in this REVIEW, Vol. 36, pp. 837–849 (Oct., 1942).

which was established on June 13, 1942.[14] The creation of the OWI under the direction of Elmer Davis came in response to the need for greater coördination and uniformity of information policy than that supplied by the OCI and the CIAA on the foreign front, and the OGR, the Division of Information in OEM, and the OFF on the domestic front. The product in large measure of the work of its associate director, M. S. Eisenhower, the OWI brings to the public opinion problems facing the United States a degree of unified control and direction hitherto unattained. It absorbed completely the functions of OFF and OGR, part of the work of COI, and most of the Information Division of the OEM.

The OWI is, in a very real sense, *the* organization for dealing with our war-time public opinion problems. Through its Committee on War Information Policy, composed of representatives of the State, War, and Navy Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIAA, the OC, and the WPB, general information policies and propaganda strategies are formulated. Because all information released by federal departments and agencies must clear through the Davis office, it is in a position to see that a general program is carried out. It should be noted, however, that in its relations with some departments and agencies, such as the State, War, and Navy Departments, the CIAA, the BEW, and the OC, it prefers to follow the policy of coöperation rather than direction.

It is usually hazardous, if not futile, to attempt to present an organization chart of a governmental agency in war-time, due to the fact that administrative changes are taking place so rapidly. As of September, 1942, the division of labor within the Office of War Information was substantially as follows:

Director
Associate Director
Assistant Director
Committee on War Information Policy

I. Domestic Operations Branch
- News Bureau
  - Field Operations Division
  - Foreign Sources Division
  - United Nations News Division
  - News Division
  - Overseas Division
- Radio Bureau
  - Allocation Division
  - Production Division

[14] See House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Hearings* before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1943, Sept. 28, 1942, pp. 379–460. See also Hillier Krieghbaum, "The Office of War Information and Government News Policy," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 19, pp. 241–250 (Sept., 1942).

- Planning and Service Division
- Bureau of Publications and Graphics
  - Division of Publications
  - Division of Production and Distribution
  - Division of Graphics
- Campaigns Bureau
- Bureau of Motion Pictures
  - Motion Picture Industry Liaison Division
  - Production Division
  - Research, Reports, and Information Division
  - Newsreel Division
  - Non-Theatrical Division
- Bureau of Special Operations
  - Division of Community Services
  - Division of School and College Services
  - Division of Special Events
  - Public Inquiries Division
  - Division of Foreign Language Services
- Bureau of Intelligence
  - Special Services Division
  - Extensive Surveys Division
  - Media Division
  - Sources Division

II. Overseas Branch

- Overseas Planning Board
  - Eastern Press and Radio Bureau
    - Overseas News Division
    - Program Division
    - Broadcast Control Division
  - Bureau of Overseas Publications and Pictures
    - Graphics Division
    - Motion Picture Division
    - Special Assignments Division
    - Editorial Division
    - News Pictures Division
  - Outpost Bureau
    - Outpost Operations Division
    - Liaison Division
  - Pacific Bureau
    - Radio Programs Division
  - Bureau of Communications Facilities
    - Facilities Division
    - Bronze Network Division
    - Planning Division
    - Pacific Network Division

Lack of space precludes a detailed description of the activities of these branches, bureaus, and divisions of the Office of War Information. At the risk of over-simplification, they may be said to fall into three major categories: (1) determination of general information policy, a task which is especially difficult so long as legislative and administrative policies

themselves are vague or conflicting; (2) coördination of the information activities of federal agencies of government by the issuance of directives, by consultation with the agencies concerned, and by careful checking of output; and (3) execution of informational programs or campaigns which are broader in scope than those of single departments or agencies.

Of all the public opinion problems which the federal government now faces, the problem of war aims is one of the most perplexing. Various attempts have been made, both by those inside and outside the government, to define and elaborate those aims. The principal criticism of these statements is that they are so vague as to be almost meaningless. What critics seem to demand is a comprehensive program of world reconstruction. At present it is obviously very difficult to frame such a program, due in part to the underlying conflicts in philosophy and purpose among the United Nations; in part to the fact that no one can, in a world of such rapid changes as this, anticipate in much detail the precise requisites of a desirable world order even a few years hence; and also in part to the preoccupation of political and military leaders with questions of military strategy. Rather than precipitate at this time a discussion of specific ideals of world reconstruction which might produce dissension and weaken the military effort, United Nations' leaders have focussed attention primarily on the problem of winning the war rather than winning the peace. In this respect, they are undoubtedly following a prudent and realistic policy. And yet the absence of a positive and detailed list of peace objectives handicaps the propaganda effort, and is an issue which will have to be faced squarely in the near future.

The establishment of the OWI and the Office of Censorship did much to improve the information and propaganda machinery of the federal government. Coördination and integration of public opinion activities were improved; division of labor was more clearly defined; and direction and control were more completely unified. Many administrative problems, however, remain to be solved.

In the first place, the information and propaganda activities of the United Nations as a whole need to be more fully coördinated. Some progress is being made, but the difficulties are great. United Nations information policy can only reflect the extent, or lack of coördination, of other types of policy—political, economic, military.

In the second place, in spite of their tactful handling by Elmer Davis, the relations between the OWI on the one hand and the Armed Services, the State Department, CIAA, and the Office of Censorship on the other are far from being perfect from the administrative point of view. It remains to be seen whether or not the Committee on War Information Policy will provide the needed coördination in matters of opinion.

The development of our informational machine has followed a more or

less trial-and-error course. However lamentable this may seem to some, it would have been unfortunate to saddle the country with an all-powerful agency at the outset. Information personnel had to be tested in the fire of experience. On the whole, the movement toward greater administrative effectiveness seems to have been as rapid as circumstances permitted or justified.

The global scope of United States responsibilities in this war has raised another difficult administrative problem for information specialists. This is the problem of the relation between direction and control from the center and the execution of policy at the periphery. A certain amount of global decentralization of responsibility is essential, but thus far the limits of such decentralization have not been satisfactorily defined. This is particularly true in the Far East, where directives from Washington have sometimes produced absurd results.

The opinion still prevails in many branches of the federal government that it is unsound public policy for government agencies to "propagandize" in the sense of seeking to win public support for policies by means of positive appeals and the use of techniques which have been exploited by advertisers, public relations counsel, and pressure group leaders. That this philosophy of public opinion leadership has not been universally accepted in official circles does not disprove the fact that the prevailing belief is that the function of government, even in war-time, is merely to give the "facts."

The "truth shall make you free" approach is essentially a journalistic one. The OWI seems to visualize as its main task that of getting the news to the public. That the skillful handling of news by selection, by balancing the good against the bad, and by proper timing can have a powerful effect upon the state of public opinion, is evident. But few attempts have been made to guide public thinking in the direction of specific attitudes on questions of policy. Mr. Davis has indicated the source of the difficulty. He states: "We have to wait for some of you gentlemen up here [meaning Congressmen] to find out what the policy is; just as, in many cases, we have got to wait on the State Department to find out what the policy is before we announce it."[15]

The OWI is obviously not the policy-determining agency of the government. And yet the effectiveness of its work is dependent to a marked extent upon definiteness and unity of policy. The informational problems of OWI are inextricably linked with those of policy-making. It is rather futile to streamline information activities and leave untouched the machinery of policy-making.

The OWI has all the virtues and also many of the vices of the daily press so far as responsible leadership of opinion is concerned. What the

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 440.

press has gained in the completeness, speed, accuracy, and objectivity of its news coverage, it has lost in editorial guidance of public thinking. Perhaps it is not the function of the press to tell its readers what to think. Perhaps it has done its job well if it merely gives the public "all the news fit to print." But does it follow that government, so far as its relations to public opinion are concerned, should be run like an efficient newspaper? The OWI does, of course, publish from time to time its "Sunday Supplements"—summaries of news developments over a more or less extended period. It has yet to embark, however, upon a systematic program of education designed to weave the multiplicity of confusing events into a meaningful program. Facts do not speak for themselves. The demand for systematic explanations of objectives, their justification, and some consideration of their implications for the individual will become more insistent. The public opinion problem which the United States faces is something more than a problem of good journalism. It is a problem of rallying the American people, and the peoples of the world for that matter, behind the philosophy of life, a democratic way, which gives sense and meaning to the rapidly shifting scenes of international events.

There has probably never been a time when official agencies of government have been better informed regarding states and trends of public opinion than now. Numerous public opinion polling agencies exist which, because of the sampling techniques used, have been able to supply public officials with quantities of data of this nature. Within the government itself, notably in the Department of Agriculture and the OWI, machinery has been set up for sampling and analyzing the public mind on almost every conceivable question. The problem raised by the enlarged scope of public opinion research of this nature is: To what extent is it desirable to enlarge the scope of *direct* democracy? If it is logical to assume that the mass of citizens constitute the best judges of the wisdom of *all* public policies, regardless of their technical nature, or their remoteness from the experience and knowledge of the average person, then there is ample justification for slavish attention to the results of public opinion polls. But not even the most ardent advocates of direct legislation and popular government ever went quite so far as some of the public opinion enthusiasts go today in asserting the infallibility of the common man.

In following too indiscriminately the results of public opinion surveys, public officials may actually be doing democracy a disservice. In times such as these, leadership may be quite as important as public opinion. The problem is not whether citizens should have nothing or everything to say in policy-making. It is rather a question of determining precisely what rôle they should play. The public, regardless of their readiness to answer any question asked them, will ultimately hold their political leaders responsible for the wisdom of public policies, and will do that even

though such leaders seek to excuse their mistakes by reference to what the public itself may have opined upon some long forgotten poll. Slavish regard for the sentiments of the masses on *all* questions may ultimately prove as disastrous as an arrogant disregard of public opinion on *some* questions. Progress in public opinion research may have lightened the burden of the politician who is solely interested in "keeping his ear to the ground," but for the statesman it calls for an ever-discriminating use of both his ears and his mind.

The story of the impact of war upon the public opinion activities of the federal government is a story of many changes and innovations, not only in the sphere of government but in the relationship between government and citizen. Peace is certain to bring with it new responsibilities of opinion leadership. Will the government assume a larger share of these responsibilities than it did from 1918 to 1941? The trend is definitely in that direction.

VI. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

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Even before the actual outbreak of the war in Europe, there were indications of uneasiness among our politicians over the approaching storm. The Democrats, in their platform of 1936, and in speeches and actions of President Roosevelt (especially his "quarantine" speech of October, 1937), showed themselves somewhat more aware than the Republicans that the United States might somehow be involved; but, in the end, both parties united on the neutrality policy designed to keep us isolated and therefore presumably safe from the aggressions already clearly under way. Before the national conventions of 1940, however, Dunkirk and the fall of France made seriously possible the conquest of England and the surrender of the British navy, and the consequent danger to the United States began to influence materially the course of American politics. Within the Democratic party the third-term tradition was forgotten and Mr. Roosevelt was renominated, largely because of the war situation and his experienced leadership in respect to the problems involved. The Democratic party not only continued to stand aggressively for the New Deal, but had somehow become a "war party," in the sense of anticipating possible war for the United States and preparing for it both by increasing our own defenses and by aiding those countries already resisting aggression. Henry Wallace's nomination for the vice-presidency served to emphasize the party's commitment on both points. Only six days before the Republican Convention, the President himself made a gesture toward party unity by

appointing eminent Republicans to head the cabinet posts in charge of the war services.

The situation within the Republican party was by contrast much more complex. By its almost solid opposition to measures now conceded to have been vital to our defense, such as arms embargo repeal and conscription, the party seemed to have become a "peace party," in the sense of assuming that preparations for war would tend to bring on war,[1] and that our own peace was in more danger from within than from without. Republicans as a group denounced the President's efforts at unity as a political trick, and repudiated Secretaries Stimson and Knox as pseudo-Republicans. On the other hand, the nomination of Wendell Willkie for President meant turning not only to a man who was completely lacking in the kind of political and public experience usually required for that high office, and one who had only recently begun to wear the Republican label, but also one who, although a convinced and vigorous anti-New Dealer, had spoken out clearly on the war, had definitely taken sides, had urged outright American aid to the peoples resisting German aggression, and to that extent had repudiated the policy of neutrality.

Willkie's nomination therefore seemed to represent an abandonment by the Republicans of the pacifistic and isolationist tendencies within their party, to constitute a clearer recognition than before of the impact of the war upon the United States, and to commit the party to something like vigorous support of the foreign policies already urged and begun by the President. It seemed also to point to a sharp division in the campaign over the domestic issues of the New Deal. At the same time, Senator McNary's nomination for Vice President introduced some confusion on these points, since he, as an Oregon progressive, had frequently supported New Deal measures, and especially those most vigorously assailed by Mr. Willkie; moreover, although in 1918–19 a pro-Leaguer aligned with the "mild reservationists," he had, as leader of the Senate minority, become a fairly consistent isolationist. In its platform, the party continued this ambiguity with respect to domestic issues, proposing not at all to repudiate the New Deal measures already enacted but only to make them more effective; with respect to the war, however, it took substantially the Willkie position.

With apparently so little difference between them, especially on foreign policy, the parties in 1940 indulged in the usual campaign confusions. President Roosevelt and the Democratic orators emphasized the danger from the aggressor Powers and the steps taken to meet that danger, but

[1] It may be noted that this has long been a pacifist doctrine, and was generally adhered to by the Democrats before World War I in their opposition to a big navy and to other preparedness measures.

tended, as the campaign went on, to stress particularly the party's pledge to keep the United States out of the war and the experience and wisdom of Mr. Roosevelt as grounds for confidence that this pledge could be kept. Mr. Willkie, in his acceptance speech of August 17, took a bolder stand than either party and indicated that "in defense of America and of our liberties I should not hesitate to stand for war." In this same speech, and in numerous other speeches, he made it plain that he considered himself and his party committed against any form of appeasement of the Axis Powers, to all-out aid to Great Britain, to the maintenance of peace for the United States as long as possible but not at the expense of either an Axis victory or a stalemate, and even to the support of the Administration measures along these lines. At the same time, Willkie and the Republican orators tended more and more to castigate the President for the measures he took as tending toward war, and in the end the parties seemed to be contesting much more over which was the likelier to keep its stay-out-of-war pledge than over the measures necessary to resist the aggressions which were bound, if continued, to drag us into the war. Neither party was willing to be considered a "war" party; each was anxious to be for "peace"; neither party was willing to face the war situation squarely.

With a decisive victory behind him, President Roosevelt was able to set the course of his Administration more vigorously in aid of the Allied cause, and to drive his party into general support of his position. On such vital measures as lend-lease, draft extension, and the arming of merchant ships, the Democratic leaders in both houses and in the party organization supported the President loyally, the rank and file of Democratic members followed him with relatively few exceptions, and in general the Democratic party operated pretty much as a fairly cohesive, disciplined group.[2] In other words, the Democratic victory of 1940 strengthened the leadership of President Roosevelt, and that leadership, together with the realities of the war, brought about, at least temporarily, a high degree of unity and sober responsibility within the Democratic party in respect to the problems of the war.

The Republican defeat served, on the other hand, to bring out at once and most sharply the dissident elements within that party. Wendell Willkie, no longer limited by the necessities of making a candidate's appeal, became again his natural self, spoke his mind freely and courageously on the war situation, fought strenuously to maintain the position of party leadership to which his presidential nomination seemed to entitle

[2] Numerous Roosevelt critics within the Democratic party now came out in his support, including such men as Senators Glass and Byrd of Virginia, Senator Tydings of Maryland, Senator George and Representative Cox of Georgia, Al Smith, and Lewis Douglas, former Director of the Budget.

him,[3] and sought through that leadership to commit the Republican party to whole-hearted support of the Administration's war policies. A week after the election, in a radio address to the nation, Mr. Willkie not only pledged his personal support to President Roosevelt, but also attempted particularly to define the rôle of the minority party as that of a "Loyal Opposition," by which he seemed to mean (1) the right of the majority to govern; (2) the right of the minority to criticize, even in war-time; (3) such criticism to be constructive, not merely destructive; and (4) general support, within these limitations, of the Roosevelt Administration in respect to the war.

This attempt to secure a measure of unity among the parties was warmly supported by staunch Republicans, such as Senator Austin (Vermont), the assistant minority leader in the Senate, Representative Wadsworth (New York), and others; it was commended by newspapers all over the country; but it was received with ominous silence by other Republican leaders, such as Senator McNary, Willkie's running mate and the minority leader in the Senate, and Representative Martin, minority leader in the House and chairman of the Republican National Committee; and it was openly derided by still others. For example, Mr. Clarence Budington Kelland, an extreme isolationist, at the time Republican national committeeman from Arizona, and later the National Committee's director of publicity, said in a Lincoln Day address at Tucson: "Soon after the recent election a phrase was coined for us—the phrase 'Loyal Opposition.' What, then, is a loyal opposition, to whom and to what must it be loyal, and what can and must it oppose? . . . Does patriotism demand that we surrender our beliefs and our principles and our fears? Does that phrase demand that we should be loyal to our country and our country's flag—or does it mean that we should strangle our principles, our honest beliefs, and be loyal to the New Deal? . . . Is that the meaning of 'loyal opposition'? In that phrase, has the word 'opposition' any validity? If we are loyal in the manner that we are asked to be loyal; if under the guise of emergency we admit a lie to be the truth—then where does the word 'opposition' come in? What are we to oppose? When are we to oppose it?

[3] No party has any formal provisions with respect to this matter of leadership, and the fight over Willkie within the Republican party has produced considerable discussion of the problem. It is interesting to note, however, that the most responsible Republicans in high party or public position generally acknowledge Willkie's right to titular leadership in view of his nomination to the presidency, much as they may dislike him personally or disagree with him politically. Even the *Chicago Tribune* admitted the principle, but argued that it did not apply to Willkie because "he is not a Republican. He deserted the principles of the party that nominated him, even before the election. . . . " Editorial, "The Republicans Meet in Chicago," Apr. 20, 1942.

The two words do not stand together. They do not make sense. There cannot be a loyal opposition. There can be loyalty and there can be opposition, but not in the same phrase."

The split between Willkie and his followers, on the one hand, and the isolationist wing of the Republican party, on the other, manifested itself on numerous occasions; and while Willkie's endorsement of the various Administration policies with respect to the war may have brought the President a good deal of Republican support, it certainly also increased the bitterness of the opposition toward both himself and the policies involved. At a meeting of the Young Republicans in Des Moines in February, 1941, resolutions were offered declaring: "In the last campaign, the Young Republican League and the Republican party were deliberately sabotaged by a candidate of the Democratic faith on the Republican ticket;" and apparently compromises were necessary in order to prevent their adoption. At a meeting of Republican state chairmen and other leaders from sixteen Mid-Western states, held in Omaha in the same month, angry denunciations of Willkie were heard, although formal action of any kind was staved off. At the meeting of the Republican National Committee in March, 1941, at which the isolationist Chairman Joseph W. Martin was reëlected, complimentary references to Mr. Willkie in the speech-making were said to have elicited no applause from the assembled committeemen, the customary vote of confidence in the party's presidential nominee was omitted, and a formal resolution commending Chairman Martin for his vote against the Lend-Lease Bill, and therefore an indirect slap at Willkie, was finally suppressed only in the interest of harmony.

Many Republican congressmen and some Republican newspapers accused Mr. Willkie of being a stooge for and "carbon copy" of President Roosevelt, of having deserted the party principles, even of having conspired with the President to deliver the Republican party to the New Deal, and so on.[4] The *Chicago Tribune*, for example, charged that "through-

[4] For example, Congressman Lambertson (Rep., Kans.) referred to Mr. Willkie in the House, Oct. 23, 1941, as "the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde of American politics—the Republicrat or Demorep of the contemporaneous scene. . . . Where has Mr. Willkie been? Who has been feeding him the red, raw meat of war? It is proper to inquire why this Johnny-come-lately in the political party of which I have been proud to be a member all my life espoused a sane and noble viewpoint and then abruptly turned his back on what we thought were his convictions. Was he indulging in campaign oratory just to snare the innocent and unwary voter? Did a few handshakes with the dukes and earls in England change his mind? . . . I am sure the majority of the Republicans here will agree with me in the clear statement I am now going to make. I do not accept Wendell Willkie's leadership in his bold attempt to hurry us down the ruinous road to war." *Cong. Record*, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct 23, 1941), pp. 8441–8442 [daily *Record*]. Also Congressman Dewey Short (Rep., Mo.), in the House, Nov. 6, 1941: "The President is not traveling fast enough for Mr. Willkie. Oh, this bellowing, blatant, bellicose, belligerent, bombastic blowhard

out the campaign he gave away one issue after another, domestic as well as foreign, but the Republicans, having been committed to their fate, tried to believe that Mr. Willkie didn't mean what he was saying. . . . They'd have done better, it would seem, if they had voted for Norman Thomas, who proved himself, in many respects, to be actually closer to the Republican platform than the man whose candidacy was based on it." In another editorial, the same paper said: "His nomination was the result of a clever and carefully planned political conspiracy which started with the appointment of the two Republican derelicts—Knox and Stimson—to the cabinet in order to give the nation the spectacle of a sham coalition government."[5]

On the other hand, there was a very respectable element within the Republican party which strongly supported Mr. Willkie personally and perhaps even more the views he represented with respect to the war. In general, this support came from the Eastern leaders and organizations of the party, although by no means entirely so. For example, on October 21, 1941, Mr. Willkie presented to the Republican members of Congress a statement strongly urging outright and complete repeal of the Neutrality Act, which statement was signed by six Republican governors, 24 Republican national committeemen, and 94 other prominent Republican leaders and party officials, from 40 states. In presenting the statement, Mr. Willkie emphasized the requirement of an international policy "designed to encompass the destruction of totalitarianism by whatever means necessary," the need of unity during the national emergency, and the important rôle of the Republican party as an instrumentality by which these objectives might be accomplished.[6] To what extent the Republican

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who is above the Republican party and its platform and who is a law unto himself. . . . God forgive me for ever having supported such an impostor, this 'fifth columnist' and Trojan horse, this stranger who has recently come into our party to split it wide open. . . . " *Ibid.* (Nov. 6, 1941), pp. 8812–8813.

[5] Editorials, "A Barefoot Boy Gets to Buckingham Palace," "They Can Keep Him," Jan. 31, 1941, Oct. 9. 1942. The *Tribune* took pride in the fact that it had never really believed in Willkie and had opposed his nomination. Col. McCormick, its editor, was a member of the Illinois delegation to the Republican convention of 1940, and supported Thomas E. Dewey to the end. See accounts of this and of McCormick's futile efforts during the campaign to convert Willkie to isolationism, by Jack Alexander, "The Duke of Chicago," in *Saturday Evening Post*, July 26, 1941, esp. p. 88.

[6] Text of statement and signatures in *N. Y. Times*, Oct. 22, 1941, p. 8. On Aug. 5, 1941, 15 Republicans, including former President Hoover, former Vice President Dawes, former Governor Lowden, Alf M. Landon, and President Hutchins of the University of Chicago, joined in an appeal to Congress to "put a stop to step by step projection of the United States into undeclared war," declaring that "recent events raise doubts that this war is a clear-cut issue of liberty and democracy." *Ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1941, p. 6.

rank and file supported the Willkie or the isolationist wing of the party is, of course, impossible to determine with any assurance, but there were indications that at least the war policies for which Mr. Willkie stood were approved. Polls taken in March and July, 1941, showed Mr. Willkie better liked by the voters generally than during the campaign, with some decline among sections of his own party; other polls and surveys in September showed 60 per cent of the Republicans favoring the Administration foreign policy and only 23 per cent opposed, with even the rank and file Republicans from the Western and Northwestern states "swinging into line for President Roosevelt's foreign policy."[7]

At the best, the situation within the Republican party before Pearl Harbor was confusing if not chaotic, with the leaders hopelessly divided on the issue of intervention or isolation, the dissident congressional groups increasingly bitter, and the rank and file presumably uncertain, although on the whole the party seemed to be dominated by the isolationist group. The Democratic party, properly surveyed, would also reflect this confusion, but by no means to the same degree, and that party was overwhelmingly dominated by the interventionist group within the Administration. Walter Lippmann, writing in early 1941, appraised the Republican situation in this way: "In the light of this record on the two matters of national defense and aid to the Allies, it is a fair question whether the Republican party in Congress has been wisely led. For, as a matter of fact, it has steadily backed away from its own first commitments. To have taken the pacifist and isolationist position and stood by it would have been one thing. To take it and then back away from it, as the somber history of our times has unfolded, is a confession, it seems to me, that the Republican leaders in Congress have not believed in their principles or foreseen or judged truly the real course of events." Another historical scholar, writing just before Pearl Harbor, concluded that the Republican party had become, or was in danger of becoming, another Whig party, indifferent to the world of realities, unable to make up its mind, a prey to the various ele-

[7] Gallup polls, reported in *N. Y. Times*, Mar. 2 and July 27, 1941; and survey by Charles N. Wheeler, in *Chicago Daily News*, Sept. 29, 1941. Another poll taken by a party publication, *The Republican*, of 4,000 local leaders showed that in February, 1941, Willkie was preferred by 51 per cent; by October his strength had dwindled to 38 per cent, but he still led the field, Taft receiving 20 per cent, Dewey 16 per cent, and Hoover 9 per cent. Henry F. Pringle, "What's Happened to Willkie?," *Am. Mercury*, Vol. 54, pp. 43–49 (Jan., 1942), esp. p. 46. The Willkie views were supported in Illinois by such party leaders as former National Committeeman Hill Blackett, State Treasurer Warren Wright, and Congressman Dirksen (who later, however, seemed to backtrack); in Minnesota, by Governor Stassen and Senator Ball; in South Dakota, by Senator Gurney; in North Dakota, by National Committeeman William Stern and Lynn U. Stambaugh, National Commander of the American Legion.

ments composing it, and therefore essentially an appeasement group.[8]

The attack on Pearl Harbor and the resulting declarations of war seemed at first to have brought about unity in the country, coöperation among the political parties, and a final and complete abandonment of isolation. The principal war measures sponsored by the Administration for some time had clear sailing, and the chairmen of the Republican and Democratic National Committees (Representative Joseph W. Martin and Edward J. Flynn), by an exchange of telegrams on December 10, reached agreement on what the Democratic Committee said "constitutes the most complete adjournment of domestic politics since the formation of the two-party system." Chairman Martin went even further, called off a scheduled meeting of Republican state chairmen, and urged that Lincoln Day celebrations be turned from Republican party rallies into great patriotic demonstrations. "Let us publicly proclaim our support of the Administration in an irresistible effort to win the war," he said. "We can at the same time with full consistency uphold the great principles for which our party stands." Other Republican leaders, such as Herbert Hoover and Alf M. Landon, supported these moves for party unity.

President Roosevelt expressed his appreciation of this political truce, and assured both party organizations that this should not be interpreted as an abandonment of the two-party system. "When the war is over, we will still be adhering to our historic method of settling our domestic policies. . . ." Very soon others, however, began to inject a note of distrust in respect to this adjournment of politics and to insinuate that the two-party system was in danger. Former Democratic Chairman James A. Farley seemed to imply this when he said in Chicago on December 22 that "America still believes in the two-party system and I hope the elections this fall [1942] will be on a two-party basis. . . . Certainly politics should be adjourned as far as the war effort is concerned, but only that far." And from the Republican side, Clarence Budington Kelland, only recently appointed director of publicity of the Republican National Committee, sneered at the adjournment of politics. Speaking in Salt Lake City, on January 8, 1942, he said: "Politics is good in time of peace; in time of war politics is indispensable. When political unity comes in at the door, human liberties go out of the window. It is political unity which has plunged this world into war."

Further obstacles to "adjourning politics" were set up by Democratic Chairman Flynn when, in a radio address on February 2, he accused the Republican party of being "not as much interested in the war as it is interested in controlling the House of Representatives." "I naturally feel," he said, "that no misfortune except a major defeat could befall this coun-

[8] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Can Willkie Save His Party?," *The Nation*, Vol. 153, pp. 561–564 (Dec. 6, 1941).

try to the extent involved in the election of a Congress hostile to the President." These remarks were, of course, resented by the Republicans, who now made considerable point of the implication that the Democratic party had a monopoly of the patriots and war supporters, and that the war was to be used "to liquidate the Republican party and squelch all criticism."[9] The result was no doubt to intensify Republican efforts to find or make issues for the coming congressional elections, to revive criticism of the President and of his supporters to the point of vilification, and to renew the hints dropped before Pearl Harbor that the Democratic Administration would not permit elections to be held in 1942.[10]

President Roosevelt himself declared against a purely partisan campaign in the congressional elections, said that the country needed congressmen, regardless of political party, who would support the war effort and who had a good record in that respect, and indicated that he himself would not take an active part in the campaign, thus at least by implication repudiating the Flynn appeal and avoiding President Wilson's mistake in 1918 of appealing for a Congress of his own party. In fact, the President adhered to this program so assiduously as to draw severe criticism from some liberals and ardent pro-war advocates who felt he was thereby abandoning the cause to its enemies. Other liberals, and of course the anti-Roosevelt group in general, criticized him for the part he finally did take in New York politics, charging that this was not a proper action for a war President. There were, in other words, many ramifications to this business of adjourning politics; as the time for the 1942 elections approached, it became obviously impossible for either party as such to lay aside its partisanship, and with very few exceptions the campaign of 1942 was fought along the usual lines, even on war issues.[11]

With respect to the general issue of isolation, however, the parties were

[9] Chairman Martin made a dignified reply to Flynn on Feb. 3, in which he reiterated that the Republicans, in spite of the unfair attack, would continue to support the President and put national safety above partisanship. During the campaign the *Chicago Tribune* replied to an appeal by Mayor Kelly of Chicago similar to that of Chairman Flynn, in an editorial entitled "You Republican, You Nazi, You!", Oct. 19, 1942.

[10] These intimations were made especially by Arthur Krock in his column in *N. Y. Times*, Sept. 18, 1941, p. 24; and by Colonel Lindbergh in his address at the America First rally in Fort Wayne, Ind., Oct. 3, 1941.

[11] In a few instances politics was adjourned—for example, in the case of Congressman James W. Wadsworth (Rep., N. Y.), a staunch supporter of the Administration's war policies, who was unopposed; in other cases politics was curiously mixed, as in the case of Senator Norris, openly preferred by the President over the Democratic candidate; or of Congressman Hamilton Fish, opposed by Mr. Willkie, Mr. Dewey, and practically all important Republicans in New York; or of New Hampshire, where the recent Republican governor, Francis J. Murphy, announced his disgust with the Republican party and ran a close race as the Democratic candidate for senator against Senator Bridges.

apparently brought closer together by the war. Mr. Willkie had, in a Lincoln Day address long before Pearl Harbor, strongly urged his party to abandon isolationism, and instead to "preach a positive doctrine" of freedom for America and freedom for the world. "I am here," he said, "to challenge you to a higher destiny than the destiny of compromise and negation and failure and death." After Pearl Harbor, and after a considerable amount of political fencing, Willkie's views were on April 30 incorporated into a formal resolution of the Republican National Committee and unanimously adopted. In this resolution, the Committee reiterated its pledge to preserve the two-party system and our present form of government, insisted vigorously on the right of criticism, opposed the use of the war to extend the New Deal, made certain specific suggestions with respect to the conduct of the war, declared against appeasement, and, above all, expressly repudiated isolationism by a formal statement that "after this war the responsibility of the nation will not be circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United States; that our nation has an obligation to assist in bringing about understanding, comity, and cooperation among the nations of the world in order that our own liberty may be preserved and the blighting and destructive processes of war may not again be forced upon us and upon the free and peace-loving peoples of the earth." The isolationist view was presented in resolutions prepared by Senators Robert A. Taft of Ohio and C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois, neither of which made any mention whatever of post-war problems, and which Taft justified by saying: "I don't think we can tell what conditions will be at the conclusion of the war. I don't think we can say now what our definite policy of the peace should be. We ought to devote all our efforts to the winning of the war."[12]

The Committee could hardly have made a more significant choice, and its unanimous action might have been considered as settling that issue of isolation once and for all. The Committee's action did not, however, settle the issue at all—that is, it did not prevent numerous Republicans in and out of Congress from reiterating in some form or other the isolationist view and preaching it as though it were still good Republican doctrine. For example, the announcement of Governor Lehman's appointment as administrator of relief to the starving populations throughout the world immediately brought violent denunciation of the whole business as an extension of the New Deal to the world, as taking the bread out of our own

[12] Full accounts of the Committee's proceedings, together with the text of the Willkie, Taft, Brooks, and final Committee resolutions, in *N. Y. Times*, Apr. 20–21, 1942. These should be compared with accounts in the *Chicago Tribune*, for the same dates. Attention should also be called to the resolutions adopted by the House Republicans on Sept. 22, 1942, to the same effect, although in more ambiguous terms. Text in *Cong. Record*, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 19, 1942), pp. A4044–A4045 [daily *Record*].

mouths to put it into the mouths of undeserving foreigners, and the like. It is therefore all the more significant that at its meeting in St. Louis a year after Pearl Harbor the Republican National Committee not only defeated for chairman the candidate of the extreme anti-Willkie and isolationist group (Werner W. Schroeder of Illinois), but also reaffirmed the April resolution in its entirety. Although the result with respect to the chairmanship represented a compromise not completely satisfactory to the Willkie forces,[13] it is nevertheless significant that it was the April isolationist leader, Senator Taft, who now proposed the reaffirmation of the party's abandonment of isolation. This presumably meant that even the isolationists feared the repercussions that would come from the rank and file of the party if there were any attempt to revive that issue at this time.

Whether this formal commitment of the party organization to internationalism rather than isolationism will hold after the war is by no means certain. The result of the 1942 elections was to continue in Congress most of the extreme isolationists, and to lose some of the internationalists, and the strategic committee positions involved are likely in the end to be more important than party resolutions.

Various other aspects of the recent elections should be noted, if very briefly. In the first place, the heavy Democratic losses caught most commentators by surprise, it having been assumed that the Administration was in an impregnable position.[14] Secondly, although the result was in a certain sense a Democratic victory, even though a slim one, and the party could properly take some satisfaction out of this, in view of the usual off-year reaction against the party in power, it was actually a serious Democratic defeat, especially in the loss of many of the outstanding leaders of the party in Congress.

Thirdly, the results with respect to the Republican party were not only to strengthen that party as an effective opposition to the Administration, particularly as to New Deal policies, but also, in spite of Mr. Willkie's

[13] The Committee chose Harrison E. Spangler, of Iowa, long a member of the Committee, who had been originally for Taft in the 1940 convention, who had been friendly to Willkie, and who had taken no definite position in the pre-Pearl Harbor differences over President Roosevelt's foreign policy. The Willkie group presented as its preferred candidate Mr. Frederick E. Baker, a relatively unknown business man of Seattle, who actually polled more votes than did Mr. Schroeder (43–38) when the compromise on Mr. Spangler was agreed upon.

[14] The outstanding exception was Irving Dilliard, of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, who stated strongly the possibility of a Republican victory. See his article, "Can the Republicans Win?," in *New Republic*, Vol. 107, pp. 276–278 (Sept. 7, 1942). The Gallup poll published just before the election predicted a majority for the Democrats approximately as before. *Chicago Daily News*, Nov. 2, 1942.

continuing influence in the national organization, to strengthen materially the anti-Willkie and isolationist group. The success of Dewey in New York, of Brooks in Illinois, and of others opposed more or less openly by Willkie and his friends, may well revive the isolationist sentiment within the party and have decided repercussions upon war measures as well. In fact, such a staunch Republican paper as the *Chicago Tribune* suggested, shortly after the election, the formation of a new "American party," "to call to its standard all patriots, regardless of sectionalism or previous party affiliation, and to exclude from its ranks all traitors to American ideals," with the purpose clearly indicated of saving the country from "Mr. Willkie's fraud and treachery." This seemed to be a revival of the America First plan for political action on war issues, the movement for which was under way before Pearl Harbor, but abandoned upon the declaration of war.[15]

Finally, without attempting to explain the reasons for the recent Democratic defeat,[16] attention may be called to the very effective use of "smear" and "purge" politics. The suggestion that the Administration and the pre-Pearl Harbor interventionists were "smearing" those who had opposed the war by calling attention to their record seemed actually to take hold of the public,[17] while the abuse heaped upon the President and his family and the interventionists somehow was not thought of as a "smear." Similarly, the somewhat extraordinary proposition was vehemently maintained that it was a "purge," and therefore improper, to try to defeat any pre-war or present isolationist, even though of the opposite political party.[18] This proposition was carried so far that Congressman Hoffman (Rep., Mich.) after the election proposed a resolution in the

[15] See announcements in *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 3, 1941, p. 8, cc. 6–8, and Dec. 12, 1941, p. 28, cc. 5–6: also editorial, "America First Enters the 1942 Elections," *Chicago Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1941; and John R. Carlson, "Inside the America First Movement," *Am. Mercury*, Vol. 54, pp. 7–25 (Jan., 1942).

[16] Irving Dilliard has given what are probably the best or most complete reasons, in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, Nov. 8, 1942, Pt. 4, p. 1 D. See also Representative Thomas H. Eliot (Mass.), Samuel Grafton, and others, "The Meaning of the Election," in *New Republic*, Nov. 16, 1942.

[17] The fact that the Union for Democratic Action prepared and the *New Republic* published the voting record of senators and representatives on war measures was in itself regularly referred to as a "smear," and brought extraordinary abuse upon those groups in particular.

[18] Even such a preacher of liberalism and the right of criticism as Oswald Garrison Villard complained bitterly because in his own former journal, *The Nation*, "a writer actually urged the defeat of twenty-six men who were candidates for reëlection to the Senate or the House because they had not voted the way he thought they should." See his letter in the *Christian Century*, Nov. 18, 1942, and reply of *The Nation*, Nov. 28, 1942, p. 563.

House of Representatives to investigate the attempt to unseat members of Congress. Were such a resolution to be taken seriously, the two-party system would seem indeed to be in danger.

As a matter of fact, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to draw any conclusions from the election except that the people were somehow dissatisfied, probably with the lack up to that time of any important military victory.[19] The results were evidently determined as much by local as by national considerations. In Minnesota, presumably an isolationist center, pro-Willkie and strongly internationalist Republicans were elected governor and senator, together with isolationist congressmen; in New York, an interventionist area, an anti-Willkie but moderately internationalist Republican was elected governor, while the most conspicuous anti-Willkie and isolationist Republican congressman was also elected; in Illinois, generally conceded to be the strongest isolationist center, extreme isolationists were elected senator and congressman-at-large, although both had repudiated isolationism shortly before the election. New Deal and anti-New Deal Democrats were elected; conspicuous Democratic supporters of the war policies were defeated and more were elected. These results would seem to indicate that the war has actually done little or nothing to our party system—that our political parties continue to operate in about the same confused manner as in time of peace.

[19] Irving Dilliard concludes that the results do not indicate that the people want to abandon the social gains of the last nine years or to withdraw from world affairs, but that the election nevertheless "had its meanings, and the Administration chieftains must know by now what many of these are." These meanings, even as he lists them, do not make a clear case for one kind of policy as against another. See his article, previously cited, in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, Nov. 8, 1942, esp. p. 6 D.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS FOR IMPROVING NATURALIZATION PROCEDURE

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Naturalization procedure is a complex process involving a dozen different steps from the time the alien enters the country until he finally receives his order of admission from the court.[1] In recent months, considerable attention has been given it in the hope that part of the red tape and resulting delay may be obviated. Criticism of red tape and useless steps in the procedure has been widespread.[2] As a student of the administrative process, I tried, during my period of service in the Department of Justice, to devote as much time as possible to improvement and simplification of naturalization, and in this I was encouraged by the Attorney General and other officials of the Department. In my treatment of this subject, the analysis and recommendations are primarily the result of my own thinking and analysis, but it can also be said that on the general approach, all of us in the Department who were concerned with this problem saw eye to eye. In the study of administrative procedure and the determination upon improvements, we in Washington have been greatly assisted by the administrative studies of the National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship.

Before we can deal intelligently with administrative analyses and recommendations, we must make up our minds as to the results we are trying to achieve. I am one of those who think that administration cannot be intelligently considered apart from the social problems and objectives which it subserves; for if it is so considered, it is almost sure to fall wide of the mark. What kind of citizenship are we interested in producing? Some of the most important administrative determinations to be made depend upon the answer given to this question.

Throughout history there have been two principal emphases in citizenship, one based upon status (*jus sanguinis*), and the other upon territory (*jus soli*). The emphasis upon status goes back to the earliest times and is the predominant emphasis during most of recorded history; the concept of citizenship growing out of mere residence in a territorial expanse of the world's surface is a fairly recent idea, and has received its principal support from the United States.[2a] In Greece and Rome, citizenship was a

[1] See *infra*.

[2] Fields, "Making Naturalization Administrative," *Boston Univ. Law Rev.*, Vol. 15, p. 260 (1935).

[2a] For a concise statement of the two doctrines, see *Research in International Law*, Harvard Law School (1929), p. 27 ff. For a summary analysis of the laws of the vari-

privilege, an exclusive right. The citizen stood in a class by himself, distinguished from slaves and others who were denied full participation in the community because of one limiting factor or another. In Greece, the citizens constituted a democratic fraternity in which the principle of equality within the citizen *élite* was extended so far in Athens during one period that administrative and military leaders were chosen by the drawing of lots. In the Roman Empire, only a small percentage of those in Rome were admitted to the privileged status of citizenship, while this privilege was also extended to some of those who lived in the provinces. Hence it may be seen that in this early period, citizenship was primarily a matter of status, not a matter of geographical residence. One qualification or another—birth, property, educational qualifications, which were among the most common—obtained in most of the countries of Western Europe and Great Britain until fairly recent times. The idea that citizenship attaches to territory is a consequence of the development of national sovereign states, following the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and the development of democratic influences predicating that all men are equal and entitled to participation in the conduct of civic affairs. The territorial idea was championed by the United States because of our democratic attachment; because we were drawing immigrants from all of the countries of Western Europe and needed to assure ourselves that they would give up citizenship by birth and swear loyalty to the country of their new allegiance;[2b] and also because a part of the population was made up of persons born in the United States of alien parents. It is quite natural, therefore, that the United States should have been the principal champion of citizenship by the naturalization process.

In historical and legal treatises, naturalization is customarily referred to as "artificial" as compared with "natural" citizenship. Citizenship by naturalization is now so widespread that this distinction has lost much of its

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ous countries of the world with respect to the doctrines, see Appendix No. 1, pp. 80–83, of that work. For texts of laws, see Flournoy and Hudson, *A Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries as Contained in Constitutions, Statutes, and Treaties* (1929). On the history of *jus sanguinis*, with special regard to French law, see de Lapradelle, *Nationalité d'Origine* (1893), pp. 1–28. On the history of *jus soli*, see Holdsworth, *History of English Law* (1938 ed.), pp. 72 ff.; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1897), 169 U.S. 649 (18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890). The U. S. Constitution, XIVth Amendment, Sec. 1, adopts the *jus soli* theory; also act of April 9, 1866, Sec. 1922, *Rev. Stat.* (1878), 8 U.S.C. 1. For arguments in favor of each theory, see "*Jus Soli* or *Jus Sanguinis*," The Grotius Society Publications, *Problems of the War* (1917), Vol. III, pp. 119–131, by H. S. Q. Henriques pro *jus soli* and Ernest J. Schuster pro *jus sanguinis* (1918).

[2b] For the same reason, various Latin American countries have adopted *jus soli* as the principal basis of their nationality laws. See *Research in International Law*, p. 81.

original significance. I wonder, however, if it does not point to a consideration which we would do well to keep in mind. Both from the viewpoint of the interests of our country and also from that of those who have assumed citizenship by naturalization, should we not take care that citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization are of equal value in common currency and acceptance? Our democratic form of government is based upon the assumption that citizenship should be universally held, that it is necessary for national unity, and that universal suffrage is one of the fundamental planks in the American foundation of government. It does not mean, however, that all persons who are admitted to the United States are necessarily entitled to citizenship and must be granted it. If we were ever to adopt so radical an idea, we should certainly debase the value of the currency. There would then be two kinds of citizenship: citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization, and they would not be of equal value and acceptability. Such an unfortunate and unnecessary result we must avoid at all costs.

The two most important tests in granting naturalization are loyalty and education. The determination of these is imposed upon the Immigration and Naturalization Service by explicit statutory provision.[3] The loyalty test is all-important because it establishes the individual's sympathy with our democratic beliefs and aspirations, and assures us of universal support in times of crisis such as the present war. The educational test is of equal significance because it determines the qualifications of the applicant to understand our language and institutions, and hence to participate in the operation of our democratic form of government. Obviously, he will not be able to participate as an equal unless he has the knowledge of our language and institutions which makes participation possible.

From my point of view, any proposed reforms in naturalization procedure should be aimed at furthering the social purposes of citizenship. I make the following assumptions: that citizenship in this country is based primarily upon the territorial consideration rather than status; that it should be made as universal as possible in order to encourage national unity and true democracy; that naturalization is an invitation to become a citizen, but not an assurance that everyone will be able to qualify; that naturalization is selective, and that the most important tests are those which have to do with loyalty and sufficient knowledge of our language and institutions to participate as a full-fledged member of the democratic community. If these social standards be kept in mind, certain administrative implications immediately appear: speed in naturalization is not an

[3] Nationality Act of 1940, Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, title I, subch. III, sec. 327(b), 54 *Stat.* 1150, 8 U.S.C. 727(b). As to *loyalty* requirements, see ch. 876, title I, subch. III, secs. 305, 306, 307(a), 309(a) (b). As to *educational* requirements, see ch. 876, title I, subch. III, secs. 304, 332(a).

end in itself; any proposed remedy must meet two tests, not merely one of them—it must improve the efficiency of the process and at the same time it must contribute to its effectiveness. Effectiveness is judged by the maintenance of standards and the protection of the selectivity of the process. One of the assumptions of our American way of life is that free public education is available to all. So long as this is true, we are justified in demanding, and should insist, that persons who are accepted into the body politic as full-fledged citizens shall have sufficient knowledge and understanding to be entitled to the privilege of citizenship.

The war has intensified the criticisms of delay in naturalization procedures. It has made naturalization more important to the country as a whole, because it is a means of contributing to our national unity, and it has also made it of greater urgency to the unnaturalized person. In many cases, his job, his full right to serve in the war effort, and his complete acceptance by the community depend upon it. Some of our large urban centers are still hampered by serious delays. In recent months we have made considerable improvement in many large cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia. However, there are serious delays in other places, particularly New York City, Boston, and San Francisco. The problem cannot be solved merely by additions to personnel. It is clear to those who have studied naturalization procedure that greater administrative efficiency and resulting saving of time are possible by improvements within the administrative procedure itself. We need an administrative reform such as that which has been put into effect in immigration procedure during the last two or three years. This improvement is long overdue and is now in the process of being put into effect.

What are the guiding administrative standards in analyzing the present system and recommending that it be streamlined and made more efficient? In the first place, there needs to be a simplification of procedure, accompanied by an increased concentration upon the most important substantive requirements. The two principal substantive requirements are, as I have said, the loyalty and education tests. Another way of expressing the idea is that we must eliminate anything that can be safely eliminated and that serves no useful social purpose, and direct attention to the social objectives of naturalization.

In the past, limitations of budget, personnel, and space have all been important contributing factors. Thanks to the recognition of the seriousness of this problem by Congress in recent years, there has been considerable improvement in all of these respects; but additional facilities in some cases are still necessary. However, it can no longer be said, as it once could, that the principal limiting factor is that of man-power to do the job. We can no longer hide behind this excuse, but must look to improvement of the administrative process itself if further progress is to be made.

Much of the time of the naturalization examiner is devoted to purely clerical operations. The naturalization examiner sits behind a desk, asks an incredible number of questions, the answers to which he laboriously records on the forms which he has spread out before him; and so much of his time is spent in merely recording what is said that it is not surprising if, because of the sheer weight of routine procedures, he lacks the time and energy to concentrate upon the most important aspects of the procedure. I hesitate to make such generalizations, however, because I know from personal study in the field that generalizations are unwarranted. It cannot even be said that large cities universally present a different problem from the small communities. In large part, the result seems to depend upon the type of administrative leadership that is secured in a particular jurisdiction. If the chief naturalization officer is a good administrator, knows how to organize, delegate, supervise, and inspire his staff, we find the office up to date and as efficiently run as are some of our smaller offices.

One of the principal ways of improving the administrative efficiency of the naturalization process is to provide in-service training opportunities for our naturalization staff. For years we have been operating a training school for border patrolmen. In recent months, we have set up an exceptionally fine training program for special inspectors who perform the investigatory work of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Plans have now been made for extending this training program to immigration inspectors and naturalization examiners. I am confident that this training program can accomplish a great deal in the way of administrative reform. If you take a group of men who have natural equipment and the necessary experience, and give them special training along certain lines, you can revitalize the work that is being done in a surprisingly short period of time.

Despite these provisos and exceptions, however, there seems to be no question that the larger percentage of the time of our naturalization examiners is spent on purely clerical operations. I believe it is administratively feasible to relieve them from part of this load and to make use of a greater amount of clerical assistance in certain portions of their work, thereby reserving the major percentage of their time for intensive questioning on loyalty and educational requirements. Just how the two aspects of the procedure may be geared together will have to be worked out, but I have already observed some improved methods in some of our outlying offices.

One of the most difficult parts of naturalization work has to do with the determination of the loyalty factor. There are two principal ways of getting at this question—either by the questioning of the naturalization examiner during the hearing or by outside investigation in the applicant's neighborhood. I have heard it stoutly contended that one or the other of these methods is the panacea. Such, I believe, is not the case.

Rather, we stand in need of improvement in both questioning and investigation. Have you ever observed a naturalization proceeding in which an examiner is attempting to draw out the truth from an applicant who arouses suspicion? The problem is essentially the same in a naturalization proceeding and in a hearing before one of our alien enemy boards. Stock questions get one nowhere. If the naturalization examiner is satisfied to ask the applicant stereotyped questions, there is little likelihood that he will detect fault and recommend adversely on an applicant who is anti-democratic and out of sympathy with our institutions.

The skillful naturalization examiner must develop that sixth sense which I have observed in well-trained immigrant inspectors. It is the ability to size up a person in a remarkably short period of time and determine whether he should be held for further questioning and consideration. The skillful immigrant inspector can board a train coming from Canada, and can make up his mind in a few seconds as to whether he can believe the story an individual is telling, or whether he must remove the individual from the train for a hearing before a board of special inquiry. This ability is a combination of native intelligence, understanding of human nature, knowledge of immigration law, and experience. The green recruit cannot be expected to have this ability. It is acquired only after months or years of experience, and almost unconsciously becomes part of the man's equipment. Similarly, the naturalization examiner must be able to segregate the good case from the suspicious case after a hearing has been in progress only a small proportion of the time allotted to the hearing of a case. One of the principal qualifications of a naturalization examiner is this ability to segregate the good case from the bad.

The skillful naturalization examiner must know as much as the person he is questioning if he is to have any hope of success. This means that he must have political sophistication. He must understand political philosophy. He must know how Nazi philosophy differs from that of democracy. He must have an understanding of the underlying meaning of such key concepts as religious freedom, jury trial, and all of the Bill of Rights, if his questioning is to be penetrating rather than stereotyped. Frequently the most dangerous persons from the standpoint of espionage and subversive activities are those who have the greatest sophistication in these respects. It is obvious, therefore, that the naturalization examiner not only must have equal background, but must be adept as an interrogator if he is to perform his function successfully.

Neighborhood investigations are indicated in all those cases in which there is any ground for suspicion. Recently the Immigration and Naturalization Service has consolidated all of its investigatory work in twenty districts, covering the United States. As a general proposition, the person

who holds the hearing should not be the person who makes the investigation. They are two separate functions. If the investigation is skillfully executed, it can contribute a great deal to the determination of the loyalty factor. Obviously, it is not sufficient merely to rely upon the testimony of the two witnesses who are required by law, because every applicant chooses his own witnesses, and hence they may be presumed to be "safe."

The educational requirement is equally difficult in its administration, because it depends upon subtleties which only the initiated can be expected to handle. Here, as in the case of the loyalty test, the asking of stereotyped questions is worse than useless. It is sometimes recommended that there be a standardization of questions for the country as a whole. In my opinion, this is moving in the wrong direction. Isolated facts are frequently of no great significance. Instead, an attempt should be made to determine how much the applicant knows about the underlying reasons for universal suffrage, separation of policy-making and policy-administering departments, and the check and balance system. If a person is coached long enough, almost anyone can memorize the name of the first president of the United States, the present governor of a particular state, and the date of the Declaration of Independence.

One of the most needed and urgent improvements is the better articulation of the citizenship education program and the drafting and administration of educational tests by naturalization examiners. Improvements in the former have not been adequately transferred to the latter. I believe that we should place increased reliance upon the certification of candidates by well-qualified educational institutions. Is there any reason why a good public school should not certify to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that a particular alien applicant is literate and that he understands the fundamentals of the American form of government? If such procedure were made more universal, it would have two advantages: it would make the educational program more effective because it would be a requirement in most cases, and secondly, it would relieve the naturalization officials of a heavy burden by delegating this responsibility to qualified educational authorities. Such a plan would involve the accrediting of each institution, frequent inspections of its faculty and methods, and the reservation of the right to examine any applicant *de novo* if any ground existed for believing that the certification of his case was unmerited. This method has already been tried, and the results have been promising. If the program is carefully run and surrounded with adequate safeguards, it can contribute much to the improvement of the educational test.

In the administrative history of naturalization, there has been a gradual metamorphosis from a judicial proceeding to one which is almost wholly

administrative.[4] I believe that the time has now arrived when the metamorphosis should be completed.[5] The logical extension of the rôle of the designated examiner is to make naturalization procedure wholly an administrative one.[6] The designated examiner should be permitted to order the admission of the applicant to citizenship. This last step is desirable if accompanied by appropriate safeguards. The right should be reserved to every court having jurisdiction to hear *de novo*, both as to law and as to fact, any case in which there are grounds for believing that further consideration by a judicial tribunal is desirable. Not only would the alien have the right to appeal, but a competent tribunal would assume jurisdiction on its own motion in those cases where such action seemed desirable. In view of the fact that in 99 per cent of the cases at the present time the recommendation of the designated examiner is accepted, there would seem to be no possible objection to the proposed course of action.

Now comes the meat of the matter: at the present time, there are twelve steps in the naturalization procedure. Some of these steps seem superfluous and can be eliminated without any loss to the substantive process. What is more, by their elimination it should be possible to give increased attention to those substantive provisions which are of the greatest concern.

The twelve steps are: (1) lawful admission;[7] (2) preliminary application for certificate of arrival and declaration of intention;[8] (3) issuance of certificate of arrival;[9] (4) filing of declaration of intention;[10] (5) establishment of residence requirements;[11] (6) preliminary application to file a petition;[12] (7) preliminary examination;[13] (8) filing of petition;[14] (9) preliminary hearing;[15] (10) statutory waiting period;[16] (11) final hearing in open court;[17] (12) order of admission.[18]

The substitute plan consists of the following steps: (1) Record of admission for permanent residence. Eliminate declaration of intention and

[4] See Hazard, "The Trend toward Administrative Naturalization," in this REVIEW, Vol. 21, p. 342 (1927); Fields, "Making Naturalization Administrative," *Boston Univ. Law Rev.*, Vol. 15, p. 260 (1935).

[5] In the opinion of prominent jurists, naturalization is essentially administrative in nature and not judicial. See Report No. 1328 of Hearings by Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. (1926), p. 4 (Chief Justice Taft), p. 7 (Judge Augustus N. Hand), p. 12 (Judge Learned Hand). [6] See Fields, *op. cit.*

[7] Required in all cases where a certificate of arrival is required. See Nationality Act, 1940, *supra*, secs. 329(b), 332(b), 332(c). [8] 8 CFR *supra*, sec. 365.1.

[9] See note 1. [10] Nationality Act of 1940, *supra*, sec. 331.

[11] See 8 CFR *supra*, secs. 354.1–354.8.

[12] 8 CFR *supra*, sec. 370.1. [13] 8 CFR *supra*, sec. 370.8.

[14] Nationality Act of 1940, *supra*, sec. 332.

[15] *Ibid.*, *supra*, sec. 333. [16] *Ibid.*, *supra*, sec. 334(c).

[17] *Ibid.*, *supra*, sec. 334(a), 335. [18] *Ibid.*, *supra*, secs. 334(a), 336.

substitute application for citizenship. This application could be filed any time after entry, and would contain adequate information concerning entry for the Service to verify. It would be valid for one year following completion of residence requirements. (2) Copy of application stamped "Verified" to be returned to alien. (3) Alien to petition on his own motion before a naturalization examiner to file formally a petition for citizenship, provided he has five years' residence and can at that time submit the affidavits of at least two citizen witnesses, as well as pay a fee of ten dollars. This dispenses with the declaration of intention. This document to be on file for a period of at least thirty days, in order to permit any necessary investigation. (4) Investigation of applicant. (5) Final hearing. When the petition was ready to be heard by the naturalization examiner, the petitioner should be advised to appear, at which time he would be granted a final hearing and admitted to citizenship by that officer, if the petition was granted. (6) If the petition was denied, the individual should be advised of his right to appeal within ninety days to the federal court for a judicial hearing in the district where the application was filed, the complete record to be sent to the court, which might review the proceedings not only as to facts, but as to the law.

At the present time, the alien who desires to become a citizen of the United States is required to file a declaration of intention and an application for a certificate of arrival, and he cannot be naturalized, notwithstanding that he may have the required period of legal residence (usually five years), until two years have elapsed from the filing of the declaration of intention.[19] It is believed that the application for a certificate of arrival and the declaration of intention may well be dispensed with. The desire to become a citizen is as well evidenced by the filing of an application or petition for naturalization as by any other document, and the fact that in more than 60 per cent of the cases now coming before the Service individuals are naturalized without declaration of intention indicates persuasively that this document can easily be dispensed with without detracting from the substantive requirements of the naturalization procedure. Under the proposed plan, lawful residence would be established on the application or petition for citizenship.

Over a long period of time there has been a gradual substitution of the administrative process of naturalization for the original judicial proceeding.[20] That a judicial proceeding has certain merits cannot be gainsaid; that it involves delays is established beyond question; that it affords any feature which is irreplaceable seems doubtful. Hearing days in the courts cannot be secured at all times; calendaring of cases is essential; clerical

[19] Nationality Act of 1940, *supra*, sec. 332(a), 54 Stat. 1154.

[20] See *supra*, p. 14, note 1.

burdens are imposed upon the clerks of the courts—all of these creating delays.[21]

In 1926, the naturalization law was amended to permit certain examiners to be designated by the courts to act in their stead in the examination of petitions for naturalization.[22] In 99 per cent of the cases now heard by the designated examiner, the findings are approved by the courts. A step in the direction of expeditious naturalization would seem to be naturalization by administrative process by a designated examiner, when the latter has determined that the petitioner is qualified for citizenship, allowing, however, a review by the federal courts in those cases where the petition for naturalization has been denied, or where for any reason the court finds reason for reconsidering the case *de novo*. This proposal is not as radical as it may seem at first blush, for in substance this is the method used today. It would merely be given legislative sanction. It would be possible to dispense with the present court routine; but it would not remove the essential safeguard of an independent examination of the case by the court having appropriate jurisdiction.

In the history of naturalization in the United States, legislative enactments have contributed considerably to the improvement of the process; for example, the Nationality Act of 1940, which represents a codification of all naturalization law, is a landmark in legislative progress. I would not for a moment assume that further amendments and substantive revisions are not necessary. I sincerely believe, however, that further improvement in the naturalization process should be sought by administrative reform and by a program of removing superfluous procedures and strengthening substantive requirements. This is the approach most likely to achieve the desired results—fewer delays in securing naturalization and more effective testing of all who seek the privilege.

[21] See Report No. 1328 of Hearings by Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).

[22] Act of June 8, 1926, C. 502, 44 Stat. 709, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 399a.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

THE DOMINION-PROVINCIAL TAX AGREEMENTS IN CANADA

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Canada has recently instituted a significant war-time fiscal plan. As a federal state, the Dominion has been plagued by the complicated problems of federal finance; and to meet the severe burdens of war finance, it has found it necessary to simplify the federal financial structure. This change has been accomplished by formal agreements between the Dominion and the provinces whereby the latter have agreed to retire from certain fields of taxation for the duration of the war.

The agreements do not require amendment of the British North America Act (1867), but they do necessitate abstinence of the provinces from exercising a portion of their authority under it. By the terms of that fundamental law, the provinces are authorized to levy "direct taxation within the province in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial purposes"[1] and "shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer, and other licenses in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes."[2] The Dominion, however, is granted the power to raise revenue by "any mode or system of taxation."[3] Under this distribution of tax authority, it was natural that various sources should eventually be taxed by both the Dominion and the provinces. By 1940, not only the provinces and the Dominion, but also in some instances municipalities, were levying income and corporate taxes. Inasmuch as the rates varied from province to province and from municipality to municipality, there was inequality of the tax burden throughout the Dominion. In order to secure a maximum of revenue for war purposes, the Dominion government deemed it necessary to tax corporations and incomes at the same rate throughout Canada; and for this reason, the government requested the provinces (and municipalities) to retire from these fields of taxation for the war period.

This has been accomplished by nine Dominion-provincial "taxation agreements," which were the product of extensive and complex negotiations between the Dominion and the provinces. In his budget speech of 1941, the Hon. James L. Ilsley, Dominion minister of finance, reviewed the chaotic inequalities of taxation within the Dominion and revealed that he would offer to the provinces a plan for their retirement from the

[1] 30 Victoria, Chap. 3, Sec. 92, Subsec. 2.
[2] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 9.
[3] *Ibid.*, Sec. 91, Subsec. 8.

income and corporate tax fields.[4] Immediately thereafter negotiations began. A conference with provincial officials was held December 18 and 19, 1941, to coördinate the specific terms. Details of the compacts were not announced until January, 1942, when copies were sent to the provinces for submission to their legislatures. In the following months, all the provinces passed enabling legislation and the agreements were formally signed. Recently, the Dominion Parliament enacted the Dominion-Provincial Taxation Agreement Act, 1942, whereby authority for the agreements was granted and provision for the necessary appropriations made.

The agreements assure the provinces that all of their rights will be protected. For example, the preambles state that the provinces shall not "be deemed to have surrendered, abandoned or given over to the Dominion any of the powers, rights, privileges or authority vested in the province under the provisions of the British North America Act, 1867, or any subsequent Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to have otherwise impaired any of such powers, rights, privileges or authority. . . ." The agreements became effective when signed, and are to continue until one year after the cessation of hostilities with Germany, Italy, and Japan—that is, until the last day of the provincial fiscal year which closes nearest to December 31 of the first calendar year beginning after the cessation of hostilities.[5] It is the duty of the Dominion to notify the provinces of the termination of hostilities;[6] but if any province believes that the war has ceased, it may request the Dominion to call a Dominion-provincial conference to settle the issue.[7] If either the Dominion or a province fails to fulfil its part of the agreement, the other may cancel the compact forthwith.[8] Finally, any province may terminate its agreement at a specified time in any year upon written notice to the Dominion minister of finance thirty days before such date. Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia may do so on March 31, Manitoba and Saskatchewan on April 30, New Brunswick on October 31, Nova Scotia on November 30, and Prince Edward Island on December 31.[9]

Under the specific terms of the agreements, each province "undertakes to repeal, suspend, or nullify, or to have repealed, suspended, or nullified, until the termination of this agreement, the enactments pursuant to which income and corporation taxes are assessed and levied. . . ."[10] In Appendix A of each agreement is listed the various acts or sections of acts to be

[4] *Budget Speech*, Apr. 29, 1941 (Ottawa, 1941), pp. 10–13.

[5] *Tax Agreements* (hereafter this will refer to all the agreements taken collectively; sections are similarly numbered in each one), Sec. 23, Subsec. 1.

[6] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 2. [7] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 3. [8] *Ibid.*, Sec. 21.

[9] *Ibid.*, Sec. 23, Subsec. 5. [10] *Ibid.*, Sec. 2.

suspended.[11] A special clause in the agreements with Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec provides for the repeal of municipal income and corporation levies.[12]

In the instances of taxes upon corporations, the provinces will collect only those due and payable before September 1, 1941, and any amounts collected for a subsequent period will be refunded.[13] The following corporate levies will not be suspended: a *bona fide* and reasonable provincial license, registration, filing, or other fee, provided that no fee now more than $250 per year shall be increased, and that any fee subsequently imposed shall not be more than that sum; incorporation fees; license fees for specific rights or franchises levied by a municipality or under authority of the province; assessments under a workmen's compensation act; and any business or occupancy tax based upon floor space or on the rental or assessed value of property, or on the gross receipts of a business.[14] The various provincial and municipal taxes of the above category are set forth in Appendix B of the agreements. In addition, the provinces are permitted to levy and collect taxes, license fees, and royalties upon or in respect of natural resources;[15] provincial levies of this nature are listed in Appendix C to the agreements. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Alberta agree to reduce certain fees upon businesses and corporations to $250 a year, and Prince Edward Island and British Columbia to $25 a year.[16]

In reference to income taxes, the provinces and municipalities will collect the taxes for the calendar year 1940 and prior years, and any arrears thereof, but not for any subsequent year.[17] In instances where a taxpayer's fiscal year ends in 1941, only the tax for the period in 1940 shall be collectible;[18] refunds shall be made for any income tax collected for any portion of the calendar year 1941.[19]

As compensation for retiring from the corporation and income tax fields and for the loss of revenue incurred, the Dominion agrees to pay as annual grants to the provinces the sums listed in the first column of Chart A. From these amounts, which are payable in quarterly installments of 10 per cent, June 30; 15 per cent, September 30; 25 per cent,

[11] As an illustration, the Alberta agreement lists the following acts: the Corporations Taxation Act, the Income Tax Act, the Railway Taxation Act, the Pipe Line Taxation Act, the Electric Power Taxation Act, the Banking Corporations Temporary Additional Taxation Act, the Corporations Temporary Additional Taxation Act, the Fuel Oil Licensing Act, and the Licensing of Trade and Businesses Act. [12] *Tax Agreements*, Sec. 2. [13] *Ibid.*, Sec. 6.

[14] *Ibid.*, Sec. 1, Subsec. a(i), a(ii), a(iii), a(iv), and a(v).

[15] *Ibid.*, Sec. 9, Subsec. 1 and 2.

[16] *Nova Scotia Agreement*, Sec. 2B and 2C; *New Brunswick Agreement*, Sec. 2B; *Alberta Agreement*, Sec. 2A and 2B; *Price Edward Island Agreement*, Sec. 2B, Subsec. 1 and 2; and *British Columbia Agreement*, Sec. 2A.

[17] *Tax Agreements*, Sec. 3. [18] *Ibid.*, Sec. 4. [19] *Ibid.*, Sec. 5.

December 31; and 50 per cent, March 31, shall be deducted any sums collected by the provinces from the taxes supposedly suspended.[20] Any portion withheld by the Dominion as deductions shall be paid to the provinces within thirty days after the termination of the agreements.[21]

During the negotiation of the compacts, the Dominion offered the provinces two methods for calculating the compensatory grants: the actual sum collected by the provinces and the municipalities from the corporation and income taxes during the fiscal years ending nearest December 31, 1940, or the cost of the net debt service of a province calculated for the same base period, less secession duties collected during that span. In addition, the Dominion minister of finance proposed that fiscal need subsidies should be paid if a province should prove the need. The method of calculation of the grants is set forth in Appendix D of the agreements.

Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan chose the debt option plan. Fiscal need subsidies were proved in the case of five provinces which would have experienced a definite deficiency of revenue; and the sums payable are listed in the second column of Chart A. In most instances these deficiencies would have occurred because the Dominion, in 1941, suspended payment of special subsidies to the provinces for the duration.[22] However, the right to the restoration and continuance of these sums is in no way prejudiced by the agreements.[23]

CHART A[24]

Fiscal Need Subsidies

	Grants under Proposals	*For Loss of Revenue*	*Additional Subsidy*	*Total Grants*
Prince Edward Island	$ 264,769	$262,174	$ 175,000	$ 701,943
Nova Scotia	2,585,308	325,769	. . .	2,911,078
New Brunswick	3,278,574	71,493	300,000	3,650,067
Quebec	20,586,074	. . .	. . .	20,586,074
Ontario	28,964,039	. . .	. . .	28,964,039
Manitoba	5,054,740	. . .	600,000	5,654,740
Saskatchewan	4,330,471	. . .	1,500,000	5,830,471
Alberta	4,080,860	. . .	. . .	4,080,860
British Columbia	12,048,367	. . .	. . .	12,048,367
	$81,193,207	$659,436	$2,575,000	$84,427,643

[20] *Ibid.*, Sec. 11 and 14. [21] *Ibid.*, Sec. 15.

[22] The suspended subsidies include: Prince Edward Island, $275,000; Nova Scotia, $1,300,000; New Brunswick, $900,000; Manitoba, $750,000; Saskatchewan, $1,500,000; and British Columbia, $750,000.

[23] *Prince Edward Island Agreement*, Sec. 10; *Nova Scotia Agreement*, Sec. 10; *New Brunswick Agreement*, Sec. 10; *Manitoba Agreement*, Sec. 10A; *Saskatchewan Agreement*, Sec. 10A; and *British Columbia Agreement*, Sec. 10A.

[24] Compiled from *Tax Agreements*, Sec. 10 and Appendix D (all fractions of a dollar have been eliminated).

The Dominion government has recognized that provincial revenues will decrease as the war continues. Particularly will this be true of the revenue from gasoline taxes. Mr. Ilsley, Dominion minister of finance, foresaw this tendency and incorporated a provision in the agreements whereby the Dominion will pay to the provinces each year a sum representing the differences between actual gasoline collections as compared with yields in the base year 1940.[25] The base figures are set forth in Appendix E of the agreements; the maximum amounts payable are: Prince Edward Island, $307,901; Nova Scotia, $2,853,363; New Brunswick, $2,101,072; Quebec, $11,803,248; Ontario, $26,608,290; Manitoba, $2,678,148; Saskatchewan, $3,397,279; Alberta, $3,221,975; and British Columbia, $3,763,625—a total of $56,734,905. If a province should amend its gasoline taxes or fail to exercise due diligence and efficiency in the administration of its acts, the Dominion may make deductions from the gasoline payment to compensate for any decrease in the gasoline receipts due to the action of the province.[26] If a province objects to any deduction, the issue shall be submitted by agreement to a qualified accountant or other person for determination—with the decision binding.[27] However, should it be impossible to agree upon one person, the matter must be referred to an arbitral tribunal.[28]

If losses occur in other sources of provincial revenue, the Dominion undoubtedly would undertake to provide compensation. For example, Mr. Ilsley, in a debate on May 25, stated that if there were any further reductions in provincial revenues, such as might arise from a decrease of drivers, and automobile licenses, the Dominion would take cognizance of the financial consequences upon the provinces.[29] Up to the present, no additional compensation has been awarded or considered.

If the parties to the compact fail to agree on the interpretation of any of the provisions or on any matter arising therefrom, either has a right to refer the issue to an arbitral tribunal.[30] If either the Dominion or a province believes that the other party to the agreement has failed to fulfil any of the provisions of the pact, the complainant may submit the matter to an arbitral tribunal.[31] Each tribunal shall be composed of three persons, one to be selected by the government of Canada, one by the government of the province concerned, and the third member by the two already chosen. If the two selected fail to approve a third, this member is to be appointed by the Chief Justice of Canada.[32] The findings of any two members

[25] *Tax Agreements*, Sec. 16, Subsec. 2.

[26] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 3. [27] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 4.

[28] *Ibid.*, The composition and function of the arbitral tribunals are explained in the second following paragraph.

[29] *The London Free Press* (Ontario), May 26, 1942, p. 18.

[30] *Tax Agreements*, Sec. 21, Subsec. 1. [31] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 2 and 4.

[32] *Ibid.*, Sec. 22, Subsec. 1.

of the board will constitute the decision of the tribunal.[33] Each arbitral board is to determine its own procedure,[34] and the expenses of any tribunal is to be borne by the Dominion.[35] If any tribunal decrees that the Dominion or a province is at fault and the failure is not rectified, the other party may terminate the agreement forthwith.[36]

The tax agreements are important as war measures, but they have a further significance because actually they constitute a partial introduction, for a trial period, of the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission. One should recall that Canada has suffered from an unsatisfactory Dominion-provincial fiscal arrangement because the terms of confederation (1867) were inadequate to meet the services of the present century. Piecemeal and makeshift efforts for adjustments were made at various times by the award of special subsidies to individual provinces, but no complete examination of the problem was undertaken until the depression years, when the Dominion had to assume provincial obligations for relief and other services. After several years of provincial importunity, the Dominion finally placed the whole issue before a Royal Commission in 1937. The outcome was the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations.

There is no need to review the recommendations of this body, for they were examined in a previous article in this REVIEW.[37] But one should recall that the Commission suggested that the Dominion be assigned the income and corporation tax fields, and in turn assume the burden of provincial debts. Efforts to implement the Rowell-Sirois Report in January, 1941, failed; however, the matter is far from a dead issue. Under the terms of the tax agreements, the Dominion has taken over the income and corporate tax fields, and it has indirectly assumed the burden of the debt service of four provinces. Thus, a portion of the Rowell-Sirois Report has been placed in operation for a temporary period. One cannot expect that Canada will return after the war to its former structure of federal finance. In fact, there is strong reason to believe that the agreements constitute a step toward reconstruction of Dominion-provincial relationships along the lines of the Royal Commission Report. For example, the Hon. Stuart G. Garson, provincial treasurer of Manitoba, stated in his budget speech of March 13, 1942: "When peace comes, we do not think that Canada will return to the pre-war system of public finance. We think that any change in the present taxation agreement will be in the direction of carrying into effect, in substance if not in name, many, if not all, of the recommenda-

[33] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 3. [34] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 4.
[35] *Ibid.*, Subsec. 5. [36] *Ibid.*, Sec. 21, Subsec. 3 and 5.
[37] See Luella Gettys, "Canadian Federalism: Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations," in this REVIEW, Vol. 35 (Feb., 1941), pp. 100–107.

tions of the Rowell-Sirois Report."[38] This view undoubtedly is shared by members of the Dominion government, though it is impossible to estimate how many provincial officials would give it their approbation.

The Canadian tax agreements have a further significance because of the example which they set for the United States. Already the fiscal effects of a country at war have appeared in state revenues. Those states which employ income taxes can forestall and offset other revenue losses, due to the increased incomes of war-workers, though the pressure of federal income taxes may overburden this field. Eventually, the states will become hard-pressed. Then the Canadian experience will be of value in the determination of action in the United States. Space permits one merely to observe that greater uniformity of taxation is necessary in the United States, that the states will have to retire from some fields of taxation (the income and corporation tax fields are the most likely), and that the federal government will have to guarantee the states some minimum of revenue so that they may provide a reasonable level of services—the only alternative being the complete operation of these services by the federal government. Perhaps we shall have to choose between the continuance of the federal form in the United States and a further shift toward a unitary state.[39] At all events, the Canadian tax agreements constitute one attractive method of meeting our problems of public finance.

[38] *Budget Speech of Hon. Stuart G. Garson* (Winnipeg, 1942), p. 20.

[39] If the United States wishes to retain its federal system, it should avoid a plan recently instituted in Australia. A Commonwealth tax law practically forced the states from the income tax field by prescribing a uniform income tax, and by placing the state tax departments under Commonwealth supervision. This act was upheld by the Australian High Court on July 23, 1942.

NEWS AND NOTES

PERSONAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

Compiled by the Managing Editor

Dr. Harry A. Garfield, eighteenth president of the American Political Science Association, died at his home in Williamstown, Massachusetts, on December 12, 1942, and Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell, fifth president, at his home in Boston on January 6, 1943. Memorials prepared by committees of the Association will appear in the next issue of the REVIEW.

Professor Walter H. C. Laves, of the University of Chicago, who from December, 1941, was director of the United States Division of the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, has been transferred to the post of chief of the Division of Special Operations of the OCD.

Professor Edwin A. Cottrell, of Stanford University, has recently been elected president of the Western Governmental Research Association, and reëlected vice-president of the California Merit System League.

Professor Roland W. Maddox is on leave this year from the University of Kansas in order to carry on special studies for the research department of the Kansas Legislative Council.

Professor Joseph R. Starr, of the University of Minnesota, is now in active service with the U. S. Army and is stationed at Fort Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska.

Professor E. Allen Helms, of Ohio State University, has been chosen chairman of the Central Ohio Branch of the Foreign Policy Association.

Dr. Malcolm C. Moos, formerly of the University of Wyoming, has been appointed an associate in political science at the Johns Hopkins University to take over for the time being the work of Dr. V. O. Key, now on leave with the U. S. Bureau of the Budget.

Swarthmore College granted leave of absence for the current year to Professors Vernon O'Rourke and Bryce Wood. The former is serving as a mediator for the National War Labor Board, and the latter is attached to the Division of Special Research in the Department of State. At Swarthmore, Dr. G. Homer Durham, of Utah State Agricultural College, has been appointed acting assistant professor to carry on the work given up by Professor O'Rourke; while Mr. Herbert G. Sonthoff has been appointed an instructor and is conducting Professor Wood's work.

Mr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, of the University of Pennsylvania, participated in a conference on September 25 at Princeton University on "Military Manpower and American Policy."

Professor Orba F. Traylor, of the University of Kentucky, has been employed to organize a finance office at Grand Rapids, Michigan.

At the University of Vermont, Dr. Andrew E. Nuquist has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Dr. Richard H. Heindel, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed director of the American Library in the U. S. Office of War Information at London.

At Iowa State College, Dr. John R. Mashek has been appointed assistant professor of government, effective January 1, 1943.

Mr. Roy Melbourne, graduate student and one time holder of a Penfield Fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania, was interned in Japan for six months and is now serving at the U. S. Embassy in Turkey.

Dr. Edgar B. Cale, who handles the course in Latin American government and politics at the University of Pennsylvania, has been promoted to an assistant professorship.

Mr. Paul Kelso, formerly instructor at Ohio State University, is now a member of the political science staff at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Dr. Joseph A. Kitchin, formerly a teaching fellow at the University of Michigan, has been promoted at the University of Maryland from the instructorship which he held last year to an assistant professorship.

Professor Arthur W. Bromage, of the University of Michigan, received early in January a commission as Major in the U. S. Army, and was ordered to report at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia.

Professor Jane Perry Clark Carey, of Barnard College, has become principal training specialist on the training of women for government service under the Civil Service Commission. Professor Carey continues her work at Barnard on a part-time basis.

Professor Harold Sprout, of Princeton University, is directing the preparation of a strategical atlas for the OWI and doing consultation work for the Geopolitical Section of the General Staff.

While on leave from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Professor Smith Simpson is serving as chief of the Allied Nations Section in the Recruitment and Manning Organization of the War Shipping Administration.

Dr. Herman Finer has resigned from the London School of Economics in order to serve for some time with the International Labor Organization

as special consultant on post-war reconstruction. In the main, he is engaged upon the problem of International Development Authorities for assisting the under-developed countries better to exploit their natural resources and so raise their standard of living. He expects to be on this side of the Atlantic for some time, and correspondence may be addressed to him at the I.L.O. in Montreal.

Dr. John B. Andrews, for thirty-two years secretary of the American Association for Labor Legislation, founder and editor of the *American Labor Legislation Review*, and an outstanding figure in the field of labor and other social legislation, died in New York City on January 3 at the age of sixty-two.

Professor Heinrich P. Jordan has been granted leave of absence from New York University for the second semester of the current academic year to serve as visiting professor in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Puerto Rico, San Piedras, P. R. He is offering courses on "Dictatorships of Today," "Government and Politics of Latin America," and "Problems of Post-War Reconstruction."

At Tulane University, Professor W. V. Holloway has secured leave of absence to serve with the New Orleans department of city civil service as head of the classification division. Professor Hollis W. Barber also has secured leave and has been awarded a commission as a Lieutenant in the U. S. Naval Reserve. Mrs. Mary Symons Strong, who received a master's degree from the University of Cincinnati, has been made acting instructor, and is giving courses in public administration and constitutional law. Professors Howard P. Johnson, and W. E. H. Baringer, of the department of history, are devoting half-time to the department of political science, the former offering courses in international relations and the latter courses in American government.

Dr. Oswaldo Trigueiro, an exchange fellow from Brazil in 1939–40 who received his master's degree in political science in June, 1940, has recently published a monograph entitled *O Regime Dos Estados Na União Americana*. Dr. Trigueiro, who at present is a director of the Instituto Brasil-Estados Unidos, states that this is the first Brazilian work on the governmental institutions of the United States.

During November and December, the political science department at the University of Pennsylvania had as guest speakers Dr. John Earl Baker, former inspector-general of the Burma Road; Dr. Anup Singh; Captain Edward J. Lobkowicz, attaché of the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile; and Dr. Randolph Paul, general counsel of the U. S. Treasury Department.

War-time administration is the subject dealt with in a new seminar offered during the winter term at the University of Washington. Officials of various federal agencies, as well as members of the University staff, are participating.

The Southern Institute of Local Government, sponsored by the University of Tennessee, held its third annual meeting at Memphis on November 13 and 14. It was addressed by James W. Martin, University of Kentucky; John K. Langum, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; and Clarence E. Ridley, International City Managers Association. Joint sessions held with the Tennessee Law Institute were addressed by Professor Roscoe Pound and Mr. James P. Pope. The department of political science at the University of Tennessee is assisting the city of Knoxville in a classification survey.

In an effort to make quasi-judicial decisions easier of access, the Brazilian government has, beginning with August 13, 1942, been publishing daily a fourth section to the official gazette (*Diario Oficial*). This separately paged section includes not only a brief record of the proceedings, but the decisions of the first and second councils of tax and customs appeals, the national council of water and electric power, the national and regional labor councils, the tariff council, the national traffic council, and the administrative maritime tribunal. Previously these proceedings and decisions were more or less buried in the bulky first section of the Brazilian official gazette.

The American University and the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, in coöperation with the coördinator of Inter-American affairs, presented an Institute on the Law of Our American Neighbors on November 18, on the occasion of the opening of the Inter-American Bar Association Council meeting in Washington. With a view to developing materials which may be made available to other local bar associations wishing to sponsor similar institutes to study the juridical systems of the Western Hemisphere, the following program was arranged: "The Sources and Structure of the Civil Law," by Dr. Ricardo Alfaro, secretary-general of the American Institute of International Law; "Constitutional Guarantees in the Americas," by Professor Noel T. Dowling, of Columbia University Law School; "Procedure and Practice in Civil Law Countries," by Mr. Otto Schoenrich, of New York; and "Criminal Code and Proceedings," by Hon. Justin Miller, associate justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and Dr. Gaston Godoy, of the Havana Bar. Each paper was discussed by a panel including the presidents of both the Brazilian and Cuban bar associations. Members of the panel were: Dr. Raoul Herrera-Arango, secretary of the Cuban embassy;

Dr. Roberto Cordova, counselor of the Mexican embassy; Dr. Mario Rodriguez, counselor of the Chilean embassy; Dr. Hector Castor, minister of El Salvador; Dr. Edmundo de Mirando Jordaou, president of the Brazilian Bar; Dr. Manuel F. Supervielle, president of the Cuban Bar; and Donald Richberg, Edmund L. Jones, and William S. Culbertson, of the Washington Bar. A copy of the proceedings of the Institute may be obtained by writing to President Paul F. Douglass, The American University, Washington, D. C.

Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems. For the purpose of creating a central organization by which to focus the attention and mobilize the thought particularly of scholars in residence at American colleges and universities on the problems of post-war settlement, a Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems has recently been organized. This Committee originally grew out of conferences held at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton during the summer and autumn of 1942. The work of the Committee has recently become one of collaboration between the Committee and the World Peace Foundation by the action of the board of trustees of that organization in agreeing to give the project financial and staff support. The Committee plans to undertake and encourage, through local coöperating individuals and groups, the systematic survey, analysis, discussion, and appraisal of policies and ideas, rather than research on matters of fact. Discussion outlines and memoranda on significant questions of policy will be prepared and circulated to coöperating groups. On the basis of comments received and occasional conferences of specially qualified and interested persons, it is anticipated that memoranda on significant questions will be put into shape for final publication and that the interested Government agencies will be informed of conclusions reached. The Central Committee consists of Ralph Barton Perry, as chairman, Frank Aydelotte, Edwin F. Gay, Arthur O. Lovejoy, Leland M. Goodrich, James Phinney Baxter, III, George H. Blakeslee, Frederick S. Dunn, Edward Mead Earle, Guy Stanton Ford, Charles H. McIlwain, Wallace Notestein, Edwin G. Nourse, C. Reinold Noyes, Jacob Viner, and Payson Wild. Contacts have been made with over 150 colleges and universities and a substantial number have signified their intention of participating in the enterprise. Other individuals or groups who are interested are invited to communicate with Professor Leland M. Goodrich, Executive Secretary, Universities Committee, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts.

Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. The thirty-eighth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association was scheduled to be held in Chicago December 28–30, 1942, with the Hotel Sherman as headquarters. It was to have been a joint

meeting with the American Society for Public Administration. On December 2, at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation addressed to all learned, professional, and scientific societies, the meeting was cancelled, the decision to cancel being taken at a conference in Chicago of the presidents, the secretaries, and the chairmen of the program committees of the two societies. Immediate notification was mailed to the members of both societies, together with the Joint Preliminary Program.

The address of Vice-President Henry A. Wallace on "World Organization and Administration," scheduled for Monday noon, December 28, in Chicago, was given that same evening as a broadcast from Washington, D. C., over the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company. The address was made with the approval of President Roosevelt and aroused favorable comment from all continents of the globe. The Vice-President spoke under the sponsorship not only of the American Political Science Association, but also of the American Society for Public Administration, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, and the American Historical Association.

The Joint Preliminary Program for 1942 contained the following significant foreword:

"The pressure of total war has brought our democratic system and its legislative and administrative machinery to the most severe test. The complex governmental problems of World War II have demonstrated not only the interdependence of nations and peoples, but also the interdependence of all techniques and branches of knowledge. Thus, more than ever before the United States needs a free exchange of information and ideas among those who have been trained in the theory and practice of government.

"The joint annual meeting of the American Political Science Association and the American Society for Public Administration therefore performs a vital function as the second year of active American participation in total warfare begins. Never before have so many teachers of political science been called to public service, and never have so many government officials been immediately concerned with both practical and theoretical problems.

"Government officials and leaders of public opinion have expressed the desire that the thirty-eighth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association and the fourth annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration should be held this year as in former years in order to give these officials an opportunity to discuss with their college and university colleagues the urgent questions of policy and administration of our war-time government and the various plans that are being considered for the post-war world. At the same time, teachers in public schools as well as in colleges and universities, who are partly responsible

for the maintenance of public morale, have asked for this opportunity to discuss public policy with government officials. The program of 1942 has been constructed largely with the purpose of fulfilling these requirements."

The program for the American Political Science Association was constructed by a committee under the chairmanship of Harold W. Stoke. This program offered such a realistic approach to the war effort and post-war reconstruction that it is deemed advisable to publish it in full in spite of its cancellation. It is believed that members of the Association will find in it pertinent suggestions for research in actual government and public policy.

Monday, December 28, at 9:30 A.M.

SECTION MEETINGS

(1) Coöperative Government

Emergency governmental programs have led to the development of administrative collaboration among levels of government and units of government. What promise does such collaboration hold for the future and what problems is it likely to bring?

Chairman: Frank Bane, Council of State Governments.

Discussion: Joseph B. Eastman, Office of Defense Transportation; Wilson W. Wyatt, Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky.

(2) Legislation and Legislatures

A discussion of Congress as a functioning unit in American government. Congress of late has been criticized as an institution with a vehemence seldom exceeded. Is it playing its rôle correctly? What is its correct rôle? Have changes in the economic and political milieu been sufficiently reflected in changes in the organization and operation of Congress and its committees? What light can state experience shed upon the problems of our national legislature?

"The Report of the American Political Science Association Committee on Congress," George B. Galloway, Twentieth Century Fund.

"Progress Report, Columbia University Studies on Congress," Schuyler Wallace, Columbia University.

"Research in Legislative Process and Its Implications for the National Legislature," Garland Routt, Office of Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Chairman: Ernest S. Griffith, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Discussion: Roland Young, Clerk, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate; Elbert D. Thomas, U. S. Senator from Utah; T. V. Smith, University of Chicago; E. Pendleton Herring, Harvard University.

Secretary: Floyd M. Riddick, Congressional Intelligence.

(3) Manpower Administration

The problems of organizing for the most efficient use of our national human resources for the prosecution of the war.

Chairman: Otto S. Beyer, Office of Defense Transportation.

(4) War-Time Management of Opinion

Chairman: Wesley C. Clark, Syracuse University.

Discussion: George Creel, Committee on Public Information, 1917–1918; Captain Leland P. Lovette, Director of Public Relations, U. S. Navy; E. L. Bernays, Public Relations Counsel, New York City; Herman Beyle, Syracuse University; Raymond Carter Brecht, *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin.*

Monday, December 28, at 12:30 P.M.

JOINT SUBSCRIPTION LUNCHEON

American Political Science Association, American Society for Public Administration, and Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

World Organization and Administration

Chairman: Mrs. Louise Wright, Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

Speaker: Henry A. Wallace, Vice-President of the United States.

Monday, December 28, at 2:30 P.M.

ROUND TABLE MEETINGS

(1) Central Control of the Administration of Justice

"The Evolving Rôle of State Police in Criminal Law Enforcement," David Geeting Monroe, Northwestern University Traffic Institute.

"The Canadian Example in Control over Prosecutions," H. McD. Clokie, University of Manitoba.

"The Consequences of Increased Federal Activity in Law Enforcement," David Fellman, University of Wisconsin.

Chairman: John G. Heinberg, University of Missouri.

Discussion: Bruce Smith, Institute of Public Administration; O. W. Wilson, University of California; W. L. Bradshaw, University of Missouri: Theo. Hall, Chief of Police, Wilmette, Illinois; G. F. Robeson, University of Iowa.

Secretary: R. L. Rupard, Assistant Corporation Counsel of Chicago.

(2) Comparative War Administration

General questions of war administration will be discussed. There will be short statements on the various solutions applied in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Thereafter the administrative problems as revealed by the comparative approach will be discussed by the members of the panel in an informal give-and-take, in which the audience is invited to join.

"Over-all Administration: Decision of Interdepartmental Controversies by Supra-departmental Agencies; Combination of Top Agencies with Overlapping Functions."

"Streamlining Departmental Headquarters: Devolution of Central Functions on Agencies of an Administratively Detached Yet Strictly Controlled Character; Types of Agencies."

"Devolution of Functions on Regional Agencies."

Chairman: Arnold Brecht, New School for Social Research.

Speakers: Herman Finer, London School of Economics; Luther Gulick, Office of Organizational Planning, War Production Board; Joseph P. Harris, School of

Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia; Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University; Arthur W. Macmahon, Columbia University; Fritz Morstein Marx, Queens College; Donald C. Stone, Bureau of the Budget; Paul H. Appleby, U. S. Department of Agriculture (invited); George C. S. Benson, Office of Price Administration (invited); Heinrich Bruening, Harvard University (invited).

Secretary: J. Donald Watson, Bendix Aviation Corporation.

(3) Legal and Social Responsibilities of Labor Unions

Chairman: James J. Robbins, American University.

(4) Organization of Civilian Defense

Primarily to protect our citizens against attack, a network of federal-state-local organizations has been set up throughout the country based on the local defense councils. What will be the significance of this development for other functions and for the future of inter-governmental relationships?

Chairman: James C. Charlesworth, University of Pennsylvania.

Discussion: Harold Butler, British Minister to the United States; Samuel C. May, San Francisco Bay Region Metropolitan Defense Council; Stephen B. Sweeney, Institute of Local and State Government, Philadelphia.

(5) World Organization

The administrative institutions by which the United Nations is now collaborating have added to the international administrative experience of such organizations as the League of Nations and the International Labor Office. From all this administrative experience, what can we learn about the future of world organization?

Chairman: Charles E. Merriam, National Resources Planning Board.

Monday, December 28, at 6:30 P.M.

DINNER CONFERENCES FOR GROUPS

Monday, December 28, at 8:00 P.M.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

The Rôle of Political Science

William Anderson, University of Minnesota and President of the American Political Science Association.

Progress in Administration

Louis Brownlow, Public Administration Clearing House and President of the American Society for Public Administration.

Chairman: Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University.

Monday, December 28, at 9:30 P.M.

SMOKER

Members and guests of both societies are cordially invited to be present.

Hosts: University of Chicago and Northwestern University.

Views of Chungking in 1942

Illustrated talk by Esson M. Gale, University of Michigan.

Tuesday, December 29, 8:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

JOINT REGISTRATION AND EXHIBITS

Tuesday, December 29, at 9:30 A.M.

Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Tuesday, December 29, at 10:30 A.M.

GENERAL SESSIONS

(A) Civic Education in the United States

A discussion of current educational programs. A report on and discussion of various programs in civic education, including those in colleges and universities, forums and institutes, the preparation for naturalization, secondary schools, and participation in civic activities by university graduates.

Chairman: John M. Gaus, Harvard University.

Speakers: Phillips Bradley, Queens College; Franklin L. Burdette, National Foundation for Education in American Citizenship; Marshall E. Dimock, War-Shipping Administration; William E. Mosher, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Howard White, Miami University; Shepherd L. Witman, New Jersey College for Women.

Secretary: Hugh A. Bone, Queens College.

(B) The Present Status of Representative Government in the United States

Chairman: Thomas Barclay, Stanford University.
(1) Lindsay Rogers, Columbia University.
(2) George Gallup, American Institute of Public Opinion.

Secretary: J. Oliver Hall, Ely Junior College, Ely, Minnesota.

(C) Prospects for the Revival of Liberalism in Europe

Chairman: Frederick A. Middlebush, University of Missouri.
(1) Germany. Hans Simons, New School of Social Research.
(2) Italy. Henry R. Spencer, Ohio State University.
(3) France. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Office of War Information.

Secretary: Mary Earhart Dillon, Northwestern University.

Tuesday, December 29, at 12:30 P.M.

SUBSCRIPTION LUNCHEON

Political Scientists in the War Effort

Speaker: Luther Gulick, War Production Board.

Chairman: Robert E. Cushman, Cornell University.

Tuesday, December 29, at 2:30 P.M.

ROUND TABLE MEETINGS

(1) American-Russian Relations

In the relations between the United States and Russia, both before and after the Revolution, periods of mutual distrust have alternated with periods in which a

common interest was recognized. Ideological differences have been a factor influencing relations, because of Tsarism as well as Sovietism in Russia. While there has been friction, no serious conflict has developed between the two vast continental countries on opposite sides of the globe. Russian policy has often run closely parallel to American policy in both Asia and Europe. Present relations are within the framework of the Declaration of the United Nations and the Lend-Lease Program. Since the Roosevelt-Molotov conference and statement of June, 1942, Soviet Russia has come to be considered in America as an "ally."

Chairman: Samuel N. Harper, University of Chicago.

Speakers: Malbone W. Graham, University of California, Los Angeles; Samuel N. Harper, University of Chicago; Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, New York City; Robert F. Karsch, Westminster College.

Secretary: Ronald B. Thompson, University of Chicago.

(2) Geo-Politics

Chairman: William Montgomery McGovern, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Speakers: Stanley Hornbeck, U. S. Department of State; Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University; Edmund A. Walsh, President, Georgetown University; Nicholas J. Spykman, Yale University (invited); Harold H. Sprout, Princeton University (invited); Robert Strausz-Hupé, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania (invited).

Secretary: John E. Fields, Northwestern University.

(3) Public Schools in the War Effort

A discussion of the place of the public schools in the war effort, including: (a) articulating instruction in the social studies at the various levels; (b) college preparation for teaching the social studies; and (c) curricula of the social studies in war-time.

Chairmen: Robert H. Keohane, University of Chicago, and Russell M. Cooper, Cornell College.

Discussion: Paul Busey, Chicago Heights, Illinois; Henrietta Fernitz, Chicago Teachers College; D. W. Knepper, Mississippi State College for Women; Howard White, Miami University; Hilda M. Watters, Western Illinois State Teachers College.

Secretary: Lucie H. Schacht, Chicago Council for the Social Studies.

(4) Political Aspects of Fiscal Policy

"Rôle of Pressure Groups in Determining Tax Policy."
"The Effect of Central Collections upon Popular and Proprietary Interest in Taxation."
"The Relation of the Franchise to Taxation."
"Taxation for Non-Revenue Purposes"
"The Use of Taxation for Price and Production Control."

Chairman: Harold M. Groves, University of Wisconsin.

Speakers: Roy Blough, Tax Research Division, U. S. Treasury (invited); Luther Gulick, War Production Board (invited); Roscoe C. Martin, University of Alabama; Lent D. Upson, Wayne University (invited); James W. Martin, University of Kentucky (invited); Simeon Leland, University of Chicago (invited); Charles S. Hyneman, U. S. Bureau of the Budget.

Secretary: John R. Mashek, St. Lawrence University.

(5) Problems of the Pacific

A discussion of the United States and the post-war reconstruction in the Far Eastern and Pacific areas. The circumstances of the war in the Far Eastern and Pacific areas are serving to mark out the problems and to indicate some of the lines of reconstruction when the war has been won. The round table discussions will be directed toward a definition of some of the problems of reconstruction and an evaluation of proposals for their solution.

Chairman: Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati.

Speakers: Hugh Borton, Columbia University; Paul H. Clyde, Duke University; Esson M. Gale, University of Michigan; W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations; Franz Michael, University of Washington; Lennox A. Mills, University of Minnesota; James H. Shoemaker, Board of Economic Warfare; Jacobus D. tenBroek, University of California.

Secretary: Walter F. Fee, Michigan State College.

(6) The Treatment of Enemy Aliens in the United States

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President issued three proclamations designating Japanese, Germans, and Italians as enemy aliens. Broad restrictions on their activities were established and machinery was set up to implement and administer the provisions. Recently, the Italians were removed from the classification as enemy aliens. This round table will examine the philosophy underlying restrictions on aliens of enemy nationality, the political, economic, and psychological implications of such restrictions, the development and application of the organization and procedures for the enforcement of restrictions, the extensive evacuation of enemy aliens from prohibited and restricted areas, and the special provisions for the naturalization of aliens of enemy nationality who satisfactorily demonstrate their loyalty to the United States.

Chairman: Marshall E. Dimock, War Shipping Administration.

Speakers: Thomas S. Barclay, Stanford University; Thomas I. Cook, University of Washington; Henry B. Hazard, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Secretary: Claude E. Hawley, U. S. Army.

Tuesday, December 29, at 7:00 P.M.

SUBSCRIPTION DINNER

In Celebration of William James, 1842–1942

William Anderson, University of Minnesota, presiding.

Pragmatism and the Current Political Situation

"Reason and Action," Dean George H. Sabine, Cornell University.

"Pragmatism and the Totalitarian Will to Believe," Max Eastman, author and editor.

Wednesday, December 30, 8:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

JOINT REGISTRATION AND EXHIBITS

Wednesday, December 30, at 9:30 A.M.

SECTION MEETINGS

(1) Collaboration of English-Speaking Peoples

Chairman: H. Duncan Hall, British Raw Materials Mission.

Speakers: Walter Nash, Minister of New Zealand; N. J. Coldwell, Member of the Canadian Parliament; Harold Butler, Minister of Great Britain; Sir Howard d'Egville, Empire Parliamentary Association; William Y. Elliott, Harvard University.

Secretary: Richard E. Hibbard, Muhlenberg College.

(2) Constitutional Law: The Executive and Treaty-Making

A discussion of agreements as substitutes for treaties. Is it proper or desirable that Senate approval for treaties be avoided by substituting executive agreements in foreign affairs, without Congress if possible, with Congress if necessary?

Chairman: Edwin Borchard, Yale University.

Speakers: Wallace McClure, Department of State; Walter F. Dodd, Attorney-at-Law, Chicago, Illinois; Denna F. Fleming, Vanderbilt University; Royden Dangerfield, University of Oklahoma.

Discussion: H. McD. Clokie, University of Manitoba; David M. Levitan, War Production Board.

Secretary: Lynford A. Lardner, Northwestern University.

(3) Inter-American Affairs

Chairman: Walter H. C. Laves, Office of Coördinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics.

Secretary: Malcolm C. Moos, Johns Hopkins University.

(4) International Law: Recognition of Human Rights

A discussion of law in the post-war world. If international law is to contribute adequately to the shaping of a world in which the aims of the United Nations may be realized, changes will be necessary. Must some of the fundamental concepts of international law be modified? Should new sources of international law be recognized? How can international law be more adequately sanctioned?

Chairman: Quincy Wright, University of Chicago.

"The Bases of International Law," Percy Corbett, McGill University.

"The Protection of Human Rights by International Law," Hans Leonhardt, Michigan State College.

"Administration and Enforcement of International Law," Pitman B. Potter, Oberlin College.

Discussion: Clarence A. Berdahl, University of Illinois; Kenneth Colegrove, Northwestern University; Max Rheinstein, University of Chicago; Ivan Stone, Beloit College.

Secretary: Inez Nelson, University of Chicago.

(5) Political Theory

A discussion of war and personal liberty.

Chairman: Francis G. Wilson, University of Illinois.

"Standards of Personal Liberty in Time of War," Carl B. Swisher, Johns Hopkins University.

"The Position of the Minority Political Party," Maynard C. Krueger, University of Chicago and Chairman of the National Executive Committee, Socialist Party.

"The Government Policy and Civil Liberty," Harold D. Lasswell, Library of Congress, Member of the Board of Censorship.

Secretary: Frank H. Jonas, University of New Mexico.

Wednesday, December 30, at 2:30 P.M.

RESEARCH PANELS

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Convener: Karl Loewenstein, Amherst College.

POLITICAL THEORY

Convener: Benjamin E. Lippincott, University of Minnesota.

PUBLIC LAW

Convener: Carl B. Swisher, Johns Hopkins University.

THE RÔLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

Convener: Phillips Bradley, Queens College.

By mail ballot, the Executive Council voted to hold an abridged annual meeting of the Association in Washington on January 29–31, 1943. Local arrangements were in charge of W. Reed West and a program was prepared by a Washington committee under the chairmanship of Marshall E. Dimock. The entire Committee on Program and Local Arrangements included: Marshall E. Dimock, Ernest S. Griffith, Lawrence Z. Howard, Howard K. Hyde, Walter H. C. Laves, Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, Donald C. Stone, W. Reed West, Francis O. Wilcox, Herbert Wright, and Gerald E. Yates. There was a total of 566 registrants; and all sessions were held either in the Hotel Statler or in the Auditorium, Department of Commerce.

The program was as follows:

Friday, January 29, at 8:00 P.M.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Chairman: Ernest S. Griffith, Library of Congress.

Secretary: Floyd Riddick, Congressional Intelligence.

Speakers: George Galloway, Twentieth Century Fund; The Honorable Joseph O'Mahoney, U. S. Senator from Wyoming; Roland Young, Harvard University.

Discussion: The Honorable John Murdock, Congressman from Arizona.

Saturday, January 30, at 10:00 A.M.

GEO-POLITICS—ROUND TABLE

Chairman: Richard Hartshorn, Office of Strategic Services.

Secretary: Roy Snapp, United States Navy.

Participants: H. L. Abbott, Joint Intelligence Committee; Benjamin Williams, Military Intelligence Service; Robert Strausz-Hupé, Wharton School, University of

Pennsylvania; Ralph Turner, Division of Cultural Relations, State Department; Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., Georgetown University.

Saturday, January 30, at 12:45 P.M.—Luncheon

COMPARATIVE WAR-TIME ADMINISTRATION

Chairman: Robert E. Cushman, Cornell University.

Speakers: William Anderson, President, American Political Science Association—"Federalism—Then and Now"; The Right Honorable Sir Arthur Salter, K.C.B., M.P., Head of the British Merchant Shipping Mission and of the British Petroleum Mission—"Methods of International Coöperation in Two Wars."

Saturday, January 30, at 3:30 P.M.

1. WAR SUPPLY ORGANIZATION ON A CZAR BASIS OR OTHERWISE—ROUND TABLE

Chairman: E. Pendleton Herring, Bureau of the Budget.

Participants: Ralph K. Davies, Petroleum Administration for War; Charles Dearing, Office of Defense Transportation; Bradley Dewey, Office of the Rubber Director; Herbert Emmerich, Federal Public Housing Authority; William Haber, War Manpower Commission; V. O. Key, Bureau of the Budget; Merle Fainsod, Office of Price Administration; Leon O. Wolcott, Agricultural War Relations; Edward Dickenson, War Production Board.

II. COMPARATIVE WAR ADMINISTRATION—ROUND TABLE

Chairman: Arnold Brecht, New School for Social Research.

Participants: George C. S. Benson, War Department; John J. Corson, Bureau of Employment Security; William Y. Elliott, War Production Board; Herman Finer, London School of Economics; Joseph P. Harris, School of Military Government; Fritz Morstein Marx, United States Army; Donald C. Stone, Bureau of the Budget.

III. COÖPERATIVE GOVERNMENT—ROUND TABLE

Chairman: Frank Bane, Council of State Governments.

Participants: Harold H. Burton, United States Senator; Wayne Coy, Bureau of the Budget; Joseph B. Eastman, Office of Defense Transportation; Kenneth Warner, Office of Price Administration; Morris B. Lambie, Harvard University; Garland C. Routt, Office of Civilian Defense; John Russell, War Department; Charles P. Taft, Office of Defense Health and Welfare.

Saturday, January 30, at 8:00 P.M.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE WAR—ASSOCIATION BUSINESS MEETING

The American Political Science Review.

Business—Election of Officers.
Constitutional Amendments.
Brief Committee Reports.

The Rôle of Political Scientists in the War.

Sunday, January 31, at 1:00 P.M.—Luncheon

COLLABORATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Chairman: William Anderson, President of the American Political Science Association.

Speakers: The Honorable Walter Nash, Minister of New Zealand—"The United Nations and the War"; Charles Bunn, Department of State—"The United Nations and the Reciprocal Trade Program."

Sunday, January 31, at 3:00 P.M.

I. The United Nations and the War—Round Table

Chairman: John A. Vieg, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.
Participants: Louis T. Olom, Office of Civilian Defense; Eugene Staley, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Walter Nash, Minister of New Zealand.

II. Prospects for the Revival of Liberalism in Europe—Round Table

Chairman: Leo Rosten, Office of War Information.
Participants: Henri Bonnet, World Citizens' Association; Herbert Marcuse, Office of War Information; Franz Neumann, Board of Economic Warfare; Renzo Sereno, Office of War Information.

III. The United Nations and the Post-War World—Round Table

Chairman: Robert Blakely, Office of War Information.
Participants: Edwin Dickinson, Department of Justice; Clarence K. Streit, Federal Union, Inc.; Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, American University; Francis O. Wilcox, Office of Civilian Defense.

Sunday, January 31, at 6:00 P.M.

Panel Discussion on Research Relating to the Rôle of the United States in the Post-War World

This panel, sponsored by the Research Committee of the American Political Science Association, was conducted by Phillips Bradley of Queens College.

In pursuance of a mail ballot of the officers and members of the Executive Council, the Council met on the morning and afternoon of January 30, and the annual business meeting of the Association was held on the evening of the same day. The latter meeting was devoted principally to the problem of the political scientist in war and post-war reconstruction. Routine business was largely eliminated while members of the Association engaged in informal discussion of this pertinent problem.

The Secretary-Treasurer reported that the membership of the Association on December 15, 1942, was 2,902 as compared with 3,108 in the year 1941, with 2,857 in 1940, and with 2,442 in the year 1939. During the year, 363 new members were added, as compared with 578 in 1941, and 597 in 1940. Cancellations of memberships in 1942 amounted to 569, as compared with 327 in 1941, and 182 in 1940. The year thus showed a net loss of 206 members, as compared with a net gain of 251 members in 1941 and 415 in 1940. Of the 2,902 members in 1942, 2,817 were regular members, 38 sustaining members, and 47 life members. The loss of membership in 1942 was due chiefly to: (1) the cancellation of library memberships in

the war areas of Europe and Asia; (2) resignations of members who entered military service; and (3) curtailment of the expenditures of members apprehensive about the increase of income tax rates. The decrease of membership would have been far greater had not many members of the Association coöperated energetically throughout the year in suggesting new names for membership. The maintenance of the membership of learned and professional societies like the American Political Science Association during war-time is justified upon several grounds. In the first place, the promotion of science is a human activity that should proceed in time of war as well as in peace. In the second place, a society like this Association has a definite contribution to make toward the winning of the war and the peace. Such a society cannot carry on effective activities with a heavily declining membership. Accordingly, efforts to maintain the membership should not be abated.

The financial report of the Secretary-Treasurer showed that the budget for 1942 provided for an income of $15,787 and an expenditure of $15,715. The actual income was $20,356.80, and the expenditure was $19,972.02. The increase in income and expenditure above the budgetary figures for 1942 was largely due to a contribution of $4,200 for the use of the Committee on Congress. It has been the practice to separate the funds of committees having special incomes from the usual expenses of the Association, and this practice will ordinarily be followed unless the funds at the disposal of a committee are very small. The income for 1942 showed $12,531.67 from membership dues, $1,064.41 from sales of publications, and $6,760.72 from other items, including the gift for the use of the Committee on Congress. The expenditures for 1942 showed $8,577.37 for editing and publishing the REVIEW, and $11,394.65 for other expenditures, including $4,200 for the use of the Committee on Congress. The budget for 1943, approved by the Executive Council, anticipates an income of $12,575 from membership dues, $780 from sale of publications, and $1,400.75 from other sources, making a total of $14,755.75. The budget for 1943 calls for expenditures for editing and publishing the REVIEW to the amount of $8,565, and $6,186.51 for other expenditures, including $400 for the use of the Committee on Congress, making a total of $14,751.51.

The Secretary-Treasurer stated that the budget for 1943 called for an increase in the number of sustaining members (paying dues of ten dollars per year). There were 38 such members in 1942. It is hoped that there will be a considerable increase in 1943. The Constitution as revised at the annual business meeting also provides for a new form of membership, namely, a contributing membership (annual dues of twenty-five dollars per year). A few such memberships have already been promised.

The assets of the Association include $3,507.84 cash on hand as of

December 15, 1942, the day on which the books of the Association for 1942 were closed. This compares with $3,123.06 cash on hand in 1941. The Trust Fund showed $8,100 invested in United States Treasury Bonds as compared with $7,600 in 1941. Cash in the Trust Fund Account was $486.64 as compared with $911.88 in 1941. Office equipment is valued at $236.98, paper stock for the REVIEW at $557.36, and capitalization of publications at $8,000, making a total of $8,794.34. Accounts receivable are $101 and accounts payable, $7.58.

An audit of the Association's books was made on December 21, 1942, by the Frank E. Kohler Company, of Chicago. The Committee on Audit, composed of Messrs. Walter F. Dodd and John D. Larkin, reported as follows: "We have examined the accounts of the Secretary-Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, and have verified the audit report prepared by Frank E. Kohler and Company which is attached hereto. We found the statements of accounts as prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer to be correct. The financial condition of the Association during the current year has been satisfactory, with receipts of $23,479.86 (less $4,200.00) and disbursements of $19,972.02 (less $4,200.00 expended by the Committee on Congress). The excess of the income over expenditures was $3,507.84, although a prepaid membership of 1943 would account for $2,725.51. The membership has been reduced by 206, and a further reduction is likely during the current year. In view of this situation, it will be necessary to reduce the expenditures of the Association. The Association now has a Trust Fund of $8,100 and $486.64 in cash which has been deposited in that fund. There is a likelihood that cash on hand will be needed for current expenses during the present year. It is recommended that the Secretary-Treasurer be authorized to invest cash on hand or that may accrue from future interest on Trust Funds, if such cash is not needed for current expenses, such investment to be made in Federal Government Bonds or equally safe securities. Attention is called to the fact that the audit report and the report of the Secretary-Treasurer indicate receipts and disbursements for the year ending December 15, 1942, exceeding the estimates of receipts and disbursements submitted at the last meeting of the Association. This excess is primarily due to the receipt of $4,200 in place of an estimated $400 for the expenses of the Committee on Congress. This amount was contributed for this purpose only, and the Association was merely an agency for the transmission of the money to this Committee. The $4,200 thus noted as a receipt and as a disbursement is not a part of the budget of the Association. The accounts of the Association show only the receipt of this amount and its transmission to the chairman of the Committee on Congress. It is recommended by this Audit Committee that the Secretary-Treasurer of the Association

should hereafter obtain from each committee a full and complete statement of the expenditures of such committee, whether the expenditures are directly paid by the Association or paid from separate contributions which are handled by the Association through its Secretary-Treasurer."

On motion of the Secretary-Treasurer, the members in attendance stood in silence in tribute to members of the Association whose death occurred during the year. Certain memorials are printed at the close of this account, and others will appear in the April issue.

Frederic A. Ogg, Managing Editor of the REVIEW, reported: (1) that war-time distractions have caused first-rate manuscripts of leading articles to grow more scarce; (2) that many of our best and most dependable reviewers of books have been drawn into military and government service and are not now available as reviewers; (3) that labor shortages at the publishing plant have begun to entail delays in printing the REVIEW; and (4) that if the revenues of the Association continue to shrink, it may be necessary before the year expires to reduce the number of pages in the REVIEW. The distribution of space in Vol. XXXVI (1942) of the REVIEW was as follows: leading articles, 232 pages; American government and politics, 184; constitutional law, 49; public administration, 25; rural local government, 43; foreign government and politics, 38; international affairs, 36; instruction and research, 20; news and notes, 80; book reviews and notices, 292; recent publications of political interest, 181; list of doctoral dissertations in preparation, 17; and volume index, 19—making a total of 1,216 pages. The total number of pages in Vol. XXXV (1941) was 1,246. For the two-year term expiring in December, 1944, the following persons were elected members of the Editorial Board: Eugene P. Chase, Robert E. Cushman, James K. Pollock, Clyde F. Snider, and Robert R. Wilson. The Secretary-Treasurer reported that during the past half-year seven copies of each current issue of the REVIEW were distributed to the various libraries of the War Relocation Authority for the use of *nisei* students whose education was interrupted by war-time evacuation to interior communities.

The Association was represented during the year in the American Council of Learned Societies by Joseph P. Chamberlain and Frederic A. Ogg. At the annual meeting of the Council in New York, January 27–29, 1943, particular attention was paid to the first year's operation of the intensive language program which the Council has undertaken, as well as to the promotion of cultural relations in Latin-American countries carried on by the Council as fiscal agent of the United States Government.

The Executive Council voted to accept associate membership in the American Council on Education.

As to the Social Science Research Council, President William Anderson reported that an office at 726 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C., has been

established in order to advise officials of the national government with respect to personnel, research, and current problems in the social sciences. The Committee on Public Administration also moved its offices from New York to the same Washington location. Seeking to broaden its research planning in political science and government, the Social Science Research Council in 1941 created a new committee entitled the Committee on Government. Its function is the exploration of research needs and possibilities in political science fields outside of public administration as narrowly construed, and in the border zones between political science and other disciplines. The present members of the committee are William Anderson (chairman), Robert E. Cushman, Simeon E. Leland, and Charles McKinley. In April, 1942, this committee held a joint meeting with the Research Committee of the American Political Science Association. The Committee on Government has set up a Special Committee on the Management of Civil Liberties in War-Time under the chairmanship of Robert E. Cushman. This sub-committee has outlined various research projects in the field of civil liberties and is endeavoring to keep abreast of current changes during the war. Another area tentatively marked out for exploration is the "new political economy" with special reference to fiscal policy and administration. By vote of the Executive Council, the following resolution was adopted: "That the President appoint a committee to examine (a) the relationship of the APSA to the SSRC with a view to the closer integration of the APSA with the SSRC, (b) the suitability of the SSRC to exercise leadership in the present crisis with regard to problems which call for the collaboration of the APSA with the other associations of social scientists."

The Executive Council also took note of the statement submitted to the United States Government by the American Library Association regarding government publications, particularly in time of war, and expressed agreement in principle with the recommendations therein offered.

A complete revision of the text of the constitution of the Association was reported by Robert E. Cushman, chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Constitution. This report was adopted and the new constitution approved at the business meeting on January 30. While the Association has thrived under the old constitution in spite of its obvious defects, it was believed that an association which includes constitutional law among its fields of study should possess a model constitution which might well be imitated by other learned and professional societies. The new constitution as adopted is printed on pages 131–136 of this issue of the REVIEW.

The report of the Committee on Regional Societies under the chairmanship of Professor John E. Briggs included a brief survey of the activities of the Southern Political Science Association, the Pennsylvania Political Science and Public Administration Association, the Midwest Conference

of Political Scientists, the Connecticut Valley Political Scientists, and the Government Section of the Southwestern Social Science Association. The report recommended that regional groups of the conference type should be encouraged and that representatives of the national association should attend regional meetings. The report also urged the consideration of a plan for the affiliation of regional groups with the national society and for the reflection of the needs of political scientists in all sections of the country in the REVIEW. By action of the Executive Council, the jurisdiction of the Committee on Regional Societies was extended to functional societies. The Council also appropriated a sum for the programs of regional conferences.

The Business Meeting adopted a resolution regarding the publication program of the Department of State expressed in the following words: "Whereas the grave problems of international relations arising from the war make it especially important at this time that reliable sources of information on these problems be available, and whereas political scientists in this country have a particular responsibility to keep themselves informed on the past and present course of American foreign policy, a responsibility which they cannot meet unless the essential documents are published in reliable texts, and whereas, in the pressure for funds for war purposes, there is danger that appropriations for publications of the Department of State may be curtailed, therefore, be it resolved by the American Political Science Association: (1) That the Association appreciates the willingness of the Department of State, in developing its program of publications, to consider the needs of the teaching profession and of the members of learned societies; (2) That Congress and the Department of State be urged to continue and expand the publication program of the Department and that members of the Association be urged to subscribe to and use those publications of the Department relevant to their work; (3) That the records of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 are of the utmost importance in developing policy and opinion with reference to the problems which will follow the present war, and that the publication of these records be carried on with the utmost expedition; (4) That the *Department of State Bulletin* be utilized to an even greater extent as the medium for publishing all kinds of materials bearing upon the foreign policy of the United States which can be published without impairing the public interest; (5) That the publication of *Foreign Relations of the United States*, now fifteen years behind, be brought as near to date as possible, and the publication of Miller's definitive edition of *Treaties of the United States* and Hackworth's *Digest of International Law* be completed as soon as possible; and (6) That copies of this resolution be sent to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, of the House Committee on Foreign Af-

fairs, of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and of the subcommittees on the State Department of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, and to the members of the American Political Science Association."

The report of the Committee on Public Law, under the chairmanship of Oliver P. Field, was accepted. The conclusions of this Committee were as follows: (1) The central core of public law as it is being taught in the political science curriculum consists of constitutional law, international law, and administrative law, with administrative law not quite as well established as the other two, but rapidly being recognized as being on a plane of equality with them. (2) In addition to constitutional law, international law, and administrative law, public law in political science is thought to include municipal corporations, jurisprudence, legislation, social legislation, government regulation of business, and public utilities, with labor law, taxation, and the administration of justice still being considered possible, but less certain candidates for inclusion. These additional subjects are sometimes taught in the departments of political science, and sometimes are taught in other social science departments, and in a few instances are taught both in political science and other departments in the social sciences, or in the law school. It is usual for departments of political science to give credit in political science if the courses are taught in other departments. (3) The field of public law is recognized by the overwhelming majority of schools as a field of study for graduate students who major in political science, and it is recognized in a majority of the schools surveyed for purposes of undergraduate majors study. (4) The enrollment in public law courses has been relatively stable, with some tendency to remain more stable than many other courses in the curriculum. This seems to be true during the present war, subject to the exception of international law, which seems to have fluctuated more than constitutional law or administrative law. There has been some tendency for public law courses to decline in enrollment in those instances in which public law was the primary field of instruction in a department and later other fields were added to the departmental curriculum. In these instances the size of the classes seems to have declined from huge classes to classes of ordinary size. The classes in the public law subjects seem to fall into the range of 25–40, at the senior college level, and the seminars at the graduate level, excluding thesis seminars, within the range 7–12. (5) There seems to be some tendency for public law subjects to be associated with political theory, as in the case of jurisprudence and constitutional law, with international relations and organization, as in the case of international law, and with public administration, as in the instance of administrative law, but this development seems not to have affected the nature of the techniques of instruction so much as the emphasis that is given to certain

aspects of the content of the subjects concerned, with the exception of international law, where techniques of instruction are not as likely to stress judicial decisions and case analysis as much as in constitutional and administrative law. (6) The teaching personnel in public law seems to be well-trained, with both general training and specialized legal training being included in the educational background of many of those who teach the public law subjects. About two-thirds of the personnel surveyed had taken the degree of doctor of philosophy, while one-third had taken a law degree, and the overwhelming majority of those canvassed had taken the equivalent of one year or more of law work. It seems reasonably clear that the training of the public law personnel, so far as degrees and work taken are concerned, is adequate, and may be somewhat superior to the training of the law school personnel teaching in the same field, so far as the political science taken by law school personnel is concerned. That is to say, the public law teachers of political science have had more law than the law school professors of public law have had political science. (7) There is considerable evidence that the relations between the law school work in public law and that in political science is being carried on with some friction within many universities. It is difficult to assess the causes of this friction, but it seems clear that there is no general tendency for political science departments to rely upon law school offerings in public law to replace political science offerings in the field. The consensus of opinion of those replying to the questionnaire was that the law school offerings were not adequate as substitutes for the political science offerings, so far as major students in political science were concerned. To this generalization there were a few qualifications, but in no instance did it appear that the qualification was based on principle, being based in each case on the satisfactoriness of the particular public law professor in the law school as a teacher for political science students, in view of the stress and manner of conduct of the course in the law school. In no department surveyed was all the public law work turned over to the law school. The tendency seems to have been for the political science departments to expand their political science offerings in order to meet the needs of political science students. It seems that only in the case of international law has there been any tendency for the law schools to give credit in law for political science offerings in public law, and then only when there is no course in that subject offered in the law school. (8) Little progress seems to have been made in the movement to integrate law and political science curricula, and in those institutions in which some progress seems to have been made in this direction on paper, caution was sometimes given to the Committee not to assume that the integration on paper was integration in fact. A small minority of those replying to the questionnaire voiced some apprehension over the possibility that law schools might, in view of their desperate

plight during the present war, seek to assume the public law work in political science departments, but the overwhelming majority seemed to feel that in view of the increasing development of professionalization in certain aspects of political science the danger that law schools might either assume the burden of this training or tend to influence students against taking political science subjects in the field of public law was relatively slight. The feeling seems widespread that law school offerings in public law were becoming increasingly less, rather than more, suited to the needs of political science students. This seems to be particularly true in the case of those students who are preparing for the junior professional examinations for admission to the government service, because of the difficulty of adapting a law school course so as to meet its primary purpose of training lawyers to practice at the bar and the requirements of the administrative profession.

The Committee on National Citizenship Education, under the chairmanship of Marshall E. Dimock, reported that this committee had been consulted throughout the year in the promotion of the National Citizenship Education Program under the direction of Dean William F. Russell. This program has resulted in the setting up of advisory councils in thirty states and the employment of 9,400 teachers in development of the program, while 346,000 students attended classes under public school or WPA supervision. The Committee suggested further arrangements for coöperation between the Association and the National Citizenship Education Program.

The report of the Committee on Congress under George B. Galloway was published in the December, 1942, issue of the REVIEW (pages 1091–1103). Further progress reports were made by the chairman. By a resolution, the Executive Council expressed the appreciation of the Association for the gift of $4,200 by Benjamin B. Wallace for support of the studies of this committee. The Committee will continue its investigation throughout the coming year.

Frederick M. Davenport, chairman of the Committee on the Civil Service, presented the plan for identifying, recruiting, and developing a pool of administrative talent within the Government, prepared at the request of the President of the United States by the U. S. Civil Service Commission and the Council of Personnel Administration. Copies of this report can be obtained by addressing Mr. Davenport at the Council of Personnel Administration, 1626 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

Messrs. Davenport and White called attention to S.575 (a bill to provide that officers in the executive branch of the Government who receive compensation at a rate in excess of $4,500 a year shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in the manner provided by the Constitution) and similar bills pending in the Sev-

enty-eighth Congress. It was stated that these bills, if enacted, by requiring senatorial confirmation of all positions in the executive civil service above a prescribed minimum and for a specified term, would endanger the basic principle of the merit system and make impractical the training of youth for careers in public administration. Although the Executive Council refrained from the adoption of resolutions expressing opposition to the McKellar Bill, members of the Council agreed that the bill would strike a demoralizing blow to efficient administration in the federal service. It was suggested that members of the Association interested in the preservation of the merit system urge their Senators and Representatives to oppose the McKellar Bill and similar bills.

The Committee on the Social Studies, under the chairmanship of Howard White, made several recommendations, including adoption of the principle that "the primary objective in instruction in political and other social sciences should be to aid young citizens to fit themselves for their civic responsibilities." The report praised the work of the High School Victory Corps, asserting that progress in learning democratic processes must be made by participation in these processes. It was suggested that learning by doing should be further stimulated by reducing the minimum voting age to eighteen years. The report was accepted but not adopted.[1]

Ernest S. Griffith, chairman of the Committee on Research, reported that this Committee met with the Committee on Government of the Social Science Research Council in New York on April 18–19, 1942, and formulated a program of action. Four panels were set up for the purpose of formulating a research strategy in each field. Over each panel a convener was appointed. The names of the panels and conveners are: (1) Public Law, Carl B. Swisher; (2) Political Theory, Benjamin E. Lippincott; (3) Comparative Government and Politics, Karl Loewenstein; and (4) Rôle of the United States in the Post-War World, Phillips Bradley. By means of correspondence, several of the panels are in process of developing a program. The fourth panel held a session on January 31, 1943, at the Washington meeting of the Association.

W. Reed West, chairman of the Committee on Publication of Election Statistics, reported continued collaboration with the United States Bureau of the Census in regard to the publication of a yearly compilation of election statistics.

The Secretary-Treasurer's report showed that the 1942 edition of the

[1] In the February, 1943, number of *Education* (The Palmer Company, Boston), Professor White has presented the substance of the Committee's report and recommendations. Mimeographed copies of the report are obtainable from the Secretary-Treasurer.

Personnel Service contained the records of 71 men and women available for teaching, research, and governmental positions in the field of political science. The total expense of the 1942 edition was $266.76. The receipts included $30.00 in fees, received from registrants who were listed a second time and $132.00 from the Trust Fund. The 1942 edition was distributed to the appointing officers of colleges, universities, and research agencies and a considerable mass of correspondence developed regarding the persons listed therein. Perhaps in no other year, in spite of the small number of listed personnel, has the Personnel Service been so extensively used.

The report of the Committee on War-Time Services, under the chairmanship of Charles S. Hyneman, was published in the October, 1942, issue of the REVIEW (pages 931–945). This report was also published by the American Council on Public Affairs and evoked considerable discussion throughout the country. The Washington Committee, under the chairmanship of Marshall E. Dimock, reported on its study of the employment of political scientists by the Federal Government during war-time. As a result of its investigations, two questionnaires were distributed to all members of the Association. The first one sought to ascertain the names of political scientists engaged in military and governmental service and the character of their employment. The second attempted to ascertain the names and addresses of political scientists who would be available for government service in the near future. The second questionnaire was in duplicate, the original reply being kept in the secretariat of the Association and the duplicate being sent to the Civil Service Commission. The Secretary-Treasurer reported that there had been 206 returns of this questionnaire and that every day was adding to the number. The Secretary-Treasurer also reported that throughout the year his office had supplied government departments and other agencies, upon request, with numerous recommendations of persons for government service.

Francis W. Coker, chairman of the Committee on the Library of American Political Thought, offered the following resolution, which was adopted: "(1) That the Association undertake to coöperate with the University of North Carolina Press in the preparation of a series of volumes to constitute a *Library of American Political Thought;* (2) That the president of the Association be authorized to appoint a committee of five to take action in raising funds for the editorial expenses of the series and to act on behalf of the Association in the execution of the project, including the expenditure of any funds made available to the committee by the Association."

Clarence A. Berdahl, chairman of the Committee on the REVIEW, made a progress report indicating that this committee was in the process of collecting information which would be serviceable in recommending any changes in the policy of editing the REVIEW. A free expression of opinion

from as many sources as possible was earnestly solicited. Such statements should be sent directly to Professor Clarence A. Berdahl, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

The report of the Committee on Political Science Courses in War-Time, under the chairmanship of Evron Kirkpatrick, was published in the December, 1942, issue of the REVIEW (pages 1142–1146).

The Committee on Nominations placed in nomination the following persons, who were duly elected: President, Robert E. Cushman (Cornell University); First Vice-President, John M. Gaus (University of Wisconsin); Second Vice-President, Peter H. Odegard (Amherst College); and Third Vice-President, Denna F. Fleming (Vanderbilt University). The following persons were elected members of the Executive Council for the term 1943–46: Clyde Eagleton (New York University); Charles Fairman (Stanford University); V. O. Key, Jr. (Johns Hopkins University); Amry Vandenbosch (University of Kentucky); Harold Zink (DePauw University). The Executive Council elected Kenneth Colegrove (Northwestern University) as Secretary-Treasurer, and Harvey Walker (Ohio State University) as Assistant Secretary-Treasurer.

The membership of the Association's committees during the year 1942 was as follows:

Committee on Program for the Annual Meeting in 1942: Harold W. Stoke (University of Wisconsin), *chairman;* Harwood L. Childs (Princeton University); Denna F. Fleming (Vanderbilt University); Clarence E. Ridley (International City Managers Association); and Francis G. Wilson (University of Illinois).

Committee on Revision of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association: Robert E. Cushman (Cornell University), *chairman;* Walter F. Dodd (Chicago, Illinois), *vice-chairman;* John A. Fairlie (University of Illinois); William O. Farber (University of South Dakota); J. A. Clifford Grant (University of California at Los Angeles); and H. Clarence Nixon (Vanderbilt University).

Committee on Publication of Proceedings: W. Brooke Graves (Temple University), *chairman;* Harwood L. Childs (Princeton University); and Frederic A. Ogg (University of Wisconsin).

Committee on American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, with Particular Reference to Congress: George B. Galloway (Washington, D. C.), *chairman;* Marshall E. Dimock (War Shipping Administration); Meyer Jacobstein (Brookings Institution); Benjamin B. Wallace (U. S. Tariff Commission); and Schuyler C. Wallace (Columbia University).

Committee to Coöperate with the Advisory Board of the National Citizenship Education Program: Marshall E. Dimock (War Shipping Administration), *chairman;* Franklin L. Burdette (Butler University); Joseph P. Chamberlain (Columbia University); Kenneth Colegrove (Northwestern

University); John M. Gaus (University of Wisconsin); E. Pendleton Herring (Harvard University); Roscoe C. Martin (University of Alabama); John Brown Mason (Fresno State College); Peter H. Odegard (Amherst College); Catheryn Seckler-Hudson (American University); Russell M. Story (Claremont Colleges); and Elbert D. Thomas (United States Senator from Utah).

Committee on Regional Societies: John E. Briggs (State University of Iowa), *chairman;* Thorsten V. Kalijarvi (University of New Hampshire); Roscoe C. Martin (University of Alabama); Charles C. Rohlfing (University of Pennsylvania); Charles H. Rohr (Trinity College); Schuyler C. Wallace (Columbia University); and Herbert Wright (Catholic University of America).

Committee on War-Time Services of the Association: Charles S. Hyneman (U. S. Bureau of the Budget), *chairman;* Merle Fainsod (Harvard University); Ernest S. Griffith (Library of Congress); William C. Jones (University of Oregon); Robert D. Leigh (National Resources Planning Board); Kirk H. Porter (State University of Iowa); and Herman Walker, Jr. (U. S. Department of Agriculture).

Committee on Endowment: William Anderson (University of Minnesota), *chairman;* Charles A. Beard (New Milford, Connecticut); Joseph P. Chamberlain (Columbia University); Frederick M. Davenport (National Institute of Public Affairs); Walter F. Dodd (Chicago, Illinois); John A. Fairlie (University of Illinois); Charles G. Haines (University of California at Los Angeles); Arthur N. Holcombe (Harvard University); Isidor Loeb (Washington University); Charles E. Merriam (University of Chicago); William B. Munro (California Institute of Technology); Frederic A. Ogg (University of Wisconsin); Lindsay Rogers (Columbia University); and James T. Young (University of Pennsylvania).

Committee on the Personnel Service: Harvey Walker (Ohio State University), *chairman;* Herman C. Beyle (Syracuse University); Arthur N. Holcombe (Harvard University); Evron Kirkpatrick (University of Minnesota); and Samuel C. May (University of California).

Committee on Public Law: Oliver P. Field (Indiana University), *chairman;* Marshall E. Dimock (War Shipping Administration); David Fellman (University of Nebraska); Charles G. Haines (University of California at Los Angeles); and James Hart (University of Virginia).

Committee on Publication of Election Statistics: W. Reed West (George Washington University), *chairman;* Thomas S. Barclay (Stanford University); Harold F. Gosnell (U. S. Bureau of the Budget); E. E. Schattschneider (Wesleyan University); and Catheryn Seckler-Hudson (American University).

Committee on Research: Ernest S. Griffith (Library of Congress), *chairman;* Benjamin E. Lippincott (University of Minnesota); Karl Lowen-

stein (Amherst College); Walter Sharp (College of the City of New York); and Carl B. Swisher (Johns Hopkins University).

Committee on the Social Studies: Howard White (Miami University), *chairman;* Roscoe L. Ashley (Pasadena Junior College); Robert H. Connery (Catholic University); Russell M. Cooper (Cornell College); Henrietta Fernitz (Chicago Teachers College); Samuel R. Harrell (National Foundation for Education); Garfield Jones (Toledo University); David W. Knepper (Mississippi State College for Women); and Harrison C. Thomas (Board of Education, Brooklyn, New York).

Committee on Nomination of Officers for 1943: Charles M. Kneier (University of Illinois), *chairman;* Alfred B. Butts (University of Alabama); Charles G. Haines (University of California at Los Angeles); Robert R. Wilson (Duke University); and Benjamin F. Wright (Harvard University).

Committee on Changes in Political Science Courses in Colleges and Universities during War-Time: Evron Kirkpatrick (University of Minnesota), *chairman;* Ethan P. Allen (Iowa State University); Rodney L. Mott (Colgate University); Kenneth O. Warner (University of Tennessee); and Francis O. Wilcox (Office of Civilian Defense).

Committee to Report on the Proposal of the University of North Carolina Press: Francis W. Coker (Yale University), *chairman:* Peter Odegard (Amherst College); and Frederic A. Ogg (University of Wisconsin).

Committee of Political Scientists in Washington, D. C.: Marshall E. Dimock (War Shipping Administration), *chairman;* James W. Fesler (War Production Board); E. Pendleton Herring (Harvard University); Harold F. Gosnell (Bureau of the Budget); Ernest S. Griffith (Library of Congress); Charles S. Hyneman (Bureau of the Budget); Walter H. C. Laves (Office of Civilian Defense); and Donald C. Stone (Bureau of the Budget).

Committee on the REVIEW: Clarence A. Berdahl (University of Illinois), *chairman;* Ben Cherrington (University of Denver); Arthur N. Holcombe (Harvard University); John W. Manning (University of Kentucky); and Frederick F. Blachly (Brookings Institution).

Advisory Committee to the Division of State and Local Government of the Bureau of the Census: Thomas H. Reed (National Municipal League), *chairman;* William Bradshaw (University of Missouri); Arthur W. Bromage (University of Michigan); M. P. Catherwood (Cornell University); J. C. Charlesworth (University of Pennsylvania); Edwin A. Cottrell (Stanford University); Herman Kehrli (University of Oregon); Charles M. Kneier (University of Illinois); Morris B. Lambie (Harvard University); Lane W. Lancaster (University of Nebraska); Stuart A. MacCorkle (University of Texas); John W. Manning (University of Kentucky); Roscoe C. Martin (University of Alabama); Kirk H. Porter

(Iowa State University); Pressly S. Sikes (University of Indiana); John F. Sly (Princeton University); W. Reed West (George Washington University).

Committee on Audit: Walter F. Dodd (Chicago, Illinois), *chairman;* and John Day Larkin (Illinois Institute of Technology).—KENNETH COLEGROVE, *Secretary-Treasurer.*

MEMORIALS

Russell M. Story. To his students and colleagues of the past quarter of a century, the name of Russell M. Story stands out as that of a great teacher of political science. In the capacity of one of the first of the many students who came under his influence at Pomona College, I have been asked to collaborate with his colleague, Professor E. M. Sait, in a presentation of a brief memorial following upon his untimely death last May. Although former students still speak of his fine work at the University of Illinois, Russell Story was most effective in the intimate personal relationships which are possible in a small college. He spent his most fruitful years at Pomona, where he took charge of the department of political science in 1926, bringing new life to political science and related social studies. He challenged students to a vibrant awareness of what he called "the human scene," dissipating sham and false pretense with mellow but penetrating criticism. He took his students beyond the formally descriptive materials of political science into the analysis of institutions as they arose out of the *mores* of society. His seminars and classes became centers of genuine intellectual endeavor.

Young people trained under him scattered throughout the United States and entered many forms of employment. Graduate schools both in the West and in the East felt the impact of the early training. His students are found at all levels of the teaching profession. They are present in Congress and, in larger numbers, in the executive branch of the federal government. Civic life in California has been invigorated by their experience. It is in no small part as a result of his efforts that Claremont has become the cultural center of a vast area of Southern California.

As a professor at Pomona, and later as president of Claremont Colleges, he had under way a project for a new collegiate institution for the more realistic study of modern business in a world of corporate enterprise. The depression of 1929 brought one postponement of the project, and the outbreak of war in 1941 brought another. With characteristic hopefulness and understanding of modern trends, however, he predicted thereafter that "certainly the idea will find embodiment some place, somewhere, some time." Although his personal leadership has been lost, his influence, flowing through his students and friends and the institutions with which he was connected, will continue to spread down through the years.—CARL B. SWISHER.

To this memorial, Edward M. Sait added the following words: "Perhaps Story was primarily a teacher. He may be said to have collaborated rather than taught. He had the rare gift of breaking through the formal barriers of the classroom, examining—as an equal and a friend—the problems of each individual, and communicating his own enthusiasms and ideals, which included honest and thorough workmanship. What the young man learned left a permanent impress. Story's influence upon his colleagues was scarcely less notable. When difficulties arose, whether curricular or personal, they sought his advice, knowing how generously he shared his time with others and how sagacious his advice would be. At meetings of the faculty or committees his opinion—often conclusive and always persuasive—was received with great deference. During a close association of fifteen years, I had ample opportunity to discover why he merited such a reputation. In the service of the college and of the public he never spared himself. His death, at the early age of fifty-nine, may be attributed to continuous overwork."

Jesse Siddall Reeves. The death of Jesse Siddall Reeves on July 7, 1942, brought to a close thirty-two years of devoted and fruitful service to the University of Michigan. Called to Michigan in 1910 as chairman of the department of political science, Professor Reeves held that post until 1937, when he decided to give up his administrative duties. In 1931 he was appointed William W. Cook Professor of American Institutions, a chair which he retained until his automatic retirement from the faculty in February, 1942.

Professor Reeves was born at Richmond, Indiana, January 27, 1872, the son of James Eyre and Hannah More (Peters) Reeves. He was proud of an American ancestry which stretched back into colonial days. His education was an indication of the widely-diversified interests which were to mark his later life. After a brief period at Kenyon College, he went to Amherst, where he received his B.S. degree in 1891. Graduate work in history at the Johns Hopkins University brought him the degree of doctor of philosophy in 1894. He was admitted to the Indiana bar in 1897 and for the next ten years practiced law at Richmond. During this period he took an active part in state and local politics, an experience which later proved of great value to him in teaching American government.

Reeves was at heart a scholar and the lure of academic life drew him away from the practice of law. While a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University, he served as instructor in American history in Woman's College (now Goucher), from 1893 to 1894, and in the year 1905–06 he was lecturer on diplomatic history at the Johns Hopkins University. In 1907, he was appointed assistant professor of political science at Dartmouth College, where he remained until his call to Michigan in 1910.

Reeves did not confine himself to academic life. During the first World War he was commissioned captain in the Air Service, and later was promoted to the rank of major and judge advocate of the 20th Division. He received his honorable discharge from the Army on December 23, 1918. A recognized authority in the fields of diplomatic history and international law, his advice and assistance were frequently in demand. From 1920 until 1930, he was a member of the board of advisers of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts, and also served as a round table leader at the Institute. He lectured in the Academy of International Law at The Hague in 1924, and from 1925 to 1927 was a member of the Pan-American Commission of Jurists for the codification of international law. In 1926, he delivered the James Schouler lectures in history and political science at the Johns Hopkins University. He was an Associé, Institut de Droit International, and a member of the American Institute of International Law, the American Society of International Law, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association (of which he was president in 1928), the American Philosophical Society, and the Research Club of the University of Michigan. He was the recipient of two honorary degrees, that of doctor of humane letters from Amherst in 1926 and that of doctor of letters from Williams in 1933. In 1932, he was named Henry Russell Lecturer in the University of Michigan.

There seemed no limits to Reeves' intellectual interests. Indeed it could well be said of him, as Cotton Mather said of John Cotton, that he was "a *most universal* scholar and a *living system* of the liberal arts and a *walking library.*" A voracious reader, he roamed the fields of art, music, and literature, in addition to those of history, government, and international law. Not content with translations, he delved into the original Greek, Latin, French, German, and Spanish texts. He set a high standard of scholarship for himself and his students, a standard clearly set forth in his Honors Convocation address, "Scholarship, an Accomplishment and a Profession," delivered on April 30, 1937. His publications, in addition to numerous essays and reviews, include *International Beginnings of the Congo Free State* (1894); *Napoleonic Exiles in America* (1895); *American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk* (1907); and *La Communauté Internationale* (1925). He assisted in editing the works of Grotius, and at the time of his death had collected a mass of material for a book on Prester John.

Through the many years of his association with the University, Reeves was one of its most active members on questions of educational policy. His opinions, always eloquently and earnestly expressed, and frequently made more effective by flashes of biting satire, carried great weight with his colleagues. To those who did not know him well, Reeves might have appeared somewhat gruff and reserved. His intimate friends, however, realized that this seeming brusqueness covered a generous and tender

heart, ever ready to champion a just cause, no matter how humble its nature. He was also possessed of a delightful sense of humor. A typical illustration is found in his comments written in the margin of a reprint on "A Statistical Analysis of Golf." Opposite the statement, "each player has an individual type of game," Reeves wrote, "I have a bad one." On the author's conclusion that "the humanly perfect shot is one having a deviation of approximately 5° on both sides of the intended line of flight of the ball," his comment was: "Mine is nearer 45°; therefore I am by no means humanly perfect. Q.E.D."

At the final meetings of his classes in Political Thought and American Constitutional Law in June, 1941, Professor Reeves was deeply touched by the tributes presented to him by his students. After a recital of some of his scholarly accomplishments, the students in American Constitutional Law concluded: "We are sincerely sorry that future students at the University will not have the opportunity to study under and appreciate the true greatness of so eminent an educator."

It has long been recognized that the greatness of a university depends less on its physical equipment than on the members of its faculty. Measured by this standard, Jesse Siddall Reeves will be listed among the immortals of the University of Michigan.—EVERETT S. BROWN.

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION*

ARTICLE I: NAME

This Association shall be known as the American Political Science Association.

ARTICLE II: OBJECT

It shall be the purpose of this Association to encourage the study of Political Science, including Political Theory, Government and Politics, Public Law, Public Administration, and International Relations.

The Association as such will not assume a partisan position upon any question of practical politics, nor commit its members to any position thereupon.

ARTICLE III: MEMBERSHIP

There shall be five classes of members in this Association:

1. *Annual Members.* Any person may become a member of this Association upon payment of five dollars and after the first year may continue such by paying the annual dues of five dollars.

2. *Sustaining Members.* Any person paying annual dues of ten dollars or more shall be a sustaining member of this Association.

3. *Contributing Members.* Any person paying annual dues of twenty-five dollars or more shall be a contributing member of this Association.

4. *Life Members.* Any individual paying dues of two hundred dollars in a lump sum, or in four annual instalments of fifty dollars each, shall be a life member of this Association.

5. *Associate Members.* Any graduate or undergraduate student registered in a college or university may become an associate member of this Association upon payment of three dollars, and after the first year may continue as long as he is so registered, by paying annual dues of three dollars.

Each member shall be entitled to a copy of each number of the *American Political Science Review* issued during his membership.

ARTICLE IV: OFFICERS

The officers of the Association shall consist of a President, three Vice-

* In 1941, President Frederic A. Ogg appointed a committee to undertake a general revision of the Association's constitution. President William Anderson continued the committee, with personnel unchanged, in 1942, and at the meeting of the Association held in Washington, D. C., January 29–31, 1943, the revised constitution presented herewith was formally adopted. The committee on revision consisted of Robert E. Cushman (Cornell University), *chairman;* Walter F. Dodd (Chicago, Ill.); John A. Fairlie (University of Illinois); William O. Farber (University of South Dakota); J. A. C. Grant (University of California at Los Angeles); and H. Clarence Nixon (Vanderbilt University).

Presidents, a Secretary-Treasurer, an Assistant Secretary-Treasurer, a Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review*, and an Executive Council consisting *ex officio* of the officers above mentioned and fifteen elected members. Ex-Presidents of the Association may attend meetings of the Executive Council and participate in its discussions.

ARTICLE V: ELECTION OF OFFICERS:

1. The President and Vice-Presidents shall be elected annually. The fifteen elected members of the Executive Council shall serve for three years, and shall be divided into three groups of five each, the term of members of one of such groups expiring each year.

2. The elective officers shall be nominated by a Nominating Committee composed of five members. This Committee is authorized to canvass members of the Association by mail for suggestions for nominations. Additional nominations may be offered from the floor at the Annual Business Meeting.

3. The elective officers shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Association present at the Annual Business Meeting, a quorum being present.

ARTICLE VI: APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS

1. The Secretary-Treasurer, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer, and the Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review*, shall be appointed by the Executive Council for specified terms of office not to exceed three years, and shall be eligible for reappointment.

2. There shall be a Board of Editors of the *American Political Science Review* to assist the Managing Editor. This Board shall consist of such number, and shall be appointed in such manner and for such terms, as the Executive Council may determine.

ARTICLE VII: DUTIES OF OFFICERS

1. The President of the Association shall preside at all business meetings of the Association and of the Executive Council. Except as may be otherwise specifically provided, he shall appoint all committees of the Association, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Council may assign to him. In his absence, his duties shall devolve successively upon the First, Second, and Third Vice-Presidents, and the Secretary-Treasurer.

2. The Secretary-Treasurer shall keep the records of the Association, shall receive and have custody of the funds of the Association, subject to the rules of the Executive Council, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Council may assign to him.

3. The Assistant Secretary-Treasurer shall assist the Secretary-Treasurer in the performance of his duties.

4. The Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review* shall edit and publish the *American Political Science Review*, with the assistance of the Board of Editors, and subject to such rules as may be adopted by the Executive Council.

5. The Executive Council shall have charge of the general interests of the Association, shall call regular and special meetings of the Association, appropriate money, create committees with appropriate powers, and in general possess the governing power in the Association, except as otherwise specifically provided in the Constitution.

The Executive Council shall provide for the auditing of the accounts of the Association.

The Executive Council shall have the power to fill vacancies in its membership occasioned by death, resignation, or failure to elect, such appointees to hold office until the next annual election of officers.

6. The Association shall meet annually at such time and place as may be designated by the Executive Council, unless the Council shall otherwise determine because of an emergency. All members of the Association may attend such meetings, and may vote at the Annual Business Meeting if in attendance.

In the event of an emergency which prevents the holding of the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, the Executive Council shall be authorized to exercise all the powers of the Association, including the election of officers.

7. Seven members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Council, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

Twenty members shall constitute a quorum of the Association, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

ARTICLE VIII: PERMANENT ENDOWMENT FUND: TRUST COMMITTEE

1. The American Political Science Association authorizes the establishment of a Permanent Endowment, to be invested and preserved intact as to principal, except as any donor may otherwise stipulate, the income thereof to be used from year to year for the purposes of expanding and improving the work of the Association.

2. The President of the Association is authorized to appoint an Endowment Committee to solicit gifts and bequests to the Permanent Endowment Fund.

3. The Executive Council is authorized to appoint by a majority vote of all the members of the Council (taken by mail if necessary) a Trust

Committee, and is authorized to fill vacancies therein by similar vote, such Committee to consist of the President, Secretary-Treasurer, and five other members of the Association, the latter for terms of five years, with overlapping terms, so that after the first year one member shall be appointed each year.

4. The Trust Committee is authorized:

a. To receive gifts and bequests to the Permanent Endowment Fund, provided that where special conditions as to the use of funds are attached to any gift or bequest, the Executive Council must also give its approval to the acceptance.

b. To make arrangements with a legally incorporated bank or trust company for the investment, custody, and safekeeping of the endowment funds.

c. To appropriate from the annual income of the Fund (or from the principal, if so provided by the donor) for any of the purposes for which endowments have been established.

5. The Trust Committee shall present annually to the Executive Council and to the Association a statement of all endowment funds expended by the Committee during the preceding fiscal year, and of all proposed expenditures from such funds for the succeeding fiscal year. The accounts of the Committee shall be subject to audit in the same manner as other accounts and funds of the Association.

ARTICLE IX: RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions shall be referred to the Executive Council for its recommendation before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting.

ARTICLE X: AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this Constitution shall be proposed by the Executive Council and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the Association.

Ten members of the Association may propose amendments to this Constitution. Such proposed amendments shall be referred to the Executive Council for consideration, and by them referred to the Association for its action thereon at the next Annual Business Meeting with such recommendations as the Council may see fit to make.

* * * * * *

Notes on the Revision of the Constitution

ARTICLE III: LIFE MEMBERSHIP

The change regarding Life Membership is explained as follows: The

word "individual" is used to prevent libraries and institutions from taking life memberships. Years ago a law library bought a Life Membership for fifty dollars, and our Secretary-Treasurer has only recently worked out a compromise with them. With the present low rate of interest on invested funds and the increase of the subscription to the *Review* to five dollars, the Association would lose heavily on Life Memberships under the old arrangement. There was some opinion that such memberships should be abolished. It was felt, however, that the increase in the rates would give the needed protection.

ARTICLE IV: OFFICERS

Most of these changes regularize past practice. The provision with regard to ex-Presidents serves the purpose of inviting these men to sit with the Executive Council and at the same time indicates that they are not members of the Council and therefore cannot vote.

ARTICLE V: ELECTION OF OFFICERS

Here are incorporated some of the changes in electoral procedure recently authorized by the Association. There was rather widespread opinion that the recently adopted practice of printing the report of the Nominating Committee in the October *Review* should remain in the status of a practice until the Association has had longer experience with it. The present committee has therefore not incorporated it in the Constitution.

ARTICLE VI: APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS

The specification of three-year terms for the Secretary-Treasurer, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer, and Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review* was vigorously urged by the men now holding these offices. The purpose is not to promote frequent changes, or rotation in these important and exacting positions, but rather to provide definite occasions at reasonable intervals at which the question of the continuance of these men in office will be raised as a routine matter and therefore without embarrassment either to the incumbents or to the Executive Council. Under our previous practice of unlimited tenure in these positions, action taken by the Council to end the tenure of the Secretary-Treasurer or the Managing Editor could hardly fail to be construed as evidence of dissatisfaction with the men so removed. At the same time, a sensitive man filling such a post is bound to feel that he must offer his "resignation" at what he regards as appropriate intervals in order to make sure that he still commands the confidence of the Council. It is believed that the proposed change will not alter previous practice in the matter of long tenure for the loyal and overburdened men on whom the Association places these

onerous responsibilities. It will, however, eliminate the embarrassments referred to.

It seemed desirable to leave the arrangements regarding the Board of Editors of the *American Political Science Review* in flexible form. A special committee on the *Review* has been set up to consider broadly problems relating to the journal. The proposals of this committee may easily be of such a character as to influence decision as to the size of the Board of Editors and the terms of its office. The Committee believed it wiser to leave the door open for experimentation in these matters under the general direction of the Executive Council than to try now to formulate more specific provisions.

ARTICLE VII: DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The final section dealing with emergency powers seemed appropriate in view of the uncertainties arising out of the existing emergency. Whether an annual meeting of the Association can be held next year no one can now determine. If we are obliged to abandon the annual meeting, authority should be lodged in some responsible body to transact the business of the Association.

ARTICLE VIII: PERMANENT ENDOWMENT FUND: TRUST COMMITTEE

The text of Article VIII was adopted as a by-law at the annual meeting of the Association in 1940.

ARTICLES IX AND X: RESOLUTIONS AND AMENDMENTS

The changes involved here call for referring all resolutions and all constitutional amendments proposed by members to the Executive Council. The Executive Council would then pass them on to the Association with a recommendation, favorable or unfavorable. The approval of the Executive Council is not required, but the Council is thus given an opportunity to state its opposition at the time it submits the proposals to the Association. This practice is followed by several societies, including the American Bar Association.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The American Spirit; A Study of the Idea of Civilization in the United States. By Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. vii, 696. $5.00.)

In this fourth and presumably culminating book of the *Rise of American Civilization* series, the Beards have undertaken an emphasis, as they put it, upon "the interior aspects of Civilization in the United States since 1776." The strategy of the book is to seize upon and exploit the single idea that most "coherently, comprehensively, and systematically" expresses the "spirit" of the American enterprise. "Civilization" is the word which they have hit upon.

In simplest form, then, this study is the history of the word "civilization." Since, however, the word did not arise in America, they go abroad to find its genesis. It is of late origin, arriving just in time, as a matter of fact, to become the bearer of our earliest national spirit. Boswell tried to argue Dr. Johnson into including it in his famous dictionary (1772), but Johnson would go no farther than to include "civility" instead. "Civilization" was presently included in John Ash's dictionary three years later (1775). The equivalent was not treated in the French *Encyclopaedia*, nor did it get the endorsement of the French Academy until some twenty years after its birth into respectability in England, i.e., not until 1798. (The word has never been a popular one in Germany.)

Once legitimized in English, however, the word spread rapidly and its idea began the process of growth into greatness. We can here but indicate the larger stages of its history, and the method the authors use in exploiting the idea. They first seek to show by illustrations that the idea of civilization has been and is the "center of interest" in American thought. This is to demonstrate (neglecting negative instances and positive alternatives) that the single basket into which they have put all their eggs is a likely basket. This done, they retreat to investigate "origins." Thereupon the proper history of the idea begins. The first stage is entitled "Formulation and Affirmation in the Early Republic." Amid many differences, a dozen or so early authors agree—so the Beards believe they have proved—upon four propositions: (1) that "civilization" involves a complete theory of human history, (2) that Americans are different, (3) that America must continue different, since history is irreversible, and (4) that Americans have "both a boundless opportunity and an unlimited obligation to elevate their civilization and equalize the distribution of its benefits. . . . "

With this early amplitude of meaning thus presented, the story proceeds toward a moral growing larger through steady accretion. It proceeds through chapters on the "Popular Upsurge," the "Sectional Struggle," "Individualism and Pessimism," "Counter-Reformation and Assevera-

tion," "Foreign Criticism," "World Mission under Arms," and, at last, "Convergence." This *convergence* is to the end foreseen: cultural autonomy and political isolationism, if not something like autarchy. The quantity of labor expended to mature this moral into full bodiedness is immense. To illustrate its immensity, it is enough to remark that one chapter, "The Popular Upsurge," summarizes the major literary output of George Bancroft, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Lucretia Mott, Parke Godwin, Orestes A. Brownson, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Wendell Phillips, Henry C. Carey, James Fenimore Cooper, Walt Whitman, Edward Everett, W. E. Channing, George P. Marsh, Theodore Parker, and James Russell Lowell, with the *Atlantic Monthly* thrown in. So it goes through all the prodigious sections of the book.

If there be adequate reasons for treating the ideal element of America monistically rather than pluralistically (a procedure not here justified), and if there be further adequate reasons for letting the idea of civilization monopolize that monism (a strategy here illustrated but not argued through disproof of alternative ideas), then are there adequate reasons for slanting the monism, which the idea of civilization is held to constitute, toward the narrowly national rather than toward the never wholly absent international ideal? True, these many witnesses have used the idea in the fashion indicated; but have not other men, and sometimes these very same men in other contexts, looked through this word as a window out upon the broad expanses of the whole world, spatial as well as temporal? Lloyds, as I understand it, do not insure scholars against bias when the scholars operate in fields as imponderable as those covering the *spirit* of a whole nation.

Take Woodrow Wilson, for instance (and he but revivified an international conception of civilization as old in America as Thomas Jefferson). Being a negative instance, Wilson here gets paid for his pains. He is accorded less space (half a dozen pages) for the summary of his voluminous war utterances on civilization than that given to many a name all but unknown. Nor does Franklin D. Roosevelt fare better. Neither of these history-makers and writers on civilization gets as much emphasis as that given to, say, Joel Barlow or Robert Coram. Who calls that sober? Who calls it circumspect? Who, indeed, calls it fair?

T. V. SMITH.

University of Chicago.

Democracy, Efficiency, Stability. By ARTHUR C. MILLSPAUGH. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1942. Pp. x, 522. $4.00.)

Published as No. 43 of the *Studies in Administration* of the Institute for Government Research (Brookings Institution), this volume bears the

subtitle, "An Appraisal of American Government"—a caption accurately descriptive of the nature and scope of the treatise. The criteria for the appraisal of American government are defined thus: "The ultimate test of the strength or weakness of any governmental feature is whether it contributes or may be expected to contribute to stability, efficiency, and democracy." These are the standards by which the adequacy of the governmental system is judged throughout. The author approaches the problem historically, devoting approximately half of the book to a survey of the history of American government from 1787 to 1929 and the remainder to an account of the New Deal, its causes and effects. In view of the fact that governmental history, as contrasted with general political history, has been more neglected by scholars than it deserves to have been, Millspaugh's review of the first 140 years of American government is useful and instructive in spite of the fact that the treatment is not exhaustive and does not pretend to be. In general, the discussion is thoughtful and will repay careful study.

Millspaugh argues cogently and convincingly that the American system of government gives excessive recognition to local and special interests to the detriment of the public welfare. On numerous occasions in the course of his discussion, he attributes the lack of coherence of American public policy to the pressures of private associations promoting special aims on the one hand and to the exaggerated influence of local political interests on the other hand. As the arena of these interests, Congress is condemned to futility and is certain to decline in prestige and importance. Having made a truly formidable argument to this general effect, however, the author views the logical consequences of his demonstration with dismay. Federal centralization and the growth of executive power seem to be the inevitable results of the political system described, but, in the opinion of the author, they seem also to be incompatible with the survival of democracy. In the elaboration of these propositions, Millspaugh makes numerous shrewd observations, sheds much light on the subject, but generates also a great quantity of gloom which the reader may or may not share, depending upon his predilections.

As is true of many other books, the first half of *Democracy, Efficiency, and Stability* gives evidence of having been worked over more painstakingly and thoughtfully than the second half. Millspaugh's treatment of the New Deal will seem slightly bilious to readers who disapprove of contemporary political tendencies less strongly than he does. Doubtless the least satisfactory part of the book deals with "Managed Opinion." This chapter is replete with hypothetical propositions tending to create a vague impression that freedom of opinion is endangered by the government of the United States. Having written the chapter in this manner, Millspaugh says: "In the Federal Government, the threat, if there was

one, to freedom of opinion was still largely potential." What can be the purpose of a discussion of this character?

Despite his awareness of the rôle of pressure groups in American politics, Millspaugh has developed no comprehensive theory of interests and makes only passing references to the relations between parties and pressure groups. More fundamental is the fact that he places an extremely low valuation on American political parties as instruments of democratic government. This view of the party system is central to the whole structure of the book. In the opinion of this reviewer, the analysis of the American major parties, while suggestive, is inadequate, and this inadequacy vitiates large segments of the argument. Despite these reservations, it is just to say that Millspaugh has written a notable and distinguished book.

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER.

Wesleyan University.

The Modern Government in Action. BY ERNEST S. GRIFFITH. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. 91. $1.00.)

This volume contains three lectures given at Swarthmore College by the author, who is director of the Legislative Reference Service at the Library of Congress. Beginning with the proposition that the old governmental categories no longer fit the times, the author's avowed purpose is "to explore the possibility of formulating a new set of categories, more realistic than the old and hence more useful to the present generation."

The result is an interesting, stimulating, and often provocative little book which will amply repay the time that anyone spends in reading it. The general thesis, of course, is that we have developed all manner of new governmental institutions, practices, and relationships which cannot be herded into the pigeon-holes of our traditional political terminology. So we must try to construct a pattern of thought and speech which will make place for them.

The problem is how to do it. Dr. Griffith does not think that we will get very far by merely devising a new set of compendious formulas to replace the old. He is not captivated by such current phrases as planned economy, political integration, social readjustment, functional organization, and the like—which so frequently serve as a hide-out for those who dislike to think or write in concrete terms. What he tries to find out is how far, and by what machinery, the realities of economic planning can be reconciled with individual liberty and democratic procedures. For if we accept man as the end and not as the means, individual rights must have a place reserved for them in any logical scheme of social organization.

What we need, therefore, is a consensus on objectives and values instead of (as at present) a conflict of interests masquerading as principles.

Much of the trouble with administrative regulation is that purpose and scope have not been clearly agreed upon by any of the parties concerned. Do we want a government of men and not of laws? The answer is that we are going to have it whether we want it or not. Some day, the author suggests, the only provisions of a "law" will be the preamble and the enabling clause. If that is ahead of us, we should see to it that the men whose delegated authority fills the gap between these two clauses know precisely what they are seeking to do and are competent to do it. All this indicates only a few of the high spots in Dr. Griffith's discussion, which (whether one agrees with him or not) is marked throughout by orderly and forceful presentation.

WILLIAM B. MUNRO.

Pasadena, California.

Victory—and After. By EARL BROWDER (New York: International Publishers. 1942. Pp. 256. $2.00.)

Goals for America. By STUART CHASE. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1942. Pp. 134. $1.00.)

In different fashions, these volumes discuss the riddle of our age—scarcity in the midst of plenty. The books are supplementary, for the first deals with attaining victory, while the second looks to an economically secure peace after military triumph.

Mr. Browder's recent experiences have mellowed him somewhat, for he consciously strives for tolerance; but frequent use of "idiocy" and "stupidity" as epithets, especially for his left-wing enemies, indicates a lingering bitterness. Coöperation between the United States and Soviet Russia is his leading theme, since Mr. Browder considers these two nations the most powerful in the world, and their joint action essential to United Nations victory. Unconvincingly, Mr. Browder contends that the United Nations are a continuation of the United Front of the 1930's. The main thesis is that the Capitalist lion and the Socialist wolf not only can coöperate in destroying the Fascist hyena, but should form a lasting union during the course of the war. Domestically, managers may be appeased to the Rooseveltian maximum of $25,000 annually to prevent their sabotage of the war effort. In general, Mr. Browder agrees with Mr. Wendell Willkie in advocating independence for India, the abolition of imperialism, and a Second Front.

Nothing strikingly new or startlingly significant emerges, not even the labored defense of Browder's position before June 22, 1941, when suddenly the "imperialist war" became a defense of democracy, which Mr. Browder and Mr. Stalin had always known would happen. Hence he had worked to have the United States coöperate with Russia in pacifying

Hitler so Hitler would be destroyed! Mr. Browder concludes: "Our theory is no dogma, but a guide to action" (p. 256).

Stuart Chase, in *Goals for America*, his second published volume in a special series of six, presents a popularization of national planning. Planning is the preparation of a national budget, in which national minimum standards of food, shelter, clothing, health, and education are established. The productive machine now producing an abundance of arms, with scarcity of consumer goods, can be reversed after the war to produce a national plenty of necessities by mass production and mass employment, thereby avoiding another depression. Life will be freed from a condition of poverty, starvation, and fear of violent death (Hobbes), to become a world of reasonable plenty (Locke), because man is essentially good (Rousseau). Minimums of necessities imply maximums of luxuries. However, floors beget ceilings, as the farmers are now learning, sometimes impatiently.

Mr. Chase's contagious optimism and good will disarm his critics. However, scholars may remember that in many civilizations, a spiritual *élite* has conceived a good life, lived by intelligent men, just before those civilizations collapsed. Practical students of government may want to know how to produce: (a) a consensus among our population on national planning so that the "loyal opposition" will oppose only means, not ends; and (b) substantial agreement on a procedure for handling international disputes so that technology can devote itself to production, not destruction. To Mr. Chase, the true *general* or *public* interest is a consumer interest. However, pressure groups are organized as producers. Can an elected representative advance an unorganized consumer program when the voters of his district are organized as producers? Mr. Leon Henderson might qualify as an expert witness in this regard. Recently a presidential threat of drastic action was required before Congress acted in war-time for the general (consumer) interest. Some congressmen were punished by their constituents at the ensuing election. What overhauling of our political machinery will be necessary for planning when one of ninety-six senators may exercise a *liberum veto* (filbuster) to prevent voting by men who are preparing to die for democracy.

Mr. Chase writes: "What Christian ethics, for all the devotion of its advocates, was never able to do, technology is now doing" (p. 126). The prospect of a technology without Christian ethics is not a happy one, witness Hitler's Reich. Perhaps more than technology is necessary to the working of the new New Order. Mr. Chase, it is hoped, will throw more light on these perplexing problems in his eagerly awaited future volumes.

J. B. SHANNON.

University of Wisconsin.

Grass Roots Politics. By HAROLD F. GOSNELL. (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 1942. Pp. ix, 195. $3.00.)

This volume is another valuable contribution to the series of quantitative analyses of American political behavior. Although its conclusions are interesting and revealing, they are by no means startling. The greatest importance of the book lies in its careful methodology and promising techniques. Concisely, convincing evidence is presented demonstrating how socio-economic data and election results may be used to discern political trends in certain states. Many highly detailed tables are included showing the intercorrelations of certain social, economic, and political variables to voting behavior. The author is fully cognizant that qualitative methods must still be widely used. Indeed, he makes a studied effort to avoid extravagant claims for the use of statistical methods. But he maintains, quite plausibly, that such methods are valuable as time and labor-savers, and that "quantitative techniques promise to give some very fruitful results if significant hypotheses and relevant indexes can be devised" (p. 146).

The political life of six states during the thirties, and in some cases in the twenties, was selected for study. In each instance, a description is first given of the economic, religious, and ethnic characteristics, and of party allegiances in each state. This is followed by an attempt to show patterns of relationships between these factors and voting behavior in various counties, sections, and large cities in the state. Illustrative of the generalizations made for each state is the following summary about Iowa, a case study in "farm belt politics": " . . . the southern counties, which gave Roosevelt the least support, constituted the poorest section of the state and also had the most native whites, the "driest" voters, the largest proportion of older people, the most rapidly declining population, the fewest big cities, the smallest number of tenants and farm laborers, and an active Republican radio station. On the other hand, the cash grain area, which gave Roosevelt the greatest support, comprised the wealthiest section of the state and also had the largest population of foreign stock, relatively "wet" voters, the largest proportion of young people, the largest urban area, and the largest number of tenants and farm laborers" (p. 74).

The other five states considered are Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Illinois, California, and Louisiana as respectively exemplary of industrial, progressive, rural-urban, utopia, and machine politics. Admittedly, important differences exist in the politics of the adjacent states of Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin. Some readers will undoubtedly wish that an analysis of two of these had been waived in favor of considering more politically divergent states such as those of New England, the Southwest, or border

states such as Kentucky or Tennessee. It is hoped, therefore, that Dr. Gosnell's studies will inspire others to conduct analyses of their own states along similar lines.

In a closing chapter on the future of the party system, the author has enhanced the value of his work for both the layman and the specialist by summarizing the changes now taking place within the parties. Centralization, the new bureaucracy, and the increasing partisanship of civic groups are viewed as probable significant developments following the war. To this must be added the pertinent factor of the creation of a new, unusually large, class of war veterans. As always, the future "depends upon our faith in the efficacy of the democratic process to solve the difficult problems of the war and post-war periods . . . " (p. 138).

HUGH A. BONE.

Queens College.

Public Control of Labor Relations. BY D. O. BOWMAN. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. xi, 504. $4.00.)

Here we have a valuable addition to the library of persons interested in the present-day problems of public administration and labor relations. There is, of course, no attempt on the part of the author to draw a hard and fast line between the two. In fact, he has broken down the treatment of his subject, not into two, but into six parts, which he calls "Legislative Policy," "Unfair Labor Practices," "Certification of Representatives," "Procedure of the Board," "Organization of the Board," and "Record and Recapitulation."

If this work is a textbook, it is worthy of note that its author has departed from accepted practice in textbook writing in one important particular. He has no regard for the length of chapters. In Part I, there are three chapters. The first runs to 55 pages, the next is two pages long, the next four. In Part IV, three subjects are treated: complaint cases, procedure in representation cases, and the disposition of cases. For apparently no other reason than that the first of these topics was occupying 74 pages, it was broken into two chapters, called "Complaint Cases" and "Complaint Cases (Continued)," respectively.

For his treatment of controversial issues, Dr. Bowman deserves our praise. Until the last chapter is reached, the reader is never allowed to know whether the author agrees or disagrees with decisions of the Board or with the procedures it has prescribed. He has chosen to take the rôle of an accurate reporter of what has occurred rather than that of a social reformer, philosopher, or fault-finder. *Public Control of Labor Relations* is rich in its citations of all the original source materials with which the student of the subject should be familiar.

Undoubtedly this book is most valuable for the light that it sheds on

the development of administrative law in the United States within the past eight years. It is too bad that the author did not include a table of cases. In striking contrast to the fullness of his treatment of administrative law is his neglect of constitutional law development. Not only is this important subject compressed into four pages, but the only opinion of the Supreme Court in a labor case discussed therein at all is that in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S. 1 (1937). The names of the four other labor cases decided the same day are mentioned. There are occasional references, in different chapters of the book, to other cases tried in the Supreme Court; but those cases are not mentioned in the chapter on constitutional issues.

"In its broadest sense, the administrative method of control," says the author in his concluding chapter, "means government by experts, law as scientific method. Its essence is skepticism, flexibility, realism, and a recognition of the need for the body politic to realize and comprehend in the fullest sense that the economic processes, the law, and the government are not apart from reality." He sounds the essential note when he continues thus: "Law always must be implemented . . . The prospective growth of the administrative process should cause no additional and undue fear that traditional legal values will be impaired, for the courts as much as or more than ever stand guard over the principle and tradition that is the Rubicon of all administrative control, i.e., the right of every citizen to rely upon a court of law to say whether the proper law has been properly applied to the individual and particular case, and the right of every citizen to have the court review the procedure by which the citizen has had his specialized case handled by a specialized agency."

The last chapter also includes a carefully worded appraisal of the different approaches to its responsibilities which the Board could have taken. After analyzing what actually has been done, the author says: " . . . in reading the law in its broadest sense so as to have justification for positive and forceful action, the Board accepted and carried its stewardship." Another approach would have emphasized the investigative and minimized the judicial character of the Board. Concerning that, Dr. Bowman says: "The administrative approach might also lead to a better development of labor relations in the sense that coöperation thrives better in a non-legalistic atmosphere that is not charged with court cases won or lost."

The author has been remarkably successful in drawing a picture of the differences between the way in which the NLRB operates, on the one hand, and the Federal Trade Commission, or the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the Securities and Exchange Commission, on the other, and why it follows that the charge of "meddling" is therefore at a minimum when one considers the development of administrative law or

procedure in the hands of the National Labor Relations Board. To make assurance doubly sure, he has quoted the exact parallel provisions of the statutes applicable to all these agencies.

JOHN G. HERNDON.

Haverford College.

Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases. BY ROSCOE POUND. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1941. Pp. xi, 431. $5.00.)

This third volume in the Judicial Administration Series might well have been sub-titled: "A History of the Rise and Decline of Technicality." Excessive legal formalism is obviously wasteful, and insistence on unnecessary technicalities is a vice of higher courts as well as lower ones. This is evident to anyone who reads this book, or who inspects the 3,457 pages on "Appeal and Error" in the *Century Digest.* Fortunately, there has been a distinct improvement in this respect during the past quarter-century—an improvement which has been due in no small measure to the efforts of Roscoe Pound himself.

The situation still is far from ideal. Every state could make further improvements, and many of them retain almost all the procedural forms which shackled appeals a century ago. The purpose of this book is to explain the historical details which lie back of the proposals for improving this situation. It contains a brief survey of appeals under Roman and Germanic law, a substantial discussion of review in eighteenth-century England and in the American colonies, and a full statement of the situation as it developed from bad to worse during the last century in the United States. The improvements which have been made during the present century are described, and there is a splendid concluding chapter entitled "Toward an Effective System of Review" which should be required reading for every student of judicial reform.

The material for this historical treatment has been painstakingly collected. Statutes, court decisions, rules of court, proceedings of bar associations, and treatises have all been combed with the scholarly care and profound erudition we have come to expect from the author. Material of this nature is seldom entrancing reading, even when interspersed with an occasional Poundism or a shocking example of the length to which the courts have gone in tithing mint, anise, and cummin at the expense of the weightier matters of the law. Nevertheless, as the author points out, a "detailed statement of appellate procedure in the era of hypertrophy in the last century is necessary to show what is behind the abuses we must eliminate, what principles are sound, as shown by experience, and what are but remnants of ideas which came from the English procedure of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."

The evidence shows that there are three major faults in our appellate

arrangements. The first of these is the use of writ of error, instead of appeal, to secure review of lower court decisions. This procedure leads the higher court to view the proceeding before it as a new case in which process must be served and pleadings be made anew. It has led to record worship, an attitude of mind which prevents the lower court from trying the case efficiently and the higher court from doing justice on it. The appellate tribunal is required to dispose of the case piecemeal, instead of as a whole, with the danger of reappeals and numerous retrials in the same suit.

It is also clear that it was a mistake to give the legislature the task of prescribing rules of procedure instead of leaving these matters to the courts. Even the codes of procedure often did more harm than good. They not only prescribed judicial procedure in hard and fast detail, but they also set the fashion for constant legislative tinkering with it. The Field Code in New York grew in two generations from 393 sections to 3,441. Many states have remedied this mistake, and in nineteen the rule-making power now rests with the judicial arm, in whole or in part.

The third error was to use separate courts for different tasks, rather than a unified court with various branches. Much of our formalism has resulted from the ceremony of removing a case from one court to another, and the inevitable problems of jurisdiction in a multiple court system have often resulted in protracted litigation. As a result, parties have been put to needless expense, dockets have been clogged with practice questions, and injustice has resulted from excessive reliance on technical points.

Political scientists will find much in this volume which they should study. Unfortunately for them, Dean Pound restricted his study to the traditional aspects of procedure and has not discussed various administrative problems of the higher courts. Some consideration is given to the value of oral argument, and the intermediate courts are criticized for attempting to publish opinions in so many cases. But problems of docketing, procedural difficulties in operating a supreme court in divisions, or the procedure of the judicial conference, are not within the author's purview. But even the traditional problems of court procedure are of importance to the student of government. In a democracy, the courts need to be understood and criticized as intelligently as any other branch of government. When they become bogged down, as during the last century, the public is likely to turn to other, and perhaps less satisfactory, agencies of justice. The growth of administrative commissions, for example, cannot be fully understood unless we know the procedural problems of the courts. Likewise, the difficulties in developing a satisfactory appellate procedure should be studied carefully before we go too far along the path of judicial review of administrative decisions.

The problem of arranging a satisfactory system of appellate review is by no means a simple one. Some technicalities are inevitable in it, and

little good can be accomplished by amateur legislative tinkering. On the other hand, the inertia of the legal profession in matters of procedure is notorious. The training, interests, and outlook of the lawyer make it difficult for him to invent new legal processes. I know of but one answer to this dilemma—the political scientist.

RODNEY L. MOTT.

Colgate University.

The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890–1920. By WILFRID HARDY CALLCOTT. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1942. Pp. xv, 524. $3.50.)

Professor Callcott's purpose is "to focus attention on what the author feels to be the central theme of the foreign policy of the United States for the years indicated in the title." By presenting a detailed account of our relations with the Caribbean states and also with Mexico, he seeks to show that the steps taken by successive administrations, despite variations in aims and methods, "fell into a pattern and somewhat unconsciously formed a policy for the nation." He traces this policy through several phases. There was first the period when we were gradually obtaining from other powers the recognition of the Caribbean as an American "sphere of influence." In the late 1890's came the wave of imperialism which left us with new territorial reponsibilities there and elsewhere. From 1900 on, the central objective of American policy was the defense of the approaches to the Canal. This, in Professor Callcott's opinion, "was not the Monroe Doctrine at all but a new and parallel policy that had come into existence to face the new needs of the new Century." The determination to control the Canal explains both Theodore Roosevelt's "imperialism through diplomacy" in Panama and the Dominican Republic and Root's policy of "masterful coöperation," which replaced the more intolerant attitude of the State Department under John Hay. Knox, as Secretary of State, had less understanding of the Latin Americans and was less *simpatico* to them than Root, but his essential purpose was the same; "dollar diplomacy," so much discussed, was "merely an irritating barnacle that attached itself to the main idea."

Then came Woodrow Wilson, who "expressed the conscience of the American people as he called for democracy and self-government as fundamental principles and as he denounced dictatorship and land-grabbing by force." Wilson endeavored to apply these principles, but was soon compelled by events in other parts of the world to go even farther than his predecessors in extending control over strategic points in the Caribbean. By this time, however, American public opinion would no longer tolerate imperialistic expansion, and the post-war years saw our policy in the Caribbean changing and becoming relatively less important as we adopted

a new policy which "would consider the world in general and the whole Western Hemisphere in particular."

Professor Callcott sometimes seems more concerned with the purposes of those who directed American policy than with the story of what actually occurred. There is no clear-cut picture, for example, of the working of the American treaty régime in Haiti or the manner in which financial control was established and maintained in Nicaragua. On the other hand, there is some detail which does not seem essential to the main theme. In dealing with such a complicated story and so vast an amount of material, the selection and presentation of the essential facts is, of course, a difficult matter.

This is especially true because the author makes extensive use of manuscript material which has not hitherto been exploited in connection with the development of our Caribbean policy. His study of the papers of House, Knox, Lansing, Root, and Wilson—to mention only the more important collections of source material—have enabled him to throw new light on many incidents and to bring out more clearly the ideas and motives of those responsible for major decisions. It is this that gives the book its special interest.

DANA G. MUNRO.

Princeton University.

Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft. BY G. P. GOOCH. (New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1942. Pp. vi, 373. $5.00.)

This volume chiefly comprises a number of addresses, articles, and brochures on the conduct of diplomacy, delivered and published between 1923 and 1940, all concerned with the theme: "How rulers and statesmen have used or ought to use their powers, particularly in the sphere of foreign affairs. . . . " (Preface, v). One's interest is heightened by the inclusion also of conversations which the author had with leading actors on the European stage such as the German Foreign Ministers Kühlmann and Jagow, and the British Foreign Minister in 1914, Lord Grey. There are also chapters, not unrelated to the central theme, on "Political Autobiography," "The French Revolution as a World Force," "Politics and Morals," and "Hobbes and the Absolute State."

In a fifty-nine-page survey of Franco-Prussian relations from 1871 to 1914, based on *Documents Diplomatique Français* and *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, the author gives a well-balanced account, on the whole, of the gradual deterioration of the relations of the Powers, whose leaders were all for peace but who were weighted down in their endeavors by the traditions of prestige and power politics. To the reviewer, the author's sketch of the Conference of Algeciras is unaccountably incomplete in that the part played behind the scenes by President

Roosevelt is not mentioned. Although it was not known at the time, it has long since been revealed that President Roosevelt not only used his influence to get the reluctant French to agree to the Conference—the author does briefly allude to this—but also that he played an important if not a decisive rôle in bringing the Conference to an agreement. And he did so precisely because he saw the issue in terms of the balance of power, and hoped his intervention would avert war between Germany and France.

In a chapter on "The Diplomatic Background of the First World War," not previously published, the author summarizes with great clarity and appraises in a most judicious spirit the great volume of evidence dealing with the relations of the Powers from the Franco-Prussian War to the first World War. The compression even of a summary of the diplomacy of these years into twenty pages is, of course, a most difficult task, but one can certainly level no criticism at the author for the way he has handled the subject. He is the cool and detached historian "above the battle" throughout.

In the author's treatment of British foreign policy from 1919 to 1939, more of an attempt is made to analyze and interpret political events between the two World Wars. If he presents English policy without complete approval but with sympathetic understanding, only the carping critic will be inclined to reproach him, for he is likewise willing to make allowances for the mistakes of others. His conclusions may well be recorded again in this review:

"The tortured peoples craved for a new world without knowing how to create it, and no master builder was at hand. The transition from the institutions and ideology of the long era of unfettered nationalism to a system of collective security, the limitation of armaments and peaceful change proved too great a task to be carried through with a rush. Yet the organization of the world, first attempted in the League of Nations, was well worth trying and will assuredly be tried again. Such a revolution requires time no less than skill and resolution, but there is no reason to regard it as beyond the wit of man."

FRANK M. RUSSELL.

University of California.

A Study of War. By QUINCY WRIGHT. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1942. Two Volumes. Pp. xxiii, xvii, 1552. $15.00.)

Whether it be viewed as a catastrophe, a crime, an imbecility, or a natural phenomenon, war is indisputably a persistent phenomenon of human society which, when it pends or comes, transcends all other social endeavor. Despite this fact, American scholars as a whole have left war outside the purview of their investigations, perhaps on the theory that it

is a loathsome disease which should not be discussed in polite circles. Professor Wright's volumes are welcome evidence that war is a legitimate concern of the social scientist; indeed, they demonstrate that the study of war is imperative if we are to destroy war before it destroys us, particularly in an age when spectacular advances in military technology make almost infinite the possibilities of self-destruction. Mr. Wright's book is no mere reflex to the situation which now confronts us; on the contrary, it represents the fruition of fifteen years of collaborative research at the University of Chicago, to which a group of distinguished scholars and a whole generation of able graduate students have contributed.

The massiveness and Teutonic thoroughness of Mr. Wright's work are impressive testimony to his assiduity and erudition, although not, it must be said, to his powers of organization, selection, and criticism. The vast scope of the enterprise, to be sure, may justify some of its shortcomings: "This study attempts to cover a sufficient variety of organic and human experience to transcend narrow institutional limits. It does. however, assume, except in the chapter on animal warfare, persistence of the biological characteristics of the human species, the physical laws and general physical characteristics of the world as known to contemporary science, and the isolation of human society and social contacts within this planet. The problem is set within a definite biological, geological, and astronomical *milieu*" (p. 14). In truth, Mr. Wright goes beyond even these self-defined limits. Naturally, therefore, he has written a huge treatise, the outlines of which are not always clear.

Of the 1552 pages, fewer than eleven hundred are text. And if we take into consideration the smaller type used in documentation and appendices, it is doubtful if more than half of the total manuscript can be so classified. The footnotes are overwhelming in number and size: for example, there are 457 notes to the first 248 pages, some of them occupying more than half of the page. The bibliographical data, part of which might have been omitted, would require a lifetime of work to pursue except for purposes of reference. Occasionally, valuable material is buried in this mass of documentation. The appendices consist of tables, charts, mathematical formulæ, and essays—some of great inherent interest but not necessarily germane to the subject, as, to cite a single instance, "The Nature of History," pp. 438–449. There is an excellent index, divided into names and subjects, which will prove invaluable. Not the same may be said of some of the other appended data, such as the bizarre diagram on p. 1471 which attempts to show the "relative psychic distances between the great powers" as of November, 1938. The sheer drudgery of reading proof doubtless accounts for the considerable number of misspellings, especially of such proper names as Friedrich List, Haushofer, Malthus, Nietzsche, and von der Goltz (pp. 200, 302, 376, 425, 427).

The clue to most of Mr. Wright's historical analysis of war will be found in the last chapter of his first volume. He believes that the functions of war have been continuous from early civilizations to modern times. War has occupied "a dominant rôle as a means of preserving the ruling class, the consciousness of national unity, and the balance of power. It was also an important means of expanding the influence of the principal centers of modern civilization over the more backward areas." In this respect, the more things alter, the more they remain the same. "The significant change has been in the techniques and ideologies of war" (p. 377). This has been put differently elsewhere: "Animals have fought from inherited drives, primitive men have fought from group custom, people of historic civilization have fought for group interests, but people of contemporary world-civilization fight for a better world-order" (p. 40). Mr. Wright's analysis of war is inseparable from a definite concept of the historical process and his belief in scientific exactness in the social sciences. In a brief review it is not possible to discuss the soundness of Mr. Wright's methodology and philosophy of history. Neither is it feasible to challenge some of his definitions, assumptions, historical generalizations, and statistical devices. All one can say is that Mr. Wright would be the first to admit that unanimity on these points can hardly be expected.

Mr. Wright is of the school that believes that the general pattern of civilization determines the character of war and military institutions, rather than vice versa, and he is in distinguished company. Nevertheless, military technology frequently has revolutionary social consequences—as in the invention of gunpowder, which Mr. Wright quite rightly stresses. Furthermore, according to the author, "there has been a tendency, with the maturity of every civilization, for strictly military operations to play a relatively less important rôle in the settling of political controversies than propaganda, economic pressure, and diplomacy. World War I was said to have been won through a combination of the French army fighting the German army, the British navy blockading Germany and its allies, and President Wilson's propaganda gradually breaking down the confidence of the peoples under the central alliance in their leadership, their objectives, and their ultimate victory" (p. 854). One wonders whether this is an altogether correct evaluation of the relative importance of propaganda in relation to military power. Important as propaganda may be within the framework of military action, it is sterile in the presence of military defeat. This has clearly been demonstrated in the present war. And even in the first World War, Wilson's propaganda fell on deaf ears during the great German drives of March–June, 1918, and reached its maximum effectiveness in the months after Soissons, when the supreme German effort was frustrated.

Mr. Wright is at his best in discussing the causes of war and the conditions of peace, to which he devotes most of his second volume. This is the

field in which he has labored hardest and made his most distinguished contributions to scholarship. Doctrinaires will find no cause for comfort in these sections of his work. Capitalism is not the guilty party, socialism not the panacea, as regards the scourge of war. Unlike Nicholas Spykman, Mr. Wright has no faith in the balance of power either as a device for national security or as a guarantee of peace; on the contrary, he regards it as a thoroughly irresponsible policy from which we can obtain little tangible benefit. War is deeply rooted in all the complicated mechanism of society, in our ideological concepts, our patterns of behavior, and our national psychology and traditions. Because he has no simple explanations for the phenomenon of war, Mr. Wright has no illusions about the difficulties which lie in the way of its extermination.

On the other hand, Mr. Wright is no pessimist, as is amply demonstrated by Chapters 29 and 30, entitled, respectively, "The Prevention of War" and "Toward a Warless World." He believes in the spirit of "modernism" as a means of removing war from the civilization of the future. In this connection Mr. Wright advances an interesting theory concerning the social sciences: "The social scientist must create a structure of assumptions and use a language which is at the same time symbolic and emotive. Unless he can establish his assumptions by successful propaganda, it is hardly worth while to make hypotheses or to investigate their validity. For the problem of war this means that the scientific investigator must employ his own conviction of what the future of war ought to be as one of the assumptions for predicting what it will be" (p. 683).

An author ought not, perhaps, to be held responsible for the claims of his publishers. The University of Chicago Press asserts that these volumes are "the most comprehensive investigation ever made of the subject of war." In the opinion of the reviewer, it would be wiser to say that Mr. Wright has given us an encyclopedic work, more valuable for reference than for continuous reading and study. As such, it will serve a very useful purpose. But a definitive and comprehensive work on war by an American scholar remains to be written. And Mr. Wright has pointed the way to some Delbrück, Clausewitz, or Oman of the future.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE.

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World Organization; A Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment. EDITED BY LAURA PUFFER MORGAN. (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 1942. Pp. xiv, 426. Paper, $3.00, Cloth, $3.75.)

The twenty essays constituting this volume are revisions of papers and lectures presented at the sessions of the Institute on World Organization held on the campus of American University, Washington, D. C., Septem-

ber 2–13, 1941. They fall more or less naturally into seven parts: general place of the League; technical assistance by the League in securing international coöperation in social and economic problems, control of armaments, communications, and the like; the League as an administrative and governing body (mandates, minorities, Danzig, Saar); the World Court; the International Labor Organization; the problem of revision of the Covenant; and, lastly, the relation of the Western Hemisphere to the League. Each paper was prepared by an authority in that special field. Merely to note that P. B. Potter discusses the place of the League in the development of international organization and that Benjamin Gerig analyzes mandates and colonies in the League system gives some assurance that the discussions for the most part are serious, restrained, and authoritative.

Speaking generally, the purpose of the essays is to analyze the strong and weak points of the League system in the hope and expectation that after the present war another and greater effort will be made to build an adequate international system. All of this presupposes the defeat of the Axis Powers. Professor Potter courageously places the blame for the failure of the League system where it belongs, i.e., on the political inadequacy, if not illiteracy, of dominant groups of people in the several states. Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer also suggests a vital lack, that of a "hierarchy of values in the international field." To the man in the street, this would probably mean that the League commanded no strong loyalties by the people who would have to do the fighting for it. To sum up the discussions on economic issues, social problems, and communications, it may be said that the League did some competent work, but that its agencies were prevented by nationalism on the one hand and niggardly financial support on the other from making fundamental contributions. Its sheer lack of adequate authority is revealed in the attempts to carry out its duties in respect to armaments, mandates, minorities, and Danzig. As was to be expected, the Court and the International Labor Organization received, proportionately, the least criticism and the most praise; not that the absolute total of their accomplishments was very great, but that they seem to be qualified to perform their important functions whenever general world conditions make it possible for them to do their assigned work.

When it came to applying the lessons of the past to the future order, the contributors were, generally speaking, inclined to be cautious. No one appeared ready to cast aside the League system entirely and erect some new structure, such as a federation, in its place. Apparently the writers assume that, whether called a League or not, the future order will probably not depart widely from the order that deserved better support than

it received in those two most tragic and disappointing decades from 1919 to 1939. Some favor "democratizing" the League on the theory that the Assembly finally made a good record in policy-making, as compared with the Council. Others would tinker with this or that detail. Few give more than passing attention to the underlying factors that sooner or later will "make or break" any system. In the light of events, both before and since September, 1941, it is interesting that one writer could seriously state that even Hitler once offered to agree to a strict supervision of armaments, and that the 5:5:3 naval treaty made it impossible for either the United States or Japan to make war against the other in its own waters. No one attempted to show what must be done about small states, "neutral" states, and peoples who are quite willing to become "free," whether or not they are prepared to assume the responsibilities of freedom. Miss Helen D. Reid sensed this fundamental problem when in writing of Danzig she noted the inevitable result when there was no proper correlation between power and responsibility. This reviewer readily subscribes, in spite of the limitations suggested above, to the statement of Carl Hambro in his interesting introduction that this is a book not merely of information but of hope.

CHARLES A. TIMM.

University of Texas.

The Unrelenting Struggle. BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1942. Pp. ix, 371. $3.50.)

This book is the third in a series of compilations of Mr. Churchill's speeches. The first two, *While England Slept*, and *Blood, Sweat, and Tears*, were prepared by the Prime Minister's son, Major Randolph Churchill, M. P., now in active service. The present volume is the work of Charles Eade. Opening with Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on the occasion of Neville Chamberlain's death in November, 1940, this book covers the Prime Minister's public utterances during the following thirteen months, closing with his speeches before the American and Canadian legislatures near the end of December, 1941. A wide variety of subjects are dealt with. Sandwiched between numerous reports to the House of Commons on the various stages of the war are to be found such matters as eulogies of persons, living and dead, expressions of encouragement to the peoples of Nazi-dominated lands, speeches to the students of Harrow, and an address broadcast to the University of Rochester on receiving an honorary degree. A brief editorial summary of the principal news items of the day introduces each speech.

It is well to keep in mind that this book does not pretend to be an adequate history of the period it covers; nor can it hope to portray in any

complete sense the character of Winston Churchill. However, there is much in it of value to the political scientist, the historian, the philosopher, and even to the student of literature. The Prime Minister's ability to write and to speak vividly and arrestingly is always in evidence. For example: "History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days." This is poetry.

The student of political science will find several passages in this book worthy of study. Thus in several of the speeches to the Commons on the conduct of the war, Churchill discusses at length the difficult problems of administrative organization for war (pp. 27–34, 197–205). The Prime Minister also takes scrupulous care to point out the very important part the House of Commons is playing in this war, compared with its minor rôle in the last one. He displays a keen sense of the proper function of legislative bodies in this day of executive power. "I believe, if this House is to keep its hold on the imagination and the interest of the public, that it is necessary that the great questions which appeal to the nation out of doors and occupy the Press should also be the questions subject to current discussion in this House. I very much deprecate the House falling unduly into the debating of details and routine, and losing sight of its larger duty of giving guidance and encouragement to the nation and administering when required the necessary corrective to the Executive." Many Americans in public life could do their country a service were they to achieve this understanding of the modern political process.

To those searching for definite commitments on England's part concerning details of war aims, these speeches of Mr. Churchill offer little comfort. He confesses that "it is because of the interests of national unity that I have forborne to produce a catalogue of war aims or peace aims; every one knows quite well what we are fighting about . . . For the time being, the defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism is a sufficient war aim . . . " More specifically, Mr. Churchill denies that the Atlantic Charter alters the future position of India, Burma, or other parts of the British Empire. That document, he declaims, had in mind primarily "the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government, and national life of the states and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke . . . " This hardly squares with later pronouncements of Mr. Roosevelt.

Some scraps of encouragement may be found by some readers in the Prime Minister's speech of December 18, 1940, in which he promised that "when this war is won, as it surely will be, it must be one of our aims to work to establish a state of society where the advantages and privileges which hitherto have been enjoyed only by the few shall be more widely shared by the many . . . " In the main, however, the speeches which are

the subject of this book do not reveal Mr. Churchill as one who will countenance a sharp movement to the left on the conclusion of the war. Thus, "it is provoking when speeches are made which seem to suggest that the whole structure of our decent British life and society, which we have built so slowly and patiently across the centuries, will be swept away for some new order or other, the details of which are largely unannounced."

On reading this book, the reviewer was left chiefly with a picture of the great trials and tribulations of the chief executive of a nation at war. The difficult and critical questions of adequate military leadership, administrative organization, legislative criticism, relations with neutral powers, and public opinion at home must produce strains which few men have the mental or physical stamina to withstand. This book will appeal more to the layman than to the expert, but both will find it interesting.

VERNON O'ROURKE.

Swarthmore College.

Europe, Russia, and the Future. By G. D. H. COLE. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 233. $2.00.)

This book should do much to clear the way for realistic discussion of post-war Europe. Even more frankly than E. H. Carr's *Conditions of Peace*, it faces up to the crucial issue of European reconstruction: whether there is to be a restoration of the old state system upon capitalist foundations or the establishment of socialism over the greater part of Europe. The former, although possible "if reactionary capitalism comes back to power in the United States and finds itself in a position to dictate terms," Professor Cole rejects as a solution having in it no element of durable success. "I would much sooner see the Soviet Union, even with its policy unchanged, dominant over *all* Europe, including Great Britain," Cole says, "than see an attempt to restore the pre-war States to their futile and uncreative independence and their petty economic nationalism under capitalist domination." But, valuing as he does the personal and group freedoms of democracy, Cole's real hope is not the victory over all Europe of "*Communism à la Russe.*" It is rather the creation in Western Europe of a single socialist state, not under Soviet domination, yet willing and able to coöperate with the Soviet Union.

As for post-war Germany and the other Central European nations, it would be up to them to decide whether to join with a united Western Europe or with an extended Soviet system, and Germany's decision would of necessity be the decisive one. But here Cole is faced with a dilemma. He prefers to contemplate a German revolution on social democratic lines, but believes that in fact it can be successful only if carried out on the soviet principle. He is thus forced to advocate a revolution of which he

disapproves, a revolution which would in all probability prevent the German adherence to Western Europe which he wants.

The discussion of Britain's part in all this is hardly more satisfactory. What Cole fears most is the continuance of British capitalism under the aegis of a resurgent American capitalism. What he hopes for is a British social democracy taking its place alongside a socialist France in the leadership of Western Europe, teaching the Russians the merits of political democracy while in turn learning the lessons of economic democracy from the Soviet Union. But how socialism will be achieved in Britain he does not say. There is merely the implication that, although the power of British capitalism has not yet been broken by war changes, socialism can be realized in Britain without the kind of revolution Germany and other parts of Europe will have to go through.

Much of Cole's attention is given to the problem of national sovereignty. As already suggested, he believes that modern technology and economic organization necessitate the end of the national state as it has existed in Europe. Nationality would be divorced from the state, operating only in the cultural realm, while the political as well as the economic functions hitherto exercised by the state would be taken over in large part by a supra-national authority. Only in this way, he believes, can freedom from want be made a reality in Europe.

This book has already displeased both the right and the left, and the economic analysis upon which are based the main charges against capitalism has been questioned. But no student of international affairs, whatever his political affiliations, can afford to ignore it. For Cole deals honestly and intelligently, even if mistakenly as some think, with the basic problem which must be faced when the Axis is defeated in Europe.

HOWARD P. WHIDDEN, Jr.

Foreign Policy Association.

The American Frontier in Hawaii; The Pioneers, 1789–1843. By HAROLD WHITMAN BRADLEY. (Stanford University Press. 1942. Pp. lx, 4[illegible]. $4.50.)

The Hawaiian Islands, strategically placed at "the crossroads of the Pacific," illustrate the processes by which conflicting interests of the great trading, colonizing, and missionary powers have influenced, and imperiled the stability of, native government. Many volumes have been written about the islands, and local historical research has contributed many detailed accounts of particular episodes. It has been left for Professor Bradley to present a documented survey of the early history of the tiny Pacific kingdom. His work begins with the era of discovery, deals thoroughly with the sandalwood trade that developed out of the use of Hono-

lulu as a port of call by fur traders to China and the later whalers, takes full account of the missionary enterprise and its influence upon the Hawaiian government, recounts the story of French, British, and American diplomacy, and ends with the formal recognition of Hawaiian independence in 1843. It is evident that he has ransacked sources and mastered his materials, so that his work is likely to become the standard in its field. It is a painstaking and convincing piece of research, clearly arranged and engagingly presented.

At every turn of events on this miniature stage, the reader is reminded of similar happenings in other Pacific islands, particularly New Zealand. The early timber trade, the whalers, conflict between missionaries and traders, help given by the missionaries to native government, discord between Protestant and Catholic missions, and French interest in supporting the latter, even the disavowal by London of hasty annexation—all these are part of the Pacific pattern, as well as the beachcombers and the picturesque visits of Polynesian chiefs to foreign capitals. Only one kingdom—Tonga—survives in the Pacific, and that under a benevolent protectorate; but the nineteenth century saw many gallant efforts at the consolidation and preservation of native leadership.

The stirring days of Hawaiian history and the rapid economic development of the islands lie beyond the limits that Professor Bradley has set himself in this volume. It is to be hoped that he will go on to cover them in a future work. Meantime one is grateful for the diligence and good judgment with which he has threaded his way through the exasperating conflicts between missionaries and traders and their echoes in diplomatic policies. The men of God who went from Connecticut to establish in Hawaii the bleak morals and untiring industry of New England were lettered men who also pioneered scholarship west of the Rockies. Among them were uncompromising and even bigoted moralists as well as shrewd diplomats and financiers. The business men who drifted to Hawaii did not like their interference with business and pleasure, but the trust placed in them by the Hawaiians is good testimony to their uprightness. Professor Bradley paints a clear picture of their limitations—the *holoku* was a sad result—but he recognizes their merit.

Maybe Professor Bradley could have rounded some of his points a little by comparisons with events elsewhere in the Pacific. There were whalers and sealers on the southern islands as well as the areas he mentions, and the early Pacific trade was not just east and west, with a little north. But search of the remote sources for the southern trade would have added little except confirmation to the firm and compact body of an interesting story, solidly founded, clearly arranged, and well told.

J. B. CONDLIFFE.

University of California.

Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent; A Study in the History of Japan, with Special Reference to Her International Relations with China, Korea, and Russia. Vol. II. By Yoshi S. Kuno. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1940. Pp. xi, 416.)

The present book is the second volume in a history of Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent. The first volume, published in 1937, carried the account from the earliest historical records to the collapse of Hideyoshi's attempt to conquer all Asia in the sixteenth century. The second volume begins with the shogunate of Iyeyasu Tokugawa (1603-16) and ends with the Russian Treaty of Shimoda in 1855. At the time of the publication of the first volume, it was announced that the third volume would carry the history of continental expansion down to Japan's victorious conquest in Manchuria in 1932 and her preparation to move into North China. The untimely death of Professor Kuno in 1941 may prevent the completion of this project.

Students who expect to find in the second volume a new view on Japanese invasion of the Asiatic mainland will be disappointed; for the entire second volume is devoted to the period of seclusion, when Japan carried no great conquests to the continent and largely closed her own shores to trade and foreign intercourse. In the opinion of Professor Kuno, however, the period of the seclusion of Japan led on to the remarkable national reactions following the opening of Japan, which in turn led on to the second movement for the invasion of the continent. This thesis is not pushed with vigor. It is treated more as an assumption than as a conclusion.

In this volume, Professor Kuno has not added much to our knowledge of Japan that is newly taken from original sources. He uses such sources as the *Shiseki Shuran* ("Compilation of Rare Historical Documents"), edited by Kameki Kondo, and a few other collections. He does, however, make good use of the monumental study by Iichiro Tokutomi under the title of *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-shi* ("Modern History of the Japanese Nation"), as well as the *Kotei Koku-shi no Kenkyu* ("Research in the National History of Japan") by Katsumi Koroita. Allowing for some uncritical aspects of Tokutomi's work, it may be said that Professor Kuno has rendered a worthy service to Western readers who cannot use Oriental languages by his presentation of the fruits of his research.

Unfortunately, Professor Kuno largely disregards the ideological and economic backgrounds of the anti-Christian and seclusion policies of the Tokugawa *bakufu*. Again, while the title of the study has little to do with the current of Japanese history from 1603 to 1855, nevertheless the author barely mentions Japan's erstwhile colony, Siam, and ignores the renowned Yamada Nagamasa. From 1592 to 1632, there was an active trade between Japan and Siam. A colony of 8,000 Japanese was located at Ayutia

and another of 3,000 near Manila in the Philippines. After the proclamation of the exclusion decrees of 1633 and 1636, the Shogun cut off all connection with Japanese subjects in the South Seas. The later history of these settlements remains to be told. Professor Kuno does not tell it.

KENNETH COLEGROVE.

Northwestern University.

The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930–1940: Population, Raw Materials, and Industry. EDITED BY E. B. SCHUMPETER. Contributors: G. C. Allen, M. S. Gordon, E. F. Penrose, and E. B. Schumpeter. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1940. Pp. xxviii, 944. Tables in pocket.)

This ambitious survey of Japanese industrialization in the decade 1930–40 undoubtedly has made a contribution to the politico-economic literature of the Far East. It is, however, regrettable that the excellent chapters by Professors Penrose and Allen were not published in separate books. The optimistic and pro-official chapters by the editor, Dr. Schumpeter, are less scholarly. They repeat some of the material of the other chapters of the book and also constitute the reason why the Japan Institute, the official propaganda organ of the Japanese government in the United States prior to the autumn of 1941, made a judicious and free distribution of the volume shortly after its publication.

The part of the book under criticism relies very largely upon official Japanese statistics. This does not imply that Japanese governmental statistics are false, but only that they do not go far enough. Obviously, official statistics must not be neglected, but on the other hand, they should not remain the predominant source of information. The work thus lacks a human and realistic element that could have been supplied by either personal observation in Japan or else by an excursion into the rich literature of both right-wing and left-wing economists and publicists. Among the scholars and writers whose pertinent contributions have been ignored are Tsunao Inomata, Kin Yamakawa, and Professor Hyoe Ouchi. The well-known *Nippon Dokusen Shihon no Kaibo* ("Analysis of Japanese Monopolistic Capital") by Mosaburo Suzuki, published in 1934, is overlooked. So also is the illuminating *Nippon Zaibatsu no Kaibo* of Kamekichi Takahashi, published in 1935.

The book fails to show the important transformation of the labor and peasant movements in both the economic and political field, the decline of the Communist party in Japan, the failure of the popular front in 1937, the total liquidation of the *rodo kumiai*, or labor unions, and the growth of the *Sangyo Hokoku Kai*, or Patriotic Industrial Association. An excellent discussion of the promotion of the *sangyo kumiai*, or coöperative societies, by the government is found in the chapter on state interven-

tion in industry. But even here the whole story is not told, particularly that part pertaining to the political use to which the *sangyo kumiai* were put, beginning in 1937 under the first Konoye cabinet.

Indeed, large sections of the book are divorced from reality and buried under official statistics. Throughout the decade 1930–40, there was no secrecy about the regimentation of industry promoted by the *gumbu*, or military group in control of the Japanese government ever since the *coup d'état* of 1931, nor concerning the claim of the militarists to *seiji no keizai ni taisuru yui* (priority of politics over economics). The chapters on government policy are silent on these fundamentals. The reader is struck with the paucity of source material in these chapters. The debates in the Imperial Diet, published in the *Kwampo gogai*, are replete with information, but they are neglected by the author. So also are many significant articles and reports by governmental agencies published in the *Shuho* ("Weekly Report"). Many non-official sources such as the *Chuo Koron*, *Kaizo*, and *Teiyo* have been ignored. Even the scholarly *Nippon Keizai Nempo* ("Economic Annals of Japan") is disregarded without explanation regarding the omission.

The same author makes various errors in translation. For instance, *Shakai Taishuto* can in no sense be translated as "Labor party." This organization, the "Social Mass party," never was a labor party. It included farmers and elements of the middle class as well as city workers. The book is also full of over-simplifications. For instance, on page 824 it is said: "Agriculture is now [1940] in a more prosperous condition than at any time since the twenties." An examination of the problem of Japanese agriculture should weigh the varying conditions in the different strata of the agricultural population, such as the groups of landlords, small farm proprietors, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers. This differentiation has not been carefully made.

The writer of this review regrets to express such an unfavorable opinion concerning a large part of this book, especially in view of the many flattering reviews which have appeared in several magazines and journals. But he believes that research in the field of Oriental economics and politics should be subjected to the same rigorous standards of scholarship which we apply to endeavors in other fields of investigation.

KENNETH COLEGROVE.

Northwestern University.

India Without Fable; A 1942 Survey. By KATE L. MITCHELL. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1942. Pp. xix, 296. $2.50.)

The publisher describes this book as an unprejudiced and realistic guide to the truth about India. He would have been more accurate if he had

recommended it as an excellent example of the propaganda of the Indian National Congress Party. The writer reproduces their views with entire fidelity.

Miss Mitchell minimizes the divergences which exist between the peoples and religions of India, divergences as acute as those in Europe. The hostility between Hindus and Moslems is explained as the result primarily of economic differences, the religious cause being treated as of small importance. Miss Mitchell omits to mention that one of the principal reasons for the cleavage is the caste system, which is founded on human inequality, and that orthodox Hindus regard the Moslem community as a subordinate and unclean caste. The author does not refer to the eight centuries of conflict between the two religions which have left a legacy of present-day hostility; but she does blame the British for perpetuating and aggravating communal differences. Her evidence is that they impartially protected the rights of each community, and that they granted the Moslem demand for separate, communal voters' lists. She does not mention that there was danger of very serious disturbances if the demand were refused. The Congress assertion is repeated without adequate proof that the bulk of the Moslems are members of the Congress Party; and the Moslem League is characterized as a clique of reactionary landowners. Miss Mitchell does not explain that the League has greatly increased its membership since 1937, and that Hindu-Moslem tension is more acute than it has been for years past. The reason for this appears to be the attempt of Congress in 1937–39 to set up a single party dictatorship in the seven provinces of British India in which it gained a majority in the election of 1937.

The Indian princes are dismissed as puppet creations which are loyal to the British because their support "has relieved their rulers of the fear of rebellion." The impression is given that their subjects would turn to the Congress Party if they were free to do so. The truth is that many, though not all, of the leading princes can count on the loyalty of the agricultural four-fifths of the population, and that the adherents of Congress are a small minority of business and professional men, students, and urban laborers. Admittedly, the princes are local autocrats, but they do represent power. Nothing is gained in the present emergency by minimizing their importance and that of the anti-Congress Moslem majority. Between them, they account for about two-thirds of the troops in the present Indian army of 1,250,000. The 46,000,000 Hindu Untouchables are briefly referred to; but little attention is paid to their strong opposition to Congress. The other Indian parties having been disposed of, Congress emerges as the only truly nationalist party, and the authentic voice of the "Indian people."

The author examines the constitution of 1935 and concludes that the grant of self-government in the eleven provinces of British India was largely nominal because of the reserve powers held by the British governors. She does not mention that in accordance with their instructions these powers were hardly ever used, and that the Congress ministries that controlled seven of the provinces from 1937 to 1939 stated that their powers of self-government were a reality. No mention is made of the additional fact that the 1935 constitution is still being operated by Moslem-coalition ministries in four provinces, with a combined population of 100,000,000.

In the sections on trade and industry, the writer accuses the British of discouraging the growth of manufacturing and particularly of heavy industry, and says that British products were given a competitive advantage over Indian manufactures in the Indian market. The elected Indian majority have controlled their own tariffs since 1922, and have used their power to impose high and in some cases semi-prohibitive duties. As a result, Indian imports from Great Britain declined from 63 per cent of the total prior to 1914 to 30.5 per cent in 1938–39. The tariff manipulation of which the British are accused has had as its singular result the loss to Great Britain of about $250,000,000 of export trade a year. One of the principal reasons why Indian industry did not expand more quickly was that Indian factories found it difficult to float loans, since Indian capitalists preferred other forms of investment, particularly land. Another reason was the low purchasing capacity of the domestic market. This was expecially true of steel, where it was estimated that by 1938 India was supplying from 50 to 70 per cent of her requirements, particularly in light steel goods. She was still dependent upon imports of machinery and heavy steel. The writer states that there is "considerable evidence" that the British continued to hamper the development of heavy industry after 1939; but she omits the evidence. The facts were that there was a very serious shortage of machine tools in Great Britain and elsewhere, that American manufacturers were swamped with orders, and that India, like other countries, had to take what part of her orders she could get.

Miss Mitchell endorses the Congress Party's rejection of Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals. She considers that the actions of the British left Congress no alternative save to launch the present civil disobedience movement to coerce the government. She expresses the conviction that if the Congress Party were in control of India it would resist Japan. She does not explain how this is to be reconciled with Gandhi's statement that if he were in power he would at once negotiate for peace with Japan. And Gandhi has demonstrated time and again that whatever the other Congress leaders may propose, in the end he disposes.

LENNOX A. MILLS.

University of Minnesota.

India Today. By W. E. Duffett, A. R. Hicks, and G. R. Parkin. (New York: The John Day Company. 1942. Pp. 173. $1.75.)

The Indian States and Indian Federation. By Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency. (Cambridge: The University Press. 1942. Pp. viii, 165. $1.25.)

The complexity of Indian politics serves as the motive for the preparation of these volumes, both of which are addressed to readers who seek a background for an understanding of the Indian political situation. The scope of *India Today* is the broader of the two, as the authors seek to clarify the situation as a whole. Sir Geoffrey, on the other hand, is concerned with that segment of the larger problem which arises from the existence of the native states. His immediate aim is to impart understanding of the position occupied by the princes and to explain their reluctance in adhering to the plan of federation set forth in the Government of India Act of 1935.

India Today is described in its preface as a "small and elementary book on a large and difficult subject." First published in pamphlet form under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1941, it was revised after the Cripps mission and its contents brought forward through May, 1942. Information useful in understanding India is presented with admirable objectivity and clarity. The reader may learn that there are 562 states, and that Jinnah was made permanent president of the Moslem League as far back as 1916. There is a chapter on Indian political groups; in another are to be found thumb-nail sketches of native political leaders. Half the volume, drawing freely upon government declarations, party resolutions, and speeches, details the story of Anglo-Indian relations in the present war. The authors venture neither criticism nor defense.

Sir Geoffrey writes from a rich knowledge of Indian affairs and from wide experience with the British government in India. His book is neither as elementary nor as rigidly objective as the other, but it is somewhat more provocative. His effort to justify the anachronism of states with status and rights antedating 1858 projected into the contemporary world of Gandhi and Nehru, and dependent upon a foreign power for their continued existence, leads him into a critical attitude toward the Congress Party. Impressed by what he calls the dexterity of the party in political maneuver, he nevertheless does not like it, and resents its encroachments upon the preserves of the princes in its efforts to gain adherents from among their subjects. But he does make clear why the princes, unlikely to survive federation with authority unimpaired in a Congress-dominated India, prefer the safer anchorage of paramountcy.

Ralph A. Norem.

Oshkosh State Teachers College.

Our Age of Unreason; A Study of the Irrational Forces in Social Life. By Franz Alexander. (New York: J. B. Lippincott and Company. 1942. Pp. 371. $3.00.)

This is a non-quantitative restatement of psychoanalytic theory, indicating certain points of departure for the formulation of problems of social theory. The author is director of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis.

Six chapters trace the history of Western political philosophy, making the point that Aristotle, Bentham, Campanella, Fourier, Kant, Locke, More, Marx, Pareto, Plato, Saint Simon, *et al.* were unable to formulate a political psychology which would enable man to bring his repressed destructive and rivalrous impulses under control for more than a brief period. Even Hobbes fell short of this goal, although it seemed in certain passages of his works that he was about to approach it. The failure of the philosophers is said to lie in the fact that none of them was able to bring himself to face in its true proportions the paradox of destructiveness and capacity for affection lying side by side in the unconscious of man, in unexpected magnitudes and combinations, and hidden from consciousness by the curtain of repression. The book concludes with nine chapters on the "emotional structure" of totalitarianism and democracy, peace and war, and a series of recommendations for increasing the prospects of peace and democracy. The prescription: a social science based on explicit knowledge of psychology; less nationalism in politics and economics; "social activity based on a mature creative power instead of adolescent competitiveness arising from insecurity;" more love of "knowledge, art, and the amenities of everyday life."

The reviewer stands in complete agreement with Alexander as to the potential importance of the unification of political and psychoanalytic theory, especially in view of the world-wide disorder that seems to lie ahead. Since Alexander is in a position to direct influential research, the reviewer finds it regrettable that this particular book, in spite of the many weighty issues it raises, cannot, on scientific or pedagogical grounds, be very cheerfully recommended.

It would be encouraging indeed if juniors, seniors, and graduate students of the social sciences could be offered a single volume to serve as a sure guide to clinical psychoanalysis, translating the vital insights of the latter into a language attractive to the social scientist. It would also be useful if the same book could be offered to the medical student of psychoanalysis as an introduction to current problems in social theory and practice and an indicator of the uses of psychoanalysis as a pedagogical, administrative, and clinical art in their solution. No doubt this type of bridge between these rather artificially separated disciplines is what Alexander has sought to erect.

Unfortunately, the intellectual plane achieved in the chapters on political theory will scarcely seem adequate to most college teachers of political science. Those college seniors who have read histories of political philosophy like those of Catlin, Coker, Dunning, or Sabine will breeze through Alexander's Part I with some ease and a sense of recognition. They will not find many specific references, however, to the problems that *mainly* preoccupy the alert political scientist of today: questions of public administration, of public personnel recruitment, of labor relations, of *élite* successions, of techniques of propaganda and pressure groups, of public opinion measurement, and of the preservation or restoration of relatively democratic electoral, legislative, and administrative processes in the deeply militarized Great Power nation.

But more disturbing than what is *not* presented is the rather unscientific form of what *is* presented. At numerous points the terminology is distinctly lacking in rigor. Human wants and drives are referred to, for example, as "needs"—which is likely to cause arched eyebrows among those who are schooled in the relatively naturalistic branches of sociology, economics, and politics. Even in the psychoanalytic section, the categories and argument used are somewhat less satisfactory to the reviewer than those in a number of other relatively non-technical works with which many political scientists have been acquainted for a number of years, such as Flügel, Freud's *Introductory Lectures*, Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics*, and Alexander's own *Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality* (1930).

Even more dismaying to a scientific public than the occasional use of ambiguous terminology is the almost total absence of methodological discussion. Scientific publics will remain justified, in their own eyes, in skepticism about psychoanalysis until they are presented with explicit information as to the means by which the data are collected and the semantic devices by which the generalizations are derived from the data. Unfortunately, no data-gathering procedures are indicated in this book. As for semantics, Alexander appears to be satisfied with the language of "cause and effect" or occasionally "reciprocal cause and effect." Example: "The rôle of tradition in . . . static societies is incomparably greater than in our culture. It is not my aim here to decide whether the rigidity of social organization is the result of the lack of historical change or vice versa. Probably it is a reciprocal causal relationship" (p. 234).

Here the services of a semanticist would seem to be urgently needed. In the reviewer's opinion, the semanticist who is to be consulted should have a bit of training in statistics. It would then be possible for him to handle such anxiety-producers as the following: "[In our society] Even in a single group, individual differences are more impressive than uniformities . . . Sexual, domestic, and economic aims appear in chaotic confusion and defy every attempt at generalization" (p. 236).

A semantically trained statistician might be able to recast the argument from the relatively ambiguous language of "cause and effect" into a language expressing the relative frequency with which certain events occur, the degree of their probable association, the probable degrees of their central tendencies and dispersions, and the rates of change among the stated variables through specified periods of time. It would then be possible to introduce into the argument the very valuable quantified data which social scientists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts already have in their possession, relating to the frequency and correlation of various sexual aims, domestic aims, and economic aims among the different strata of the population during specified time periods. Promising methods of data-gathering and definition could then be indicated for those portions of the field of inquiry which have not yet been explored by scientists.

Best of all, from the standpoint of those who hope that great things will come from social psychiatry, an end might be put to the scientifically unprofitable strife between exponents of the social and psychoanalytic disciplines. We might then turn to the far more constructive task of inventing a joint curriculum for the graduate schools of psychiatric and social science, enabling each to enjoy the fruits of the joint inquiry and joint practical action which Alexander has so courageously sought to further.

BRUCE LANNES SMITH.

Washington, D. C.

Man's Most Dangerous Myth; The Fallacy of Race. BY M. F. ASHLEY MONTAGU. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. xiii, 216. $2.25.)

To the current flood of books by Benedict, Hogben, Huxley, and others exposing the false ideas of race being propagated in the modern world, Dr. Montagu, associate professor of anatomy at the Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital in Philadelphia, has contributed one of the most searching and incisive of the briefer analyses yet to appear.

Describing himself as "a student both of human culture and human biology," Dr. Montagu's approach is that of the geneticist who is convinced of the meaninglessness of "taxonomical" exercises in the classification of mankind. Moreover, the writer admits that some may complain that he has subjected his fellow anthropologists to rough treatment, but he justifies his criticisms with the assertion that "it is high time that the traditional conception of race held by my professional brethren be dealt with frankly" (p. x).

It is alleged that the confusion which has characterized presumably scientific pronouncements on the subject of race has aided and abetted the

"racists" who have exploited racial myths for their own purposes. When the biological facts with respect to "race"—a word whose use Dr. Montagu deplores because of its unsemantic character—are fully established and widely disseminated, the claims of those propagandists who assert that race is "a fixed and unchangeable part of the germ plasm which, transmitted from generation to generation, unfolds in each people in a typical expression of personality and culture" (p. 10) are doomed to defeat. One of the writer's major purposes in clarifying the evidence regarding the essential unity of the human species and factors explaining the genetic variety of mankind is to destroy the potency of the modern racial myth—"the tragic myth of our tragic era" (p. 10).

Of particular value to the social scientist is the penetrating analysis of the psychological and social factors which give rise to race prejudice. Dr. Montagu casts restraint aside in declaring that "methods can be developed by means of which persons who now harbor myths and delusions concerning race may be reached and redeemed" (p. 68). Although he suggests various educational objectives, the exact blueprints of reform are not supplied. Certainly Dr. Montagu is to be commended for pointing the way to a better day whose arrival may be hastened by treating race problems as social or caste problems. In company with several other biologists, he would drop "race" from the vocabulary of biology, substituting for it "ethnic group." And on the basis of his description of an "ethnic group," the problem of ethnic variation is seen to be in reality an ecological problem and one "within the purview of the student of the social life of man" (p. 73). In the cultural sphere, he would replace "race" with "caste." Dr. Montagu pleads for more human ecologists, "more liaison officers between the sciences of man" (p. 80).

Limitations of space forbid reference to all the aspects of the race question which Dr. Montagu considers. His defense of human hybridization and ethnic mixture, which he supports with genetic and anthropological data, his expression of the geneticist's distrust of eugenics, and his vigorous assertion that cultural differences among peoples are due to a variety of historical causes which have nothing whatever to do with the *genes* are especially significant.

Dr. Montagu's treatment of the relationship between race and war, based as it is upon a rebuttal to Sir Arthur Keith's views on the subject, is of real interest because of the insight that it gives into the ways in which the prejudices and fears productive of war are culturally generated. In stressing the concept that war is a cultural and not a natural institution, the writer does not make any essentially novel points, although forceful argument in its behalf is welcome at this critical time. Economic rivalry—"a purely cultural phenomenon having no biological basis whatever"—is acknowledged to be the paramount cause of modern war, but Dr. Mon-

tagu does not hesitate to state that "through means purely cultural man is in a position to control and regulate, in every possible respect, his own future evolution" (p. 165). Toward the end of the book especially, an unbridled idealism frequently leads the writer to indulge in broad generalizations which are certainly inspirational in tone, but which some persons may choose to question.

Dr. Montagu brings his important book to a close with a call to arms to prevent racism from exerting its pernicious influence in American democratic life. The book contains a foreword by Aldous Huxley, an appendix devoted to a digest of state legislation against mixed marriages in the United States, and a comprehensive bibliography.

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BRIEFER NOTICES

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Units of Government in the United States; An Enumeration and Analysis (Public Administration Service, pp. 45, $1.00), by William Anderson, is an enumeration and analysis of governmental units in terms of size, population, and areal distribution. This is a revision of Professor Anderson's earlier study, published in 1934 under the same title. The present publication is somewhat enlarged and completely revised in terms of the 1940 census. It carries several additional pages of text, fourteen tables, and six figures. The original Part I ("The Present Situation") has been supplanted by a new section: "1930–1940: A Decade of Changes." The old Part I has been completely revised and expanded and appears as Part II, under the caption "The Units of American Government, 1941." The revision in this respect, and particularly the author's discussion of the characterizing features of the units under investigation, is a distinct improvement both in organization and in refinement of the concept. Otherwise, the text is revised to accommodate changes in units and population, to clarify, expand, and illustrate particular sections, and to provide some moderation of statement. The author's convictions and conclusions have undergone little change. The tabular and graphic presentations of data concerning size, population, and areal distribution of governmental units greatly enhance the value of the study. The purpose of the study is clearly set forth by the author in a series of questions (p. 1): "1. How many distinct units of government are in operation in the United States? 2. What are the principal classes and characteristics of these governmental units? 3. What are their dimensions in such matters as area and population served, in so far as these are known? 4. What are the trends with respect to increases and decreases in the number of local units? 5. Are there on the whole too few or too many units of government now in operation?

. . . " "To the extent that these questions can be answered," Professor Anderson concludes, "this publication will contribute to a knowledge of the structure of government, and especially of local government, in the United States." The publication sets forth clearly, but briefly, answers to these questions. The answers are, necessarily, conditioned by the author's definition of a unit of government: " . . . a resident population occupying a defined area that has a legally authorized organization and governing body, a separate legal identity, the power to provide certain public or governmental services, and a substantial degree of autonomy including legal and actual power to raise at least a part of its own revenue" (p. 10). Few students of government will, however, question the soundness of the definition or quarrel with the elimination, from the scope of the study, of certain "areas" and "authorities." All will agree that the study not only makes a contribution, but provides an indispensable approach to the study of American government.—HAROLD M. DORR.

The interrelationships of the various levels of government grow continuously more complex and more important. In his *State Supervision of Local Government; Its Development in Massachusetts* (American Council on Public Affairs, pp. xi, 165, $2.75), Dale Pontius explores thoroughly the pattern of state-local relationships existing in one state. Particular attention is devoted to state supervision of local activities in the fields of education, health, welfare administration, highways, finance, and personnel. State-local relations in certain other areas—police, fire prevention, building inspection, planning, zoning, housing, forestry, weights and measures, and public records— are reviewed more briefly. Dr. Pontius' approach is primarily historical. The statutory and administrative evolution of state supervision in each field is traced from its point of origin. The study is almost purely descriptive, though the author does indulge in occasional qualitative judgments, and some comparisons are made between developments in Massachusetts and those in other states. Dr. Pontius concludes that while Massachusetts has been a pioneer in almost every phase of state administrative supervision, several other states have gone farther in the extent of their controls over local government. The tradition of local initiative and responsibility is still strong in Massachusetts, and Dr. Pontius clearly indicates that he is glad that this is so. This is not meant to imply that he does not recognize the benefits which have resulted from state supervision, for these are adverted to in every chapter of the monograph. But he emphasizes the fact that the state's influence has usually been exercised "in terms of advice, persuasion, and assistance." In the opinion of the reviewer, the interest and value of the study would have been considerably enhanced by the adoption of a more analytical approach. There is too little attempt to evaluate the operation

and effects of the supervisory controls whose evolution is described. Minor criticisms would be that the study is over-documented, and that relegating the footnotes to the end of each chapter considerably detracts from their usefulness.—PAUL BECKETT.

The pattern of developments in the care of the indigent under the auspices of the New Deal has been traced in a brief monograph of the Work Projects Administration. The study, Arthur E. Burns and Edward A. Williams, *Federal Work, Security, and Relief Programs* (Government Printing Office, pp. xviii, 159), treats briefly of the economic background of the relief problem. This treatment relies on the well-known theory of the decrease in capital investment and its sequential effects. There is one chapter devoted to the existing programs as of 1930 and their failure to meet the increasing needs in the early 30's. The account continues to include the early steps by the national government, the appearance and program of the FERA, the Civil Works Program, the tendency towards special programs as shown by the development of rural relief, commodity surplus distribution, student aid programs, and transient relief. The year 1935 marks a significant break with the past and points to current attitudes. The break is marked by the acceptance of categories of indigent persons and relating programs to those categories. The Social Security Act and the Works Progress Administration are the statutory bases of the development. The details of these programs are sketched briefly. A separate chapter is devoted to programs for railway workers. The uses of general relief since 1936 are told. A final chapter is devoted to the relief problem of the future. The volume includes in the appendices a series of tables which supply data on the number of relief recipients, amounts spent, and the sources of the funds. The tables are useful sources of information, and the monograph as a whole is a useful account of a tremendous program of the past decade or so. Their conclusion on future relief is: "destitution can no longer be regarded as a temporary problem to be treated on an emergency basis. Rather, it must be viewed as a continuing problem necessitating a permanent and varied program of economic security."—CHARLES B. HAGAN.

A decade of political pendulum swings during which another one-party state became a two-party state is the focal point of interest in *Michigan Politics in Transition* (University of Michigan Press, pp. 74, $0.40), by James K. Pollock and Samuel J. Eldersveld. In their analysis of major voting trends, the authors have relied principally on votes cast for governor, by counties, from 1930 to 1940 as their basic data. By separately examining four political "regions" made up of the counties that were strongly Democratic, strongly Republican, shifting Democratic, and

doubtful, several common characteristics are brought out. Nearly one-half of the counties are not included in this classification. There is pointed out an "undeniable correlation," or a suggested "co-variation" or "concurrence," between the Democratic vote and the increase in popular participation, population density, foreign born, and "liberalism" as measured by the vote on prohibition. Any question in the mind of the reader as to the degree of this co-variation could be dispelled by presenting the exact coefficients. However, the authors announce in advance that determination of coefficients of correlation is "not only unnecessary but also unpractical in describing electoral patterns and in ascertaining the degree of relationship between variables used in this study." This may be a confession of weakness which frustrates the essential purpose of such studies and one explanation of the peroration: "Meanwhile, party life in Michigan ebbs and flows unpredictably." Numerous suggestions for future investigation stem from this study—not the least of these being closer examination of the so-called independent vote and the contrasts between those elections held in presidential years and off-year elections.—DONALD S. HECOCK.

In times of national crisis, the problems connected with the treatment of minority groups tend to become more tense. National unity may be jeopardized by traditional, repressive policies respecting minorities of alien and of racial origins. The problems of American minorities in relation to the current conflict are broadly treated in "Minority Problems in a Nation at War" (*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 223, September, 1942, $2.00). The editors, J. P. Shalloo and Donald Young, present this volume, not as a definitive study, but as an introductory outline of these problems, with the view that their understanding might be increased and their solution advanced by constructive, positive measures. The study has four main sections, with from one to nine articles in each section: "The Need for National Solidarity," "The Negro and the War," "Minorities of Alien Origin," and "The Treatment of Minorities in a Democracy." The twenty-seven contributors to the volume are specialists in the fields of teaching, government service, and social service. Discriminatory and repressive measures against alien and non-alien minority groups are described and analyzed, as well as protective measures on behalf of these groups by social and educational agencies. Furthermore, the discussion is not limited to minorities in the continental United States; problems peculiar to the insular possessions are covered. This is a stimulating and timely volume which should be especially welcomed by persons responsible for the determination of national policy in connection with the prosecution of the war and with post-war adjustment.—LUELLA GETTYS.

Thomas Jefferson: World Citizen (Modern Age Books, pp. viii, 280, $2.75), by Senator Elbert D. Thomas, is not a biography of Thomas Jefferson but rather a commentary upon his philosophy in relation to present-day problems of statesmanship. The book deals with the nature of man, religion, democracy in its many aspects, freedom, the theory of revolution, slavery, international relations, and the problem of the relatedness of the entire world. In spite of the work which has gone into its compilation, the book is not well organized. It is not integrated in terms of a dominant theme. The titular author and the persons to whom he gives credit for most of the work connected with the compilation of the book have attempted to draw from Jefferson's writings materials to support the political principles of Senator Thomas and the conception of world organization which he advances. "I hope," he says, "this book may reflect that concept of Jefferson's philosophy which has guided me in the gospel I preached, the Americanism I taught, the patriotism I directed, the people and state I have represented, and the deeds I have tried to live" (page 10). The doctrines of Confucius, about whom Senator Thomas has written elsewhere, and in whom the Senator has an abiding interest, come up again and again for discussion in connection with the theories of Jefferson and the Senator-author. By and large, the book is much more important for the light which it throws upon the ideas and conduct of an active United States Senator than for that which it sheds upon the life and philosophy of our third President.—Carl Brent Swisher.

Urban Planning and Public Opinion (Bureau of Urban Research, Princeton University, pp. 87, $1.00), by Melville C. Branch, Jr., represents an experiment in applying public opinion polling techniques to urban planning. The first objective stated for the study is "to provide a more conclusive illustration of the importance of public opinion surveys in urban planning;" others are to emphasize the usefulness of public opinion survey technique, to demonstrate the potentialities of employing national or regional surveys of public opinion, and to obtain opinion and information of value for urban planning. By using the facilities of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University, the Bureau of Urban Research was able to gather opinions on home ownership, street conditions, park and school proximity, and similar data around which planners have built their ideal neighborhoods. A number of tabulations are presented on the basis of 2,500 interviews taken in 165 American cities. The data are broken down by economic class, by region, by size of city, the mode of transportation to and from work by similar breakdowns, the nearness of schools, etc. Although regional tables are presented, differences are attributed to the size of cities within each region. Scientific or random sampling is a limited means of finding out what people

want in the way of civic improvement. Civic associations, various types of clubs and political representatives, make known wants and frequently bring about results. The author implies that a number of city plans have lain unused because they did not spring from the grass roots; he recognizes, however, that the opinion survey may serve as a guide to an "educational effort designed to develop a greater understanding." This publication represents the first major venture of the Bureau of Urban Research. It is to be hoped that the post-war period will see more experiments in the approach to the study of urban problems.—THOMAS K. VASEY.

In *Alabama's State Dollar* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, pp. i, 135), Joseph M. Ray explores state fiscal policy, particularly as it relates to Alabama's war-time and post-war needs. The description of Alabama's disbursements and receipts pattern is excellent and will be helpful to those wishing a summary. Rigidity and the need for flexibility are the main points of emphasis. Increased or new taxes, restricted expenditures with increased efficiency, retirement of debt, establishment of sinking funds, purchase of federal bonds, local debt retirement assistance, and more federal-state coöperation are indicated, with perhaps too little realization of wishful, unrealizable, inconsistent goals. The discussion is couched in the usual revenue and expenditure categories long familiar to students of public finance. This approach has one major limitation in that the problems presented appear more of planning than of dollars analysis. The conclusions assume coöperation among the states with the federal treasury and possibly minimize the adjustments a long war economy may necessitate.—ORBA F. TRAYLOR.

Of particular interest to students of comparative state government is *A Handbook of Alabama State Agencies* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, pp. x, 204, free on request). This monograph constitutes a revision and enlargement of a typewritten "Guide" appearing in 1938. In comparison with similar undertakings, the work is a model of simplicity and clarity. The agencies and institutions through which the state operates are described under twelve major divisions: General Government; Protection to Persons and Property; Highways; Development and Conservation of Natural Resources; Health and Sanitation; Hospitals and Institutions for the Handicapped; Charities; Corrections; Schools; Libraries; Recreation; and Public Service Enterprises. Each office, agency, or institution is presented in terms of seven essential factors: a legal basis; date of creation; authorization; organization; method of financing; duties; and status. A valuable appendix accounts for agencies which have been

abolished or whose functions have been transferred to existing or newly organized agencies.—DAVID WILBUR KNEPPER.

In his *Police Records; Their Installation and Use* (Public Administration Service, pp. xxiv, 336, $6.00), O. W. Wilson has prepared a practical and useful handbook for police departments. The author has drawn upon his own career in police work as administrator, professor, and consultant, and upon the experience of other police administrators in presenting the fundamental principles of a complete records system and the manner in which such records operate. The records system described is intended to be sufficiently flexible to permit its adaptation to the needs of departments, large and small. The need for such records and their various uses in police activities and in planning operations are set forth with clarity and precision. Numerous forms, charts, and tables are given in the text and appendices. Police departments will find this volume an invaluable guide and reference.—FRANK M. STEWART.

Harry N. Holmes' *Strategic Materials and National Strength* (Macmillan Co., pp. 106) is a brief statement concerning the sources and uses of various materials vital to the war effort. The treatment is confined to the situation of the United States at the present time, and the facts presented are almost commonplace. The author's few excursions into the realm of opinion reveal gross over-simplification, as when he indicates (p. 31) that electric power means victory via aluminum and bombers, and (p. 61) that the daily production of 150,000 barrels of isooctane spells victory. Moreover, his nostrum for the future—the establishment of permanent stockpiles under the guidance of scientists elected by their peers in the learned societies—seems to be of questionable worth. The book was probably designed for popular consumption rather than for academic use.—VERNON VAN DYKE.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Truth About Soviet Russia (Longmans, Green and Co., pp. 128, $1.50), by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, is a compilation of reprints: an essay by G. B. Shaw on the Webbs, the slightly modified introduction to the 1941 edition of *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, the constitution of the U.S.S.R. as translated by "the most knowledgeable American student of Soviet Communism," Anna Louise Strong, plus an interesting new postscript in which the Webbs have created a Bill of Rights and Duties of Man based on the Russian constitution. The avowed purpose of the book is to help overcome the hostility of a section of the ruling class in England to the internal structure of Russia in order that there may be

true coöperation among the leaders of the United Nations in working out the peace settlement. The seventy-page introductory essay admirably summarizes the authors' main theses, which are substantially the same as when their volumes on Russia were first published in 1936. There is still the great reliance on the letter of the constitution; Russia is a political democracy; Stalin is not a dictator, but a prime minister like Churchill; the one-party system is justified because the people have not yet been educated to accept the values of the new order; the great amount of self-criticism provides a democratic phenomenon unknown to any other country. The treason trials are accepted at face value. Russia's popularly elected legislative bodies are mentioned, but more appraisal of the part played by "legislative government" over against "executive government" would have resulted in a truer evaluation of political democracy as it has existed in the country. To mitigate Russian practices, the old device of pointing out the shortcomings of Western democracies is resorted to. This is salutary, but does not necessarily add weight on the Russian side of the balance. The Webbs would find less criticism of their point of view, and they would be on surer ground, if they would be content to maintain that Russia is constructing a New Civilization, but did not attempt to harmonize or to burden, as you will, this civilization with all the political methods and values of democracy.—E. C. HELMREICH.

W. E. Simnett, the author of *The British Colonial Empire* (W. W. Norton and Co., pp. 255, $3.00), is an experienced British "good will" lecturer. His avowed purpose here is to give a bird's-eye view of the dependent portions of the British Empire except for India and Burma. In fact, he presents little more than an airplane view at great height and high speed. About half the book is devoted to the various colonies, treated in turn according to geographical distribution. The remainder covers central and local administration, other colonial systems, policies, and problems. Each colony's history is glanced at, followed by a few words on geography, climate, products, and the particular variety of government it has been given. All this is done in so sketchy a fashion that a good atlas, together with a book like A. B Keith's *The Governments of the British Empire*, would provide more information on most points. Although the author claims to be an impartial critic, the book's plain tendency is to whitewash British colonial administration. Its admirable features are emphasized and the others ignored. For example, several pages are devoted to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, while no mention is made of such criticisms as those contained in the articles by Barnes and Laski in the special Empire number of *The Political Quarterly*, October–December, 1938. Again, a page or so is given to a discussion of each of several problems such as nutrition and standards of living, but the serious labor

troubles in the West Indies and various independence movements are no more than hinted at. There is no treatment of the problem of Anglo-United States coöperation in the West Indies, nor any mention of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. The book contains an index and a nineteen-page bibliography of limited usefulness excluding most works that are sharply critical of colonial policy. There is also an end map that suffers from too great reduction, and a chart showing the framework of government in the typical colony.—MORLEY AYEARST.

Troubled Anglo-Irish affairs deserve more than an incidental consideration as a part of the history of England or Ireland. In writing *Britain and Ireland* (Longmans, Green and Co., pp. 96, $0.20), Nicholas Mansergh performs a real service, for Anglo-Irish relations are his chief and only concern. In objectively considering, in the following order of emphasis, the political, economic, and religious quarrels, the author makes plain the psychological differences between the English and the Irish which have intensified misunderstandings and made satisfactory settlement all but impossible. Expediency, which was the English approach to the Irish question, ignored abstract political ideals, national rights, and symbols of sovereignty which means so much to Irishmen. The first four chapters recreate the impact of successive waves of English settlement upon the rich cultural and religious heritage of Ireland. The period from the Act of Union in 1800 to Dominion status in 1921—years in which relations rose to a crescendo of troubles as the Liberals, Conservatives, and Irish (National and Sinn Fein) parties tried their "solutions"—constitutes the central third of this booklet. The concluding chapters show that Irishmen possess "a real political capacity," that a besetting problem still remains in Northern Ireland, and that "the differences of inner conviction between Great Britain and Eire on so fundamental an issue as that involved in this war may well widen the psychological gulf between the two countries in the future."—JOHN A. PERKINS.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

A small volume, printed in a dignified and pleasing manner, is *Problems of Hemispheric Defense* (University of California Press, pp. 139, cloth $1.50, paper $1.00), containing five lectures delivered under the auspices of the Committee on International Relations at the University of California in September and October, 1941: "Inter-American Trade and Hemispheric Solidarity," by John B. Condliffe; "The Axis Advance Guard in Latin America," by Russell H. Fitzgibbon; "Canada and Hemispheric Defense," by William H. Alexander; "Air Power and the Defense of the Americas," by Baldwin M. Woods; and "Whither Pan-Americanism?," by Herbert I. Priestley. The style is lively throughout

and there is considerably more unity than is usually found in a series of this character. This is all the more remarkable when one reflects that the lecturers represent the five diverse fields of economics, political science, Latin, mechanical engineering, and Mexican history, and that one (Condliffe) is an Australian by birth and New Zealander and English by education and another (Alexander) "lived most of his life in Canada." Much water has flowed under the bridge since the autumn of 1941, but there is much truth in many of the fundamental notions expressed in this volume that not even Pearl Harbor has been able to vitiate. For instance, Professor Condliffe, in simple words, states an obvious, but frequently overlooked, truth when he says: "There can be no fruitful trading relationships in a world where everyone wants to sell and no one wants to buy. The most advanced and powerful industrial and creditor countries have a special need to learn this lesson. The little countries cannot prosper unless they are able to find means of paying for the manufactures which the big powers are constantly struggling to sell them." In like manner, Professor Alexander calls our attention to the obvious with the words: "Canada is an American nation. The aegis of the Monroe Doctrine is spread above her as above every other American nation." This little volume will well repay the reader, for the problems of hemispheric defense have not been changed by the entry of the United States into the war.—HERBERT WRIGHT.

René Kraus's *Europe in Revolt* (Macmillan Co., pp. 563, $3.50) purports to present a rather detailed realistic picture of conditions in Nazi-occupied Europe. It is essentially a book of atrocity stories, presented as authentic facts. In its depiction of alleged Nazi practices and techniques for subjugating individuals, families, communities, cities, and peoples, it leaves little to the reader's imagination, though occasionally something is said to be "not fit to print." There is no documentation of sources, although the author indicates that he has relied heavily upon information supplied by the so-called "governments in exile," underground newspapers, various "information" agencies, and revelations from persons who have escaped from the occupied nations. The reader may be impressed by the wealth of intimate details assertedly possessed by the author concerning, and purportedly explaining, the development and behavior of literally scores of prominent Nazi and "Quisling" administrators and military men throughout Europe. Apparently, the author was not concerned with whether his work might be considered lacking in objectivity. His obvious purpose appears to be frankly to arouse animosity toward the Nazi régime and to rally sympathy and support for the peoples of the occupied lands. Some two-thirds of the book is devoted to describing conditions of hopeless degradation and blackest despair, mixed with deeds of great individual and community heroism. Then attention is given to somewhat

more hopeful aspects of the situation, the "underground" movements, the sabotage, the guerillas, the spirit of revolt, the "Sixth Column," upon which the author relies for powerful aid in driving the Nazis out, "when the Nazi army has to face invading armies" from the United Nations. "Inside Europe two hundred million slaves are prepared to take up arms . . . Europe's battered but unbeaten and unbroken nations wait, in desperate anxiety, for the signal from across the seas."—N. D. HOUGHTON.

In his careful study, *Strategy at Singapore* (Macmillan Co., pp. viii, 145, $2.50), Eugene H. Miller analyzes primarily the strategy involved in the construction of the great naval base rather than the Japanese attack upon it and its unsuccessful defense. As Captain W. D. Puleston says in his introduction, the book is "an accurate and stimulating account of the conception, construction, and destruction of the naval base at Singapore" (p. vii). The account of the capture of the base is in the last chapter (vii), which concludes with the sentences: "The island remains the most vital key to the control of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Domination of those seas constitutes an indispensable prerequisite of Allied victory" (p. 136). From these words it may be correctly concluded that the author accepts as valid the argument of those who, in the face of lethargy as well as active opposition, insisted that Singapore was the correct place among those under consideration for the major British naval base in the Southwestern Pacific area and that it should be rapidly completed for purposes of "Empire insurance." The argument for and against the immediate (in the 20's) construction of the base is so skillfully and carefully reviewed in Chapter III, "Political Considerations," that the reader is lifted back into the period of Covenant and Kellogg Pact and "collective security." This is a good thing, since it provides a stimulus to the review of older attitudes in the light of contemporary experience. In this connection it calls to mind what was then frequently forgotten, i.e., the rôle played by the Dominions in the development of British foreign policy. The technical considerations involved in the building of the base and its actual construction, together with various domestic and foreign reactions to it, are described in Chapters IV–VI. Some of the questions raised in the debate over Singapore, as summarized by the author, have been answered by the experience of the past year. Others still await a definitive answer. But in the future approach to an examination of similar situations, the student can learn much from *Strategy at Singapore*.—HAROLD M. VINACKE.

The formulation of British foreign policy has long been a somewhat informal process for which published evidence has had to be sought laboriously in a constantly swelling stream of biographies. Mr. R. V. Langford now saves the searcher much of this labor with his *British*

Foreign Policy; Its Formulation in Recent Years (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, pp. x, 226, paper, $2.75, cloth, $3.25). This book concentrates on policy formulation and leaves to others the content of that policy, the factors that determine it, and the machinery through which it is executed. It ranges over the period 1870–1939. It gives some eight hundred references to published documents. And it groups its material under such headings as "the monarch," "the cabinet," "the foreign secretary," "the prime minister." It is an interesting and convenient compilation. It of course contains no original information or any hitherto unpublished opinions. Its value would have been enhanced if its touch had been more sure when constitutional principle or recent foreign policy are concerned. It is a pity that it throws little light on the trends and changes that must presumably have occurred in the past seventy years; for the British constitution has been far from rigid. In particular, it omits all discussion of the emergent inner cabinet, and it seems to look askance at the informal concentration of responsibility in any group smaller than the cabinet as a whole. It is useful for refreshing the reader's memories of the published past, and provoking him to go back to the original documents to make quite sure what really did occur. With a little supplementing from unpublished sources, and some reinterpreting in the light of present trends, it could be used also to pave the way for an analysis of 1942 practice and of possible future developments.—W. HARDY WICKWAR.

The major argument of Henry Bamford Parke's *The World After War* (Thomas Y. Crowell, pp. 240, $2.50) is that the primary task of any peace conference must be to make war impossible, and that "those nations who make the peace settlement must retain an overwhelming superiority of power over any nation who might wish to change it, and must be willing, if necessary, to use it." Written for popular consumption, the first half of the book contains a brief review of international developments from Versailles to Pearl Harbor and a short survey of the foreign policy of the United States. Drawing from this the conclusions that isolationism is both impracticable and inconsistent with American traditions, the author next examines and rejects proposals for a revived League of Nations, for Federal Union, for European Federation, and for regional federations. His emphasis is on power politics instead of on "utopian thinking [which] is lazy thinking." The justification for his disregard of social implications of the war and for dismissing Henry Wallace's speeches with a phrase is his belief that there can be no progress except after security is achieved. And this last depends on a *pax Americana*, with Britain collaborating and China and Russia acquiescing.—DAVID O. WALTER.

In *American Agencies Interested in International Affairs* (Council on

Foreign Relations, pp. 200, $2.00), Ruth Savord has compiled a directory of some 450 American agencies dealing with international affairs. Descriptive details concerning each agency, supplied by the agency itself, are given. There is a subject index, as well as a list of dormant organizations and a list of commercial organizations in the United States representing other countries. This is a handy reference book for information concerning freedom movements, university institutes on world affairs, foundations, propaganda societies of all kinds, post-war planning associations, learned societies, etc.—GORDON SKILLING.

Fawn M. Brodie's *Peace Aims and Post-War Planning* (World Peace Foundation, pp. 53, $0.25) is a selected and annotated bibliography of 100 books, together with pamphlets and articles, published in the United States and England between 1939 and July, 1942. It was not intended to be comprehensive and is devoted chiefly to studies of planning on an international scale. Brief descriptive notes on each item include some critical comment and are very helpful.—GORDON SKILLING.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MISCELLANEOUS

Students of political theory are greatly indebted to Frederick A. von Hayek's resurrection from the ancient files of the weekly *Examiner* of a series of articles written by John Stuart Mill at the age of twenty-five, under the general title, *The Spirit of the Age* (University of Chicago Press, pp. xxxiii, 94, $1.50). There were five papers in all, published between January and May, 1831, at a time of revolutionary ferment throughout Europe, and on the eve of the Great Reform Bill. In a lucid and informative introductory essay, Professor Hayek describes the state of Mill's thought and education at that stage of his life, and particularly the impact upon his mind of the ideas of the Saint-Simonians and Comte. Mill thought that the society of his day was in a period of transition, of which the first overt manifestation was the French Revolution. As a transitional age, it was characterized by a desire for novelty, a disregard for the authority of the past and of old men, and by sharp divisions among the instructed, as a result of which the uninstructed had lost their faith in them. A "natural" state of society, by contrast, is one in which the opinions and feelings of the people are, with their willing acquiescence, formed for them by the most cultivated minds of the times; it is a stable society because it has received doctrines. There are several rather purple passages in the essay dealing with the intellectual and moral decay of the wealthy classes, which had, in Mill's opinion, lost the capacity for government. All in all, this essay contributes to a fuller understanding of Mill, and gives rise to reflections about our own society, which is certainly of a transitional character.—DAVID FELLMAN.

Not content with his own attack upon Our Enemy the State, Albert Jay Nock has enlisted Herbert Spencer in the campaign against 'Statism.' He has edited *The Man versus the State* (Caxton Press, pp. xiv, 213, $2.00), which first appeared in book form in 1884, and has long been out of print. To the original essays—"The New Toryism," "The Coming Slavery," "The Sins of Legislators," and "The Great Political Superstition"—have been added two others, "From Freedom to Bondage," and "Over-Legislation." These are welcomed, for in them more than in the others Spencer uses his sociological approach and his biological analogy. Mr. Nock has not encumbered the essays with editorial impedimenta; and in his eight-page Introduction he limits himself to pointing the parallel he finds between English development before 1884 and American misbehavior since 1932. Had the volume been published in 1942 instead of 1940, Mr. Nock might not have stressed Spencer's prophetic insight nor have written that "in Britain . . . the citizen is [now] on a footing of complete and abject State-slavery." But scholars will be grateful to him for providing in handy and accessible form the essential elements of Spencerian individualism.—ALLAN F. SAUNDERS.

Students of contemporary political theory and comparative government will welcome Michael Oakeshott's *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe* (Macmillan Co., pp. xxiii, $2.75), published now in an American edition after having appeared in English editions of 1939 and 1941. It is a volume which illustrates, says Ernest Barker, who contributes a foreword, "in authentic and original texts, the tenets of the main schools." Those schools embrace Representative Democracy, Catholicism, Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism; and selections from the writings of such men as Mill, De Tocqueville, Lincoln, T. H. Green, Leo XIII, Marx, Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler are included. Constitutions and statutes are called upon to furnish other illustrative material—for example, many sections of the Irish constitution of 1937 and the Soviet constitution of 1936 are quoted, as well as the texts of several statutes passed in National Socialist Germany. Professor Frederic A. Ogg writes a brief preface for each of the five sections. The volume is of value because it brings together in convenient form excerpts from writings which are indispensable for an understanding of modern thought; although many of us, including the writer, will doubtless much prefer to use the complete originals.—MULFORD Q. SIBLEY.

In the fourth volume of his *History of Modern Liberty*, which covers *The Struggle with the Stuarts, 1647–1689* (Longmans, Green, and Co., pp. xiii, 523, $6.40), Professor James MacKinnon returns to the narrative of the English revolutionary period which he unfortunately left unfinished

after the publication of his third volume in 1908. In spite of the apparent promise of the title of his series, Professor MacKinnon confines himself almost exclusively to political history, and gives far more space to narrative than to analysis; but a reader concerned with the general "anatomy of revolutions," or with the development of the English constitution, will find much to interest him in this lucid, detailed, and judicious account. Professor MacKinnon writes with an authority derived from an intimate knowledge of the sources, which he quotes generously; his conclusions at several points (e.g., his interpretation of Cromwell) differ somewhat from those of other historians. The present reviewer regrets that the two chapters on the principal political theorists of the period, which conclude the volume, are rather perfunctory: Professor MacKinnon seems more concerned to point out their shortcomings as historians than to evaluate their insight into the permanent problems of political obligation or to relate them to the long tradition of speculation from which both absolutists and constitutionalists derive.—JOHN D. LEWIS.

Alexander Meiklejohn's *Education Between Two Worlds* (Harper and Brothers, pp. 291, $3.00) is a challenging analysis of educational theory, not merely in the abstract, but in terms of the immediate cultural crisis in which the modern world is involved. The author, in Book I, "Protestant-Capitalist Education," examines the educational philosophies of Comenius, John Locke, and Matthew Arnold, to show that the control of education has largely passed from the church to the state. "The Problem of Reconstruction" (Book II) presents Rousseau as the first of the moderns, for he suggested the possibility of a non-theological civilization which can carry on the work of morality and of intelligence. Criticism, caustic and consistent, occurs in the analysis of "The Pragmatic Episode; A Study of John Dewey" (Book III), who had "a passion for democracy, but no theory of it" (p. 193). Finally, Meiklejohn considers "The Social Contract as Basis of Education" (Book IV). "The final goal would be the creation of a world state in which the appeal to reason would have replaced the resort to violence in the relations of all men to one another" (p. 277). He reaches the conclusion that we know what teaching is only as we see and feel what the free spirit of man is trying to do and to be.—MONA FLETCHER.

Twenty-nine topics for research are outlined in the eighty-nine pages of the *Research in Judicial Administration* number of the Committee on Public Administration's series of Research Outlines. Of these research topics, the great majority pose significant problems as well as statistical techniques. This is notably true of such topics as "Judicial Selection and Qualifications," "Appeals from Administrative Agencies," and "The

Jury Trial as a Fact-Determining Device." At the other extreme, a few topics are presented without much of any indication of their significance. Thus "Judicial Statistical Systems and Their Use" and "Costs of Judicial Administration and Their Distribution" emphasize the desirability of "gathering the facts" without adequate suggestion of a problem. In the main, however, the Committee is to be congratulated on securing an admirable combination of problem-setting and quantitative methodology. Incidentally there is no allocation of credit for topic number 26, "Appellate Practice and Procedure."—KENNETH C. COLE.

In his work entitled *From Barter to Slavery* (*Johns Hopkins University Studies*, series LX, no. 1, pp. 160, $1.50), Alexander Marchant presents, against a background of early Brazilian history, a detailed account of the relations of the Portuguese with the Indians from 1500 to 1580. He describes the social condition of the aborigines, the system of barter with them employed by the Portuguese, and the importance of the trade in brazilwood. He discusses not only the use of the barter system by the donatories, but also the effects upon that system of the establishment of royal governors, and the employment of Indians and Negroes as slaves. This scholarly study, which contains useful bibliographical notes, is a welcome addition to the works concerning colonial Portuguese America.—WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF POLITICAL INTEREST

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CLYDE F. SNIDER

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